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This thesis seeks to explain why the resource curse did not take hold in Botswana despite its 
diamond deposits. Drawing on a case study of Botswana, the thesis uses a historical 
institutional approach (state centralisation, the rule of law and property rights) and found that 
a significant degree of state centralisation and inclusive institutions – as evidenced through 
enforcement of law and property rights – laid the foundation for the Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) to emerge at independence as a centralised authority. It was this authority which 
























In hierdie tesis word uiteengesit waarom die vloek op hulpbronne nie ten spyte van die 
diamantneerslae in Botswana vastrapplek gekry het nie. Op grond van ‘n gevallestudie van 
Botswana, gebruik die proefskrif ‘n historiese institusionele benadering (staatsentralisasie, die 
oppergesag van die reg en eiendomsreg). Daar is bevind dat ‘n beduidende mate van 
staatsentralisasie en inklusiewe instellings – soos blyk uit die handhawing van wetgewing en 
eiendomsreg – die grondslag vir die Botswana Demokratiese Party (BDP) gelê het om na 
onafhanklikheid as ‘n gesentraliseerde owerheid na vore te kom. Dit was hierdie owerheid wat 
Botswana bygestaan het in die suksesvolle bestuur van diamante en sodoende die 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Botswana is hailed as the “sparkling diamond” of Africa (Herrmann, 2019).  A statement which 
in many ways is as correct as it is apt. Similarly, the country is otherwise referred to as the 
most stable in Africa, one of the most “homogenous countries” as well as one of the “fastest-
growing countries in the world” with the “highest per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 453, 450). While much of Botswana’s success can be attributed 
to its diamond wealth, it is arguably therein which Botswana’s greatest achievement lies – 
avoiding all symptoms of the resource curse which has captured and enslaved the majority of 
resource-abundant post-colonial African nations. It is precisely this question which the thesis 
seeks to address – how was Botswana able to escape the resource curse? 
 
The resource curse has evolved over the last few decades but has come to encompass any and 
all negative impacts arising from a country having resources. These negative impacts typically 
take the form of poor economic performance, high corruption, poverty and unemployment 
levels, below average service delivery and infrastructure, regime types with more authoritarian 
tendencies and even conflict and civil war. Countries that have fallen victim to this curse 
include Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leone and South Sudan to name a few. However, just because 
a country is rich in resources, does not mean that it will experience a resource curse and 
Botswana is a prime example.  
 
Botswana has an abundance of resources, especially diamonds, good, inclusive political and 
economic institutions and an embedded sense of democracy since independence. After the 
discovery of diamonds, its GDP and economy grew exponentially, and it has been able to invest 
diamond revenue in infrastructure and development which has been beneficial for the country. 
Botswana is one of the least corrupt countries according to corruption world indices, whose 
elites have refrained themselves from entering the diamond industry, unlike those in the 
aforementioned resource-abundant countries. It is therefore evident that Botswana has not 
experienced many negative impacts as a result of their diamond resources and therefore have 




The question now is how did they manage to escape it when so many of their resource-abundant 
African counterparts have not? Essentially this is because Botswana is unique which can be 
attributed to a number of factors. These factors include the culture of the Tswana people in the 
pre-colonial period including their institutional structures. Limited colonisation from the 
British was arguably one of the most significant factors as it enabled the culture and structures 
of the Tswana in the pre-colonial period to survive the time of colonisation and emerge once 
again at independence which provided a solid structure on which modern Botswana was built. 
Lastly, effective and democratic leadership under Seretse Khama at independence proved 
invaluable for the country as it propelled the country to ‘African miracle’ status due to its 
peaceful transition of power, shining democracy, fair leadership and vast diamond deposits 
which turned the country’s struggling economy into a booming one thanks to the partnership 
with the mining company, De Beers.  
 
This thesis sets out to explore the factors briefly mentioned above in greater depth in order to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of how Botswana escaped the resource curse. In so 
doing, the thesis will demonstrate how the nature of a centralised authority entrenched in 
Tswana culture combined with inclusive Tswana political and economic institutions (as 
evidenced by the enforcement of rules and property rights) was able to persist throughout the 
colonial period due to limited colonial influence from the British and create a foundation of a 
centralised authority at independence with relatively inclusive institutions. It was this 
foundation on which the BDP were able to emerge and rise with a sufficient enough level of 
centralised power and reasonably inclusive institutions which enabled them to manage the 
discovery of diamonds effectively, leading to diamonds having a positive impact and Botswana 
thereby escaping the resource curse.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
How did Botswana escape the resource curse? 
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to explain how Botswana was able to avoid the resource 
curse despite the majority of resource curse literature suggesting that due to its diamond 
resources, it should fall victim to the curse. This study therefore dispels the common notion 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3 
that a resource-abundant country will be cursed by their resources and delves into a different 
area of resource study – institutional theory – which argues that the institutions of a country 
determine whether resources will be a blessing or a curse and not simply the possessing of 
resources alone.  
 
In addition, this study seeks to contribute to resource curse and institutional theory. Much has 
been explored about the resource curse between the 1980s and early 2000s, however, since 
then fewer scholars have contributed to the field. Resources play a pivotal role not only in 
countries which have them, but also in manufacturing and economies of all countries 
throughout the world which is why this study has been conducted in order to enhance 
contemporary resource curse literature.  
 
Lastly, resource curse literature is often conducted from an economic perspective. This 
research therefore seeks to offer a contrast to such literature by providing a political science 
approach to resource curse literature which may serve to enrich the literature and contribute an 
alternative perspective.  
 
1.4 Preliminary Contextualisation 
 
Resource curse theory has existed formally since the mid-twentieth century, but in reality, has 
existed as long as resources themselves. Prior to 1980, resources were always viewed as having 
a positive impact - being able to strengthen the state and transform it from a state of 
underdevelopment to “industrial take-off” (Rostow, 1961). Commonly cited examples of this 
theory include the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, whose resources benefited 
the countries greatly, arguably propelling them to the first-world, economic powerhouse 
statuses that they enjoy today. However, this notion of resources being a blessing was 
overtaken. 
 
Come the 1980s, resources were soon to be known as a death sentence as scholars and even 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank began to 
view resource-abundant countries as having a far higher chance of experiencing economic 
downturns, political unrest and poor social development (Rosser, 2006: 7). Indeed, increasing 
numbers of scholars began studying the negative impacts of resources, finding that resource-
abundant countries are at a much greater risk of becoming rentier states – in which the state 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
relies only on income from resources and therefore no longer requires income from taxation 
and stops being accountable to citizens (Ross, 2013: 4). In addition, a commonly held theory 
is that countries rich in resources are likely to fall victim to the Dutch Disease – a phenomenon 
in which the country struggles to diversify its economy away from its resource sector and 
thereafter battles to maintain a competitive manufacturing sector which is ultimately to their 
detriment (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001: 3).  
 
There are the three fields under which the majority of resource curse literature can be classified: 
poor economic performance, conflict and civil war and lastly, a change in political regime type 
– namely, authoritarianism. The first of which argues that the reason why resources have a 
negative impact is because they lead to low economic performance in countries which have 
them. In other words, countries with resources are more likely to experience a mismanagement 
of funds, poor GDP and economic growth, minimal economic development and a lack of 
investment in infrastructure among other economic indicators. Many scholars argue that this is 
due to a lack of accountability and the corruption which ensues from that, as well as looting or 
lack of economic diversification which can result in damaging economic fluctuations if the 
resource industry is volatile as is seen commonly in oil rich countries.  
 
Additionally, a resource-abundant country is also more likely to experience conflict. 
Essentially, the resources of a country are able to be exploited by various groups in the country 
which can exacerbate tribal or political tensions and result in civil war as was the case in Sierra 
Leone. This is particularly relevant in resource rich countries which have lootable resources 
and can be found in various areas of the country as this makes them harder for the government 
and mining companies to control and can thus easily be looted and used to fund individual 
groups who use them to gain power. Importantly another major issue of resources is that they 
tend to increase the value of remaining in power which can lead to conflict as leaders attempt 
to suppress opposition.  
 
Not only do attempts to remain in power in resource-abundant countries result in conflict, they 
also go hand-in-hand with increasing authoritarianism in a bid to hold onto power and wealth. 
Leaders crack down on their opponents as well as their people in order to prevent uprisings 
which could overthrow them and thus adopt more authoritarian measures as a way of 
maintaining control. This is confirmed by Wantchekon who found that a 1% dependence on 
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resources, results in an almost 8% increase in likelihood of implementing authoritarian 
practices (Wantchekon, 1999).  
 
While poor economic performance, conflict and authoritarian tendencies have arisen in many 
resource-abundant countries and have certainly impacted them negatively, there is another 
school of thought which has delved deeper into the workings of the resource curse and found 
that institutions play a larger role than initially thought. According to institutional theory or the 
‘institutions curse’ as argued by Menaldo, resources themselves do not result in countries 
experiencing the above negative impacts, but rather it is the institutions they possess which 
determine whether the outcome of such resource deposits will be positive or negative 
(Menaldo, 2016). 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson confirm this theory as they emphasise the quality of institutions as 
playing a role in not only the success of resource rich countries, but in the overall success of 
any country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Indeed, Acemoglu and Robinson go so far as to 
argue that institutions are the reason why some nations fail, and others enjoy enormous success 
and that without even partially inclusive institutions, that country will fail to succeed. This 
thesis will use the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail in this evaluation 
of how Botswana managed to escape the resource curse, using it to explain just how vital a role 
Botswana’s institutions coupled with its degree of state centralisation have played in its 
diamond success.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
 
This research is a qualitative study with a historical institutional approach using the framework 
of Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail. Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework has 
been used because they provide a good institutional base in their book on which to analyse 
Botswana as a case study. Similarly, the historical, explanatory approach was chosen as it 
provides a fuller and more qualitative understanding of some of the more human aspects and 
explanations as to how Botswana was able to overcome the resource curse such as culture and 
tribal structures.  
 
The nature of the quantitative approach is that it lends itself to making more generalisations 
with regards to studies and offers a less in-depth analysis. Alternatively, the greatest strength 
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of a qualitative, case study is that it provides detailed, specific analysis with a very limited 
scope for generalisations. Hence, the case study, qualitative approach being used for this 
research on Botswana.  
 
This method of research has however, been criticised for being potentially biased as it only 
refers to one case instead of a multitude of cases (Yin, 2009). While this is a possibility, this 
research has been taken from a wide range of sources and has attempted to provide critique 
where possible in order to ensure the quality and efficacy of the findings.   
 
There are four main independent variables of this study. The first of which is Tswana culture 
and the institutional structure of the Tswana tribes prior to the colonial period. The degree to 
which the state is centralised is the second independent variable, followed by the extent to 
which the rule of law and subsequently, property rights, is enforced. The dependent variable is 
the resource curse and whether it did or did not occur is subject to the independent variables. 
The study will focus on how the independent variables converged to place Botswana in a 




Analysing Botswana as a single case study can be somewhat limiting in regards to findings. 
This is because the findings are unique to Botswana and cannot necessarily be applied to other 
resource-abundant countries that do not have very similar historical and current factors to 
Botswana. Therefore, the findings do not provide a broad overview of all countries with 
resources.  
 
There are very few recent articles on resources in Botswana since much was written about them 
in the late 20th century and due to their resources having had a positive impact for so long, new 
research has been focused on other elements of the country. However, in overcoming this 
limitation, the thesis has reviewed recent studies on countries which have experienced a 
resource curse to serve as a comparison to Botswana. Such comparisons reinforce the analysis 
on Botswana as they highlight the manner in which Botswana’s factors were unique, which 







1.7.1 Literature Review 
 
Chapter 2 considers the findings of the most prominent scholars from the latter half of the 
twentieth century with a particular focus on literature after 1980. This is because the resource 
curse was only coined after 1980 as prior to that period, resources were generally viewed as 
being beneficial to resource-abundant countries. Thereafter, the literature review considers the 
three primary ways in which resources are negative: poor economic performances, conflict and 
civil war and a tendency towards authoritarian regimes. Lastly, the chapter will look at an 
alternative to the resource curse, the institutions curse and show how that could potentially be 
a better, more accurate measure of the impacts of resources. 
 
1.7.2 Analytical Framework 
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of Acemoglu and Robinson’s historical institutional approach 
and why the fate of nations are so inherently tied with institutions. Their approach has received 
significant coverage and debate in the field and is one of the reasons why it was used in this 
research. The chapter therefore goes on to argue why Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework is 
a good standard by which to measure Botswana in terms of institutions and the importance of 
them in relation to resources. Thereafter, the chapter sets out a guideline on how to measure 
institutions such as through the degree of state centralisation and the enforcement of the rule 
of law and property rights.  
 
1.7.3 Emergence of a Central Authority and Inclusive Institutions 
 
Chapter 4 provides a direct look at how the Botswana state was able to emerge as a central 
authority and what that degree of state centralisation enabled it to do. This is done by analysing 
the Tswana culture of authority surrounding chiefs and tribes in the pre-colonial and colonial 
period which indicate a strong sense and respect for a central authority. The chapter also 
evaluates the extent to which rules and property rights were enforced in pre-colonial and 
colonial Botswana by way of reviewing the legal system, land and cattle rights, trade and 
economic participation. This chapter shows that due to limited colonial influence, the degree 
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of state centralisation and inclusive institutions laid the foundations for the BDP to arise at 
independence as a central authority with relatively inclusive institutions. 
 
1.7.4 Consolidation of Power Under the BDP 
 
Chapter 5 recognises that it is the long-accepted notion of a centralised authority with 
embedded inclusive institutions which persisted throughout the colonial period and emerged at 
independence which allowed for the BDP to rule. This chapter thereafter considers the rule of 
the BDP, the leadership of Seretse Khama and his predecessors as well as their role in 
maintaining a degree of centralised authority and relatively inclusive institutions. The chapter 
indicates that leaders of the BDP have continued to centralise power and enforce relatively 
inclusive institutions with the exception of Ian Khama, who’s authoritarian tendencies have 
somewhat jeopardised the inclusivity of the country’s institutions. 
 
1.7.5 Impact of Institutional Development and Management of Diamond Revenue 
 
Chapter 6 argues that due to the centralised authority of the BDP and the persistence of 
relatively inclusive institutions at independence, the BDP was not only able to rise up, but was 
able to effectively manage the discovery of diamonds which occurred shortly after the BDP 
came to power. The chapter also acknowledges the auspicious nature of the type of diamonds 
found in Botswana before recognising that by the BDP handling the discovery of diamonds 
well, their revenue was able to be used for beneficial purposes such as investment in 
infrastructure, economic sectors and overall social and economic development. Additionally, 
due to the centralised power of the BDP and existence and relatively inclusive institutions, the 
BDP was also able to manage the creative destruction which arose from diamond revenue, 
effectively. This chapter also concedes that while diamonds have had a positive impact on the 
country, Botswana still faces challenges such as HIV/AIDS, income inequality and 
unemployment as outlined in section 6.6. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that the BDP 
handled diamonds and the creative destruction from their revenue well which is why diamonds 









Chapter 7 consolidates the core factors outlined throughout the study and indicates that the 
BDP was able to emerge at independence due to the foundations of an entrenched notion of 
centralised authority and deeply embedded inclusive institutions which allowed them to 
manage the discovery of diamonds and the creative destruction which arose from diamond 




























The evolution of the Resource Curse has spanned the better half of the 20th century and 
continues to be debated widely to this day. In order to establish a comprehensive understanding 
of the resource curse, it is important to analyse its development through the years – evaluating 
the stances of different economists and political scientists and the manner in which they have 
built upon the theory which came before them. This section will demonstrate exactly how 
resources, which began as a blessing, completely reversed to becoming a curse in the majority 
of countries “blessed” with those resources. According to prominent scholars in the field, there 
are three reasons why resources are a curse – they lead to poor economic performance, are 
linked to conflict and civil war and thirdly, are correlated with low levels of democracy and 
poor development. This section will evaluate these three stances, outlining the various 
arguments for each reason and analysing its validity in relation to real life case studies. While 
exploring resources as a curse with regards to low levels of democracy, this section will also 
evaluate institutions as a vital part of this reason – referring to the Acemoglu and Robinson 
framework, considering counter arguments for the resource curse and analysing the ways in 
which the curse can be overcome.  
 
2.2 Resources are Good Prior to the 1980s 
 
Prior to the 1980s, a country’s endowment of resources was largely seen as a blessing. 
Resources were advantageous and could be used to further development and prosperity for 
countries lucky enough to possess them as had been the case in the United States of America, 
Britain and Australia (Rostow, 1961). According to geographer Norton Ginsburg, countries 
blessed with “sizeable and diversified” natural resources are in a position of significant 
advantage so far as economic growth is concerned (cited in Higgins, 1968: 222). This view 
was held by the majority of economists at this time, including Viner and Lewis in the 1950s, 
followed by Rostow who went so far as to argue that the ability of developing countries to 
transform from underdevelopment to “industrial take-off” can be attributed to their endowment 
of natural resources (Rostow, 1961). Continuing into the early 1980s, resources remained a 
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blessing in the eyes of the majority of economists. One such economist, Balassa, even argued 
that natural resources provide domestic markets and investible funds which facilitates 
industrial development (Balassa, 1980: 2). It must be noted that in the early 1950s, opposition 
to the commonly held view of resources being a blessing was raised by Singer and Prebisch 
who insisted that reliance on natural resource exports placed developing countries at a 
disadvantage due to the volatile nature of international commodity markets and the structure 
of the global economy (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1950). However, this view was not as 
commonly held, and the majority viewed resources as a blessing.  
 
2.3 Resources are Bad After 1980  
 
Resources remained a blessing until the 1980s, when new literature suggested that resources 
were no longer beneficial for resource abundant countries, but rather, posed a threat to these 
countries in the form of economic downturn and stunted development. Widely accepted by 
scholars as well as international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, is the stance 
that countries abundant in resources are likely to “experience negative economic, political and 
social outcomes including poor economic performance, low levels of democracy and civil war” 
(Rosser, 2006: 7). Interestingly, this idea of resources causing more harm than benefit, is no 
contemporary notion, but rather one traced as far back as the fathers of modern Political and 
Economic thought– Machiavelli, Adam Smith and David Ricardo. According to modern 
philosophers such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Bodin, citizens of countries with an 
abundance of natural resources become “myopic and slothful” (Ross, 2013: 3). In The Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith outlines the pursuit of mineral wealth as a perilous endeavour, 
cautioning that such ventures prove costly and uncertain, thrusting bankruptcy on the majority 
of those who embark upon it (Smith, 1776 (1991, volume IV, chapter 7, section 18). 
Consequently, Smith describes the pursuit of gold and silver mining as the most hazardous of 
these enterprises, claiming that these are projects of which a prudent law-giver, anxious to 
increase capital in his nation, would steer clear (Smith, 1776 (1991, volume IV, chapter 7, 
section 18). 
 
The notion of mineral mining posing both social and economic threats to society, is not held 
by Adam Smith alone, but rather is supported by many economists including David Ricardo, 
who went so far as to build upon Smith’s claim. In On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, Ricardo observes Spain and Portugal as the leading producers of gold and silver in 
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Europe, discovering that despite their mineral prestige, this increase in precious metals has 
neither boosted annual produce, nor improved the manufacturing and agricultural sectors of 
the countries, nor has it alleviated the poor circumstances of its people (Ricardo, 1817 (1911, 
chapter 28, paragraph 10). Instead, as Ricardo points out, Spain and Portugal – the countries in 
possession of the mines – are the “two most beggarly countries in Europe” (Ricardo, 1817 
(1911, chapter 28, paragraph 10). This supports the argument that resources can have perverse 
consequences.  
 
One such perverse consequence is the development of the rentier state. The concept of the 
rentier state was revived in the early 1970s by Middle Eastern scholars in an attempt to describe 
the oil-producing governments’ abnormal qualities (Ross, 2013: 3). The modern meaning of 
the rentier state can be attributed to Mahdavy, who describes it as a state receiving considerable 
rents from foreign governments, individuals or concerns (Mahdavy, 1970: 428). A more 
detailed definition is provided by Beblawi, who considers a rentier state as having rents paid 
by foreign actors which accrue directly to the state (Beblawi, 1987: 50). This type of state sees 
only a few involved in the generation of wealth (rents) and the majority engaged in the 
allocation and consumption of such rents (Beblawi, 1987: 50). Following their definitions of 
the rentier state, both Mahdavy and Beblawi argue that rentier states – governments funded by 
rents from foreign actors – are no longer bound by the need to raise taxes, rendering them 
unaccountable to their citizens and therefore unlikely to utilise these rents for economic 
development or the improvement of social infrastructure (Ross, 2013: 4). The concept of the 
rentier state is pivotal in the resource curse theory as it captures two of its most prominent 
claims – that resource rents diminish government accountability and harm economic growth. 
 
The experience of oil producing countries in the 1970s also gave clout to the arguments for 
why natural resources can have negative effects. Oil producing countries and exporters faced 
poor development prospects as a result of the first oil price shock in the 1970s (Stevens, Lahn 
& Kooroshy, 2015: 5). Similarly, the experience of the Netherlands in the 1970s, further 
entrenched concern over resources posing threats to growth and development by giving rise to 
the ‘Dutch Disease’ – a concept which essentially refers to the decreased development of other 
sectors in response to the increase in development of another sector as was the case in the 





2.4 Dutch Disease  
 
Originating from the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the 
discovery of the Groningen gas field in the 1970s, the term “Dutch Disease” was coined 
(Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 5). The Dutch Disease model was consequently constructed 
in the early 1980s by Cordon and Neary and was widely considered to be the resource curse’s 
most “prominent economic channel” (Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017: 130). This section will 
outline the Dutch Disease, providing an in-depth analysis of the concept and will subsequently, 
briefly consider some of the counter-arguments for the disease and evaluate each accordingly.  
 
Initially, the concept of the Dutch Disease was very particular. It referred exclusively to the 
situation in which the real exchange rate appreciates in response to increased inflation as a 
result of spending revenue from natural resources which appreciates the nominal exchange 
rate, leading to an “overheated” economy as the domestic currency attracts higher demand 
(Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 14). The non-resource sectors consequently contract and 
the output and revenue from the non-resource traded goods decreases (Fardmanesh, 1991: 712). 
Over time, the meaning of the concept has varied. From being considered a resource-rich 
country’s inability to sustain a competitive manufacturing sector to the Dutch Disease being 
known in a more general sense as all the negative macroeconomic effects related to the resource 
curse (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001: 3).    
 
To understand the Dutch Disease in further detail, it is important to break down the concepts 
of the “spending effect” as well as the “resource-movement effect”. According to Sachs and 
Warner and later, Gylfason, Frankel and a few others, the Dutch Disease appears when the 
boom from a natural resource increases domestic income, leading to a rise in the demand for 
goods (Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017: 131). As a result of this increase, inflation too, increases 
and the real exchange rate appreciates; leading to an increase in the price of non-resource 
commodities, making these non-resource commodities more expensive compared to the world 
market prices which decreases their competitiveness and the investment in them (Badeeb, Lean 
& Clark, 2017: 131). This negative impact as a result of growth in the resource-based industry 
is known as the “spending effect”. Related to the spending effect is the “resource-movement 
effect” which is when the resource sector flourishes and all mobile resources are taken out of 
the other non-resource sectors to put into the booming resource sector which leads to a 
contraction in the other sectors (Fardmanesh, 1991: 712). Sustaining growth in the resource 
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sector comes at the cost of contracting the other non-resource sectors as well as a loss in their 
competitiveness.  
 
The focus of the Dutch Disease on the non-resource sector is synonymous with manufacturing. 
The validity of this focus has been questioned in the past as many scholars have questioned 
whether a contraction in such a sector has detrimental consequences. According to Sachs and 
Warner, if “neo-classical competitive conditions prevail”, the country will be unaffected by the 
decline of that sector, however, in the majority of cases, the conditions do not prevail, and the 
country is victim to the Dutch Disease, experiencing “chronic slow growth” as a result of the 
manufacturing sector contracting (Sachs & Warner, 1997: 6). This is problematic as 
productivity growth is generally faster in the manufacturing sector due to “accelerated human 
capital accumulation from ‘learning by doing’” and a decline in such a sector, tends to decrease 
the demand for education as well as the incentive to invest in education in those countries 
(Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 15).  
 
Many authors have questioned the importance of the manufacturing sector on the economy. 
Nonetheless, it has been found that in natural resource intensive economies, the manufacturing 
and services sector experienced slow growth (Sachs & Warner, 1997: 26). This indicates that 
the manufacturing sector and how it is lead, is important as it can have negative impacts on 
resource-abundant countries.  
 
Another important question which has been debated is whether the Dutch Disease itself, is real? 
It has been argued that no “substantive evidence” pertaining to whether the Dutch Disease is a 
real phenomenon exists; and it was found that after the 1970s oil boom, the oil exporting 
countries: Nigeria, Algeria, Venezuela, Indonesia and Ecuador experienced an increase in their 
manufacturing sector and interestingly, a decrease in their agricultural sector (Fardmanesh, 
1991: 716). However, it must be noted that contrary to the Dutch Disease, these countries 
underwent significant exchange rate depreciation and an expansion of both their agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors; which was very unusual in respect to the majority of oil-exporting 
countries (Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 16). Similarly, data collected between 1975 and 
2007 on 135 countries, suggests that on average, as non-resource imports rose, non-resource 
exports reduced by 35-70% (Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 16). In addition, a 10% oil 
windfall was found to prompt a 3.4% decline in the manufacturing sector on average (Stevens, 
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Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 16). These studies indicate a negative effect on non-resource and 
manufacturing sectors which supports the Dutch Disease theory.  
 
Essentially, the Dutch Disease theory predicts that all countries with resources will suffer from 
negative effects relating to resources, i.e. the resource curse (Wick & Bulte, 2009: 143). 
However, Wick and Bulte argue that this is simply not true when taking into account the 
resource rich countries which did not experience Dutch Disease such as Botswana and 
Malaysia; and who argue instead, that Dutch Disease has a minor role in explaining the 
resource curse and should not be considered a prominent channel of the curse (Wick & Bulte, 
2009: 143).  
 
Another important point which Dutch Disease fails to consider is public savings. It appears the 
Dutch Disease model assumes that a country does not have sufficient public savings and that 
all revenue from resources is spent immediately, whereas in practice, a country with high rents 
from resources is most likely to have an increased public savings fund which can be used to 
overcome any contractions in the manufacturing sector (Wick & Bulte, 2009: 143). One of the 
few cases for which this argument would not stand is in the case of poor leadership and weak 
institutions where revenue from resources is often stolen, used to for personal gain or corrupt 
ventures. Perhaps it could be argued that not only could the validity of the resource curse as a 
theory, come down to institutions and leadership, but so too, could the validity of Dutch 
Disease depend upon it.  
 
It is evident that resource related literature, both political and economic, which arose in the 
1970s, possibly planted the seed, for the transformation in the conventional wisdom on 
resource literature which was to follow in the 1980s. Since the 1980s, the general consensus 
among scholars is that resources negatively impact development, aid in the provocation of civil 
war and conflict, diminish economic performance and pose a threat to democracy (Rosser, 
2006: 7). This consensus is arguably entirely opposite to conventional perspectives on 
resources prior to the 1980s.  
 
2.5 Defining the Resource Curse  
 
This negative perspective on natural resources has become so conventional that within a few 
years was labelled the “Resource Curse”. Coined in the early 1990s by Auty, the resource curse 
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refers to an inverse relationship between economic growth and the dependence on resources 
(Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017: 123). Auty discovered that the income per capita of countries 
with an abundance of natural resources grew three times more slowly than the income per 
capita of countries poor in resources (Auty, 2001: 3). Based on the findings of Auty and many 
other economists, Sachs and Warner embarked on a cross sectional study using a subset of 95 
countries to determine whether a negative relationship exists between economic growth and 
dependence on natural resources (Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017: 129). This study was one of 
the first scholarly works based on empirical evidence which proved “a clear negative 
correlation between natural resource-based exports and growth”, with only two countries rich 
in resources – Mauritius and Malaysia -  enjoying a 2% annual growth rate between 1970 and 
1980 (Sachs & Warner, 1997: 27). 
 
2.6 Resource Curse Analysis  
 
Given that the general overview of the evolution of scholarly perspectives on natural resources 
has been established, it is important to consider the following preliminary points prior to 
evaluating the literature produced by prominent scholars in the resource field. The first point 
to consider is that resource curse literature comprises three distinct sub-literatures – the impact 
of natural resource abundance on economic performance; the impact of natural resources on 
conflict and civil war and the impact of natural resource abundance on political regime type 
and democracy in particular (Rosser, 2006: 8). The second point to consider is that the concept 
of the resource curse was initially associated only with the first sub-literature - the impact of 
natural resources on economic performance - as this literature was developed prior to the other 
two sub-literatures (Rosser, 2006: 8). Since Auty’s initial definition of the resource curse, the 
literature on the impact of resources on civil war and regime type have subsequently expanded 
and developed (Rosser, 2006: 8). Thus, the “resource curse” has evolved into a more holistic 
term in recent years - essentially encompassing all negative impacts countries and citizens 
suffer as a result of their natural resource endowment.  
 
In addition to the literature being separated into sub-categories, it is also important to divide 
the literature. Firstly, into the impact of natural resources on economic performance, conflict 
and civil war and democracy and secondly, into the factors which cause natural resources to 
become a resource curse and analyse the arguments scholars have made for each. Subsequently, 
the analysis will follow this layout. 
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2.6.1 Resources Lead to Poor Economic Performance  
 
A significant number of scholars have focused on natural resource abundance in relation to 
economic performance and presented evidence suggesting that natural resource abundance is 
correlated with poor economic growth. One such scholar is Wheeler, who conducted a study 
among Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1970s and discovered that of the countries, those 
rich in minerals experienced slower economic growth than those without (Wheeler, 1984). 
Similarly, Gelb and Associates’ study produced similar results, finding that between 1971 and 
1983, countries with minerals experienced significant decline in the efficiency of domestic 
capital formation which resulted in negative growth in hard mineral countries and severely 
reduced growth in oil exporting economies – however, this economic decline was not 
experienced so harshly by non-mineral countries (Gelb & Associates, 1988). Based on the 
findings of such scholars and many others, Sachs and Warner embarked on a cross sectional 
study using a subset of 95 countries to determine whether a negative relationship exists between 
economic growth and dependence on natural resources (Badeeb, Lean & Clark, 2017: 129). In 
the study, they related growth in income per capita to primary products in a country’s exports 
– primary products meaning heterogeneous goods such as minerals, fuel, food and agricultural 
products – which they used as ‘natural resources abundance’ in their analysis (Deacon, 2011: 
114). Sachs and Warner controlled for the ratio of investment to GDP, initial income and 
openness to trade and concluded that an abundance in natural resources had a significant 
negative effect on economic growth, discovering that an increase in the primary products 
export share by as little as one standard deviation, resulted in a 0.6 to 1.5 percentage point 
reduction in a country’s predicted growth rate (Sachs and Warner, 1997). This study was one 
of the first scholarly works based on empirical evidence which proved “a clear negative 
correlation between natural resource-based exports and growth”, with only two countries rich 
in resources – Mauritius and Malaysia -  enjoying a 2% annual growth rate between 1970 and 
1980 (Sachs & Warner, 1997: 27). It is important to note that similar findings were produced 
by Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Gylfason et al. (1999), who also used large datasets to 
enhance their research (Rosser, 2006:8). These negative economic impacts were confirmed by 
Auty, the father of the ‘resource curse’, himself, who discovered that the income per capita of 
countries with an abundance of natural resources grew three times more slowly than the income 
per capita of countries poor in resources (Auty, 2001: 3). Building upon the knowledge already 
established in the field of resources and economic growth, Neumayer opted to measure growth 
in terms of ‘genuine income’- subtracting the depreciation of produced and natural capital from 
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the GDP amount instead of simply using GDP in the calculations – to determine if this altered 
the impact resources had on economic growth (Rosser, 2006: 9). Despite modifying the 
measurement, he found that the negative effect on economic growth persisted within countries 
abundant with natural resources (Neumayer, 2004). That numerous scholars have based their 
work on empirical case studies and all produced similar results, makes it difficult to refute the 
negative impact resources have on economic growth.  
 
In addition to impacting economic growth, a number of scholars have confirmed further 
economic problems occurring as a result of natural resource abundance. In addition to 
economic growth; export diversification, agricultural growth and inflation are impacted, as 
resource abundant countries have reported poorer performance in these categories in relation 
to their non-mineral counterparts (Nankani, 1979). Furthermore, Nankani found that “poor 
savings performance, greater technological and wage dualism, high unemployment, high 
external indebtedness and high export earnings instability” is likely to characterise these 
mineral economies (Nankani, 1979). Wood and Berge produced similar results, finding that 
countries rich in resources were less likely to export manufactured goods than those without 
resources (Wood & Berge, 1997). Atkinson and Hamilton later confirm Nankani’s claim, 
finding that resource abundant countries had lower savings rates, than those without resources 
(Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003). In addition to their work on resources and economic growth, 
Leite and Weidmann declared that higher levels of corruption were reported in countries rich 
in resources, compared to those without (Leite & Weidmann, 1999). On a social level, Ross 
found that resource well is typically associated with poor human development levels and 
increased poverty (Ross, 2003). This work produced by the aforementioned scholars indicates 
that the impact of resources on the economy is multi-faceted and largely negative. From this, 
it can be deduced that in terms of economic performance, resources have proved more a curse 
than a blessing.  
 
However, it must be acknowledged that the periods to which the above arguments refer, cannot 
necessarily determine the status quo for the negative impact of resources on growth or the 
resource curse as a whole. As Ross recognises; the period between 1970 and 1990 was an 
“economically troubled” time for oil-producing countries, on which much of the empirical 
evidence is based (Ross, 2012: 190). Auty too, admits that prior to the 1970s, much evidence 
revealed that countries rich in natural resources indeed enjoyed higher growth rates than 
countries without resources (Auty, 2001: 5). Similarly, Maloney identifies the important role 
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that natural resources have played in the success of many economically established and 
industrialised countries. He argues that processes of growth cannot be measured over a short 
turbulent period such as that of the 1970 to 1990 time-frame, but rather need to be measured 
over the long-run (Maloney, 2002: 1). This is supported by Wright and Czelusta, who dispute 
the resource curse theory, evidencing it with the United States’ ability to use their natural 
resources to grow and industrialise their economy, avoiding the resource curse (Wright & 
Czelusta, 2002: 5). 
 
A more comprehensive outlook on the resource curse is taken by Gylfason. He argues that it is 
not the quantity of natural resources which affects economic growth in countries abundant in 
resources, but rather the quality of economic management and the management of institutions 
and of the whole country over-all (Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 9). This argument renders 
the existence of a ‘resource curse’ debatable and questions whether or not the negative impacts 
of resources on growth derive from the presence of the resources themselves, or from deeper 
issues entrenched in countries such as their institutions and administration. This too, will be 
investigated later on in the thesis in further detail. It must also be noted that Auty acknowledges 
the inconsistent nature of the existence of the resource curse in resource abundant countries, 
stating that the resource curse “is not an iron law, rather it is a strong recurrent tendency” (Auty, 
1994: 12).  
 
2.6.2 Resources Lead to Conflict and Civil War  
 
More recent studies have focused on the impact of resources on conflict in countries rich in 
natural resources and in particular, civil war. This literature asserts that not only is resource 
wealth associated with the onset of civil war, but moreover influences both the duration and 
intensity of the civil war – meaning battle-related casualties (Rosser, 2006: 9). Collier and 
Hoeffler are renowned for their work on conflict and the relation between resources and civil 
war and have arguably since inspired further research into this sub-category of resource curse 
theory. It is worth noting that Collier and Hoeffler’s 1998 study is based on their analysis of 
the experience of 98 countries and 27 civil wars and that their definition of ‘natural resource 
abundance’ is in terms of the ratio of primary exports to GDP (Rosser, 2006: 9).  
 
However, before delving into the impacts of resource abundance on the onset, duration and 
intensity of civil war, it is crucial the four key differences between literature on resources and 
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conflict and general literature on the resource curse are established. These four differences 
include firstly, differing lineage of resource curse literature, types of resources, linear and 
curvilinear variables and lastly, the importance of location. The first, being that literature on 
conflict in relation to resources has a different lineage and is not descended from other branches 
of resource curse literature which have grown out of various bases of research throughout the 
years. The basis in the 1950s and 1960s being the primary commodities and development and 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the rentier state (Ross, 2013: 13). However, resource and conflict 
literature has its fundamental foundation in the economic theories of conflict which were 
developed in the early 1990s by Hirschleifer, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992 & Grossman, 1994. The 
reason for this branch of sub-literature being explored was a direct result of the ‘recent events’ 
which had taken place and the violent civil conflicts in the 1990s such as those of Angola, The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Cambodia and 
Columbia which were seemingly related to resource wealth (Ross, 2013: 13). 
 
The second difference which needs to be considered is that many scholars argue that the type 
of resources makes a difference when analysing conflict. Scholars who have focused on the 
kinds of resources have found that petroleum is the only resource which is consistently 
correlated with low levels of democracy and increased corruption, yet both petroleum and 
alluvial diamonds (diamonds which are found near the surface and are typically easier to mine) 
have been correlated with the onset and increased duration of civil war (Ross, 2003, 2006; 
Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005). Further studies have concluded that contraband resources 
such as alluvial gemstones (Fearon, 2004) or coca leaves (Angrist & Kugler, 2008) have a 
similar impact as does timber which has played a role in the multiple cases of violent conflict 
investigated by Price, 2003; Harwell, Farah and Blundell, 2011. 
 
The third difference is that in more general resource curse literature, there is a linear association 
between resource wealth and other variables. However, in regard to resource and conflict 
literature, the associations are curvilinear. For example, there is a linear association between 
oil wealth and corruption as well as oil wealth and authoritarianism – therefore the higher the 
value of per capita petroleum resources, the worse the level of corruption and authoritarian rule 
(Ross, 2013: 14). Conversely, scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler and later, many others, 
have found that in terms of conflict, this association is curvilinear. This will be discussed in 
greater depth under the onset of civil war, however, the basic principle is that as the value of a 
resource increases, the probability of conflict initially increases, but then decreases after a 
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certain point (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009; Basedau & Lay, 
2009; Bjorvatn & Naghavi, 2011; Ross, 2012).  
 
The last difference is the importance of location – meaning, where within a country’s borders 
the resources are found. Location has been found to have a significant impact on the role 
resource wealth plays in the onset, duration and intensity of civil wars (Ross, 2013: 14). Using 
oil wealth as a variable, scholars have found that oil located offshore, has little to no association 
with conflict in the region, however, oil found onshore has had a significant impact on conflict 
(Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2012). In addition, oil found onshore is also more likely to instigate 
conflict if in an area which is poorer in relation to the average national wealth (Østby, Nordås 
& Rød, 2009); and even more so, if that area is inhabited by ethnic groups which are 
marginalised (Basedau & Richter, 2011; Hunziker & Cederman, 2012). This is especially more 
likely if the ethnic groups in these areas are highly-concentrated (Morelli & Rohner, 2010) and 
comprise of members who use this oil wealth as a means to foster collective resistance to the 
government (Aspinall, 2007). Aside from instigating conflict, scholars have explored the 
impact of resource location on conflict duration and intensity and found that both petroleum 
and alluvial diamond wealth located near a conflict region have seemingly increased the 
duration of that conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; 
Lujala, 2010) as well as the intensity (Weinstein, 2007; Lujala, 2009; De Luca et al., 2014). 
One of the examples for which this rang true is Sierra Leone, where Bellows and Miguel found 
that more frequent battles and attacks took place in the chiefdoms with diamond mines 
compared to those without (Bellows & Miguel, 2009). 
 
Now that the four major differences between the literature on resources in relation to conflict 
and resource curse literature has been established, it is important to examine exactly how it is 
that resources cause conflict and in particular, civil war before delving into the literature on the 
association between resource abundance and the onset, duration and intensity of civil war. 
 
While the various ways in which resources are associated with civil war have already been 
discussed in some detail, it quite simply begs the question – what is it about resources which 
causes conflict in the first place? A subset of scholars argue that wealth as a result of natural 
resources affects the government in one of two ways, which as a result, leads to violence and 
conflict. The first way is that the government is made administratively weaker from the 
resource wealth (through corruption for example) and is thereby unable to prevent rebellions 
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as well as it should and the second way, being that resource wealth enhances the value of 
capturing the state which subsequently induces rebellion and the prospect of civil war (de 
Soysa, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Le Billon, 2005). A separate subset of theories insists that 
it is the insurgents rather than the government which is impacted by resource wealth. In this 
theory, the insurgents or rebels are motivated to initiate political conflict or rebellion to create 
an ‘independent state’ in order for them to capture the resource revenue without having to share 
it among the rest of the country (Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009; Dal Bo & Dal Bo, 2011; 
Ross, 2012). Similarly, it could be the prospect of financing the costs of rebellion through 
looting the resources themselves (especially if the resource is easily lootable such as oil or 
alluvial gemstones) or alternatively, extorting money from companies and their employees 
which work in their ‘independent state’ which make forming a rebellion more appealing 
(Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009; Dal Bo & Dal Bo, 2011; Ross, 2012). Lei and Micheals 
confirm this connection, claiming that the probability of armed conflict is increased by 5 to 8 
percentage points after an oil field is discovered and in countries which have recently 
experienced political violence, this effect is even stronger (Lei & Michaels, 2014).  
 
2.6.2.1 Onset of Civil War and Resource Abundance 
 
Collier and Hoeffler’s 1998 study indicates that there is a strong correlation between natural 
resource abundance and the onset of civil war and that interestingly, this correlation is 
curvilinear, meaning that resource wealth increases the likelihood of civil war initially. 
However, once a particular level of exports is achieved, the probability of civil war is 
substantially decreased (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). A real-world example of this being the large 
amount of oil wealth per capita in countries such as Iran or Nigeria where resource wealth has 
arguably had significant negative impacts in relation to the extremely large amount of oil per 
capita wealth in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Equatorial Guinea in which the vast level of 
wealth has been a blessing (Ross, 2013: 14). The reasoning behind this is that once resource 
wealth reaches a certain point, the wealth becomes a “stabilising force” and is able to be used 
by governments to protect the country from the possibility of impending civil war – for 
example, by using the resource wealth to invest in increased security or the bribing of potential 
rebels (Ross, 2013: 14). Essentially, the elements of resource abundance which lead to conflict 
are offset by the rentier effect, making conflict less likely once a certain level of wealth is 
generated (Ross, 2013: 14). In a later study in 2005, Collier and Hoeffler replace the export-
based measure used in their 1998 study with a rent-based measure of natural resource 
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abundance and interestingly, produce the same result – that a curvilinear relationship exists 
between resource wealth and the onset of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). Continuing their 
research, Collier and Hoeffler’s subsequent study used an improved dataset which reaffirmed 
their findings from 1998 (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Delving deeper into the sub-literature of 
the resource curse in relation to conflict, Collier and Hoeffler’s third study explored the impact 
of natural resources on different types of civil war – namely secessionist and non-secessionist 
civil wars. They discovered that the likelihood of both types of civil wars are increased by the 
presence of natural resources in a country, however, secessionist civil wars are three times 
more likely to occur than non-secessionist civil wars in a country abundant with resources 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Building upon the work of Collier and Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol’s 
research focused on the link between resource abundance and the onset of ethnic and non-
ethnic civil wars. Fixing her research between the period of 1960 to 1995, she used data from 
138 countries and concluded that resource abundance is closely associated with non-ethnic 
wars as well as various forms of political violence, however, resource abundance is not a 
variable in explaining the incidence of ethnic war (Reynal-Querol, 2002).  
 
2.6.2.2 Duration of Civil War and Resource Abundance 
 
In addition to being associated with the onset of civil war, natural resources abundance is also 
connected to the duration of civil wars. Included in their 1998 study, Collier and Hoeffler 
discovered that like the onset of civil war, resource abundance and the duration of civil war, 
too, had a curvilinear relationship (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). A further study claimed that 
resource wealth considerably decreases the success-rate of peace-building activities (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2000). Ross argues that so long as resource wealth is negatively correlated with 
successful peace-building activities, resource wealth will be associated with “longer wars” 
(Ross, 2004b: 341). According to Fearon, longer wars are experienced in countries abundant 
in contraband resources such as coca or diamonds (Fearon, 2004). This finding undoubtedly 
rings true in the case of Sierra Leone. Concentrating on developing countries, Ballentine found 
an increase in the duration of civil wars in resource rich developing countries (Ballentine, 
2003). Many scholars have taken this research a step further and included statistical analysis 
on the specific nature or type of natural resource in relation to the duration of civil wars, finding 
that petroleum and alluvial diamonds consistently increase the duration of civil war as well as 




2.6.2.3 Intensity of Civil War and Resource Abundance 
 
Intensity of civil war refers to the number of battle-related casualties in relation to the civil war 
conflict, which, in association with natural resource abundance has produced varying results. 
Ross, in his 2004 study, acknowledges that many researchers concentrating on African civil 
wars have observed that the intensity of civil wars are heightened by resource abundance as it 
causes “combatants to fight for territory that would otherwise have little value” (Ross 2004b: 
245). Ross whilst agreeing with the above finding to an extent, found little proof for it in his 
own research. Analysing 13 cases of civil war, he found in only 2 of the cases did resources 
impact the intensity of the civil war and in the remaining 9 cases, found the impact of natural 
resources to be either irrelevant or mixed (Ross, 2004b). Again, many scholars found that the 
type of resource impacted the intensity of civil war, with civil wars in regions near petroleum 
or alluvial diamonds experiencing conflicts of greater severity (Weinsten, 2007; Lujala, 2009; 
De Luca et al., 2014). Perhaps the correlation between resource abundance and intensity of 
civil war is not as strong as that of resources and the onset of civil war or the duration of civil 
war. Although it must be noted that Ross’s argument is based only on 13 case studies, rendering 
his results questionable due to the limited dataset.  
 
2.6.3 Resources Lead to a Change in Regime Type and Tendency Toward 
Authoritarianism 
 
The third sub-category of resource literature asserts that resource abundance is associated with 
low levels of democracy and in the case of oil, associated strongly with authoritarianism. This 
section will evaluate the literature on the impact of resource wealth on regime types – 
considering both democracies and autocracies, but, with a slight slant on democracy. It will 
subsequently delve into the literature on institutions and particularly, the relation between 
institutions and resources as this is a vital component of the thesis. In doing so, this section will 
refer closely to Acemoglu and Robinson’s findings in their book - Why Nations Fail – as their 
arguments will serve as the framework for which the rest of this thesis is based.  
 
Numerous studies have been conducted by scholars in the resource curse field in order to 
establish the impact of resources on regime type – the common conclusion being that resource 
abundance impairs the level of democracy. Wantchekon is one such scholar who, after 
observing the data of 141 countries between the period of 1950 to 1990, concluded that a 1% 
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increase in natural resource dependence (the ratio of primary imports to GDP), resulted in an 
almost 8% increase in the likelihood of the government adopting authoritarian characteristics 
(Wantchekon, 1999). Furthermore, his study claimed that democratic countries rich in natural 
resources were more likely to experience a “failed” democracy and that a plethora of natural 
resources would slow down the transition to democracy in non-democratic countries 
(Wantchekon, 1999). Wantchekon’s later study in conjunction with Jensen, built upon his 
earlier findings and found that African countries endowed with natural resources had a 
significantly higher probability of adopting authoritarian tendencies and that countries which 
had recently transitioned to democracy, were prone to experiencing a breakdown in this 
democracy were they to discover natural resources (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004). Ross 
questioned whether this outcome of decreased democracy in relation to resource abundance 
spanned all variations of resource economies and regimes and produced a study which took 
into account data from 113 countries between the period of 1971 and 1997. His examination 
establishes three important points – firstly, that it is the reliance on natural resources – both oil 
and mineral exports – which reduces the level of democracy – a phenomenon which results 
only from resource exports and not any other type of primary export (Ross, 2001a). Secondly, 
this phenomenon is not limited to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or the Arabian-
peninsula and lastly, it is not limited to small states (Ross, 2001a).  
 
Since the 2000s, the general consensus on resources and regime type has been that it impairs 
democracy. In so doing, resources arguably make autocracy more stable and therefore, 
decrease the likelihood of transitioning to democracy (Ross, 2013: 6). This was proved in a 
comprehensive study, in relation to oil as a resource, which examined 64 countries under 
authoritarian rule in 1960 and 50 countries which were under authoritarian rule in the first years 
of independence after 1960. Values were taken between the period of 1960 and 2006 and it 
was found that the countries which transitioned to democracy, were the ones which had no 
resources, however, no country with oil resources has successfully transitioned to democracy 
since 1960 (Ross, 2013: 7). Essentially, an increase in oil wealth is associated with less 
democracy – a finding based on Ross’s 2001 study which has been confirmed time and time 
again by multiple scholars (Ross, 2001a; Werger, 2009; Aslaksen, 2010; Tsui, 2011; Andersen 
& Ross, 2014). A widely inclusive study performed a “statistical meta-analysis” on this issue 
of oil and democracy; and using the findings from 29 studies and 246 empirical estimates, 





While it is all good and well that research has shown that oil wealth has a negative impact on 
the level of democracy, it is important to consider the conditions under which oil wealth has 
such anti-democratic impacts. The literature has broadly focused on two such conditions. The 
first being that oil wealth strengthens the already autocratic governments in oil rich countries, 
thus preventing them from transitioning to democracy or secondly, democratic countries are 
weakened by oil wealth which pushes them towards authoritarianism – the consensus being the 
first condition – that oil wealth prevents authoritarian governments from transitioning to 
democracy (Ross, 2013: 8).  
 
Further research into this field, has found that oil wealth is more likely to keep the authoritarian 
leader in their position of power, longer than it keeps the authoritarian regime in place (Ross, 
2013: 8). This was confirmed by multiple scholars who found that oil as well as kimberlite 
diamonds increase the length of time authoritarian leaders remain in office, however, it is 
alluvial gemstones and other types of minerals which can have the opposite effect – limiting 
the length of rule of authoritarian leaders due to increased volatility (Cuaresma, Oberhofer & 
Raschky, 2010).  
 
Alternatively, some scholars have argued against this, insisting that oil does not impact 
democracy negatively. Instead, claims have been made to suggest that oil wealth has “pro-
democratic” elements within oil rich democratic countries by making their governments more 
stable and therefore, less likely to transition to autocratic rule (Smith, 2004; Morrison, 2009; 
Dunning, 2008; Tsui, 2011). In this case, perhaps it could be interpreted that the effects of oil 
are pro-regime stability, more so than pro-democracy. Another group of scholars steadfastly 
argue against this, finding no evidence of oil stabilising democracies (Caselli & Tesei, 2011; 
Wiens, Poast & Clark, 2014; Al-Ubaydli, 2012). Yet more scholars argue that even if oil wealth 
has no aggregate impact on democratic stability, it can however, under specific conditions, lead 
to a breakdown in democratic regimes as was the case in some Sub-Saharan African countries 
(Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004). Ross builds upon this argument, claiming instead that it is low 
to middle income oil rich countries which are most at risk of this democratic breakdown (Ross, 
2012). These conflicting arguments should not be surprising, due to the fact that very few 





2.7 Oil Windfalls  
 
Interesting observations have been made by scholars who have focused on oil windfalls – 
excess rent from oil revenue - in both democratic and authoritarian states, particularly the US 
and South American countries. Oil windfalls have been found to lengthen the office terms of 
elected local officials in democracies such as the US (Goldberg, Wibbels & Mvukiyehe, 2008; 
Wolfers, 2009), Argentina (Gervasoni, 2010) and Brazil (Brollo et al., 2013; Monteiro & 
Ferraz, 2010). According to Brollo et al., in Brazil, the impact of oil windfalls went one step 
further as it was found that “windfall-like federal transfers” can be charged with reducing the 
education levels of candidates running for mayor, as well as with increasing the level of 
corruption in the country according to a federal government audit programme (Brollo et al., 
2013). Oil windfalls too, increased the probability of officials being re-elected, however, this 
re-election advantage is only for the short-term (Monteiro & Ferraz, 2010). Nevertheless, all 
the aforementioned studies determined oil windfalls to have pro-incumbent effects which in its 
very nature, is anti-democratic.  
 
This argument is taken one step further, as scholars have suggested that it is not only the anti-
democratic characteristics of oil which impact on regime type, but rather, the ability of the 
leaders to capture the rents from this oil wealth which has a more significant impact on 
democracy. The anti-democratic powers of oil only appeared to emerge in the late 1970s 
(Andersen & Ross, 2014). This was the time when the petroleum industries were nationalised 
in the majority of developing oil-rich countries and officials were able to seize most of the rents 
from the industry and anti-democratic tendencies became common practice (Andersen & Ross, 
2014). Alternatively, Dunning argues that it is not the capture of rents which hinders 
democratisation, but rather a different condition entirely. He insists that democratisation is 
contingent upon the level of inequality – that in countries with low levels of inequality, oil 
impedes democratization. However, in countries with high levels of inequality, oil relieves 
elites of the fear that democracy will result in the sequestering of their personal wealth and 
thereby, hastens democratisation (Dunning, 2008). This condition was used to explain why 
countries in Latin America experienced democratisation as a result of oil, yet the rest of the 
world did not (Dunning, 2008).  
 
When analysing the argument that more resources (or in this case, particularly, oil) leads to 
decreased democracy, it is vital to consider the rentier effect. As discussed earlier in the thesis, 
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the rentier effect occurs from an abundance of resource revenue flowing into the country which 
allows officials to decrease taxes and increase public goods and patronages, enabling them to 
simply buy off opponents and lessen the chance of uprising (Mahdavy, 1970; Crystal, 1990; 
Ross, 2001a). Essentially resource rent renders tax revenues unnecessary, freeing incumbents 
from accountability and granting them autocratic power. This does however, assume that 
democracy is closely linked with taxation and that increased tax revenues are associated with 
increased accountability on the part of government (Bates & Lien, 1985; Ross, 2004a; 
Brautigam, Fjeldstad & Moore, 2008). According to Morrison, non-tax revenue is correlated 
to regime stability – in both democracies and autocracies – albeit, through different ways: by 
leading to increased social spending in autocracies and by decreasing the taxation of elites in 
democracies (Morrison, 2009). The occurrence of the rentier effect was scrutinised in relation 
to data on multiple Sub-Saharan countries and was found that an increase in resource rents was 
met with diminished enforcement of tax and reduced demand for democratic governance 
(McGuirk, 2013). It was also found that resource rents do not impact the capability of leaders, 
but rather, the value officials place on staying in power (Robinson et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; 
Caselli & Cunningham, 2009; Fish, 2005). This desire to remain in office is what leads 
incumbents to investing in “regime-preserving activities”, which results in the adoption of anti-
democratic tendencies (Ross, 2013: 10).  
 
The argument for oil prolonging autocracies does not stand unopposed and has been challenged 
by two major arguments. The first of which, questions the net effect of petroleum wealth: 
assuming oil has a negative direct effect on democracy. Herb asks whether this negative effect 
is not counteracted by a positive indirect effect of the increased incomes resulting from oil 
wealth, suggesting that these two effects counterbalance each other leading to oil having no net 
effect on democracy (Herb, 2005). This argument was subsequently countered by Alekseev 
and Conrad, who investigated the same issue, finding that oil’s direct effect on accountability 
is a greater threat to democracy, than the indirect benefits of oil wealth (Alekseev, 2009; 
Conrad, 2009). It has also been argued that Herb’s approach is too straightforward, as factors 
such as openness to trade, the level of human capital, quality of state institutions and the 
survival function of officials need to be taken into account (Ross, 2013: 10). The second 
challenge is causal identification – arguably, the correlation between autocratic rule and oil 
wealth could be endogenous or determined by omitted variables (Haber & Menaldo, 2010). In 
their study, they use data reaching as far back as 1800 to develop models which control for 
country and year fixed effects, which show that the oil-democracy association has little 
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statistical significance (Haber & Menaldo, 2010). Gurses concludes a similar result, using more 
modern data (Gurses, 2009). Consequently, these findings have been challenged, as Andersen 
and Ross argue that Haber and Menaldo failed to examine the more credible variation of the 
resource curse (that increased oil wealth aids autocracies, enabling them to stay in power for 
longer), that they came to invalid conclusions from their data and that changes over time in the 
“global distribution of petroleum rents” were overlooked (Andersen & Ross, 2014). Andersen 
and Ross, in turn, claim that oil rents only posed a threat to democratic transitions after the 
expropriations in the late 1970s, which allowed governments in developing countries to capture 
the rents from oil which had previously been seized by foreign companies (Andersen & Ross, 
2014). Despite some opposition, it appears that the argument for oil wealth having a negative 
impact of democracy is the most convincing.  
 
2.8 Resources and Institutions  
 
A vital role in any regime, is played by institutions. Without strong, efficient institutions in 
place, be they political, economic or both, the state of governance in a country is severely 
impaired, disadvantaging the majority of members of society and placing the country under 
threat of external risks as weak institutions are ill-equipped to respond sufficiently. Indeed, 
institutional quality is so important that Menaldo argues that the ‘resource curse’ should instead 
be lableled the ‘institutions curse’ as it is not the existence of resources, themselves which have 
harmful impacts, but the quality of institutions which determine the impact of those resources 
(Menaldo, 2016). Ross denotes the quality of institutions as “the effectiveness of government 
bureaucracy, the incidence of corruption, the rule of law and more broadly, the state’s capacity 
to promote economic development” (Ross, 2013: 11). This section will analyse the relationship 
between resources and institutions according to many scholars in the field and will later 
incorporate the framework on which this thesis will be based – Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why 
Nations Fail – to explore the case of Botswana with reference to the mechanisms they have 
identified in association with resources and institutions. The research on resources and 
institutions can be separated into two categories – the quality of institutions and the extent to 
which resource wealth can inhibit the evolution of institutions. The first category regards the 
quality of institutions and how this quality may influence the effect that resources have on 
economic growth. In a country with weak institutions it is not unlikely that a resource boom – 
a positive fiscal shock – could have negative effects on the country, as observed by Tornell and 
Lane, who developed a model to explain this phenomenon. According to Tornell and Lane, 
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when a resource boom takes place in a country with weak institutions, that country is likely to 
suffer a “voracity effect”, in which the resource boom has a negative impact and leads to 
powerful groups in society struggling for the resource windfall which results in the windfall 
being squandered and failing to positively impact all members of society (Tornell & Lane, 
1999). Mehlum, Moene and Torvik separate institutions further into “grabber friendly and 
producer friendly” – the former characterising institutions that are prone to corruption and the 
latter being those that are not – and argue that resource wealth lowers aggregate income in 
grabber friendly institutions but increases aggregate income in producer friendly ones 
(Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006).  
 
The second category considers whether the evolution of institutions is stunted by resource 
wealth. Just a few of the ways in which this could happen is firstly, by revenue volatility and 
the threat it poses to government’s ability to plan for the future as well as its impact on 
investment (Karl, 1997); secondly, resource wealth could lead to an expansion of government 
revenue so rapid that government is unable to manage it (Hertog, 2007; Ross, 2012). Thirdly, 
a boom in resource revenue increases government dependence on this revenue and impedes the 
states’ capacity to extract taxation from citizens, which leaves the state in a precarious position, 
with a weak government, vulnerable to rent-seeking and incompetent in formulating economic 
policy (Beblawi, 1987; Chaudhry, 1989; Karl, 1997). In addition, resource wealth is enticing 
and could potentially encourage candidates of a lower quality to compete for office and lastly, 
provoke politicians and those already in positions of power to dismantle the institutions which 
control the distribution of resources (Ross, 2001b). According to Beck and Leaven, who 
researched institutions in countries which had experienced transition post 1992, it is the 
variation in mineral exports which accounts for the variation in the institutions built (Beck & 
Leaven, 2006). A multitude of authors have reported an inverse correlation between resources 
and institutional quality in their research – among these, being Bulte, Damania & Deacon, 
2005; Isham et al., 2005; Beck & Leaven, 2006; Knack, 2009; Anthonsen et al., 2012 and Sala-
I Martin & Subramanian, 2013.  
 
While the above describes the manner in which institutions are impacted by resources, it is 
important to note that under the ‘quality of institutions’ fall many categories – taxation, 
corruption, social infrastructure and law to name but a few. It is therefore crucial to consider 
the impact that resources have on these subcategories. In researching the impact of resources 
on tax systems, Knack distinguishes between the resources in relation to their impact on tax 
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systems, claiming that revenue from fuel resources is correlated with weak, inefficient tax 
systems, while non-fuel resource revenue is correlated with strong tax systems (Knack, 2009). 
Many scholars have also conducted research into resources and its impact on corruption, 
concluding that natural resource dependence is strongly correlated with the perception of 
corruption (Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Arezki & Brückner, 2011; Sala-I Martin & 
Subramanian, 2013). In an attempt to measure corruption more accurately, Andersen et al. have 
analysed the Bank of International Settlements’ data on foreign deposits which have been 
placed in banks of countries which are usually used as tax havens such as Switzerland, the 
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands and interestingly found that after an increase in oil and gas 
rents is experienced in an autocratic country, it is matched by an increase in deposits into the 
accounts those citizens hold in these tax havens (Andersen et al., 2012). The same cannot be 
said for democratic countries with oil and gas revenue, however, their study indicates that at 
least 8% of oil and gas rents from autocratic countries is moved to individual, foreign accounts 
(Andersen et al., 2012). Similarly, Vicente’s study which examined countries where oil had 
recently been discovered such as Sao Tome and Principe against those that had not such as 
Cape Verde, found that the oil discovery led to a significant increase in perceived corruption 
throughout public services (Vicente, 2010).  
 
The corruption is undeniable in many countries blessed with resources and can be seen most 
clearly through public services at municipal level. Brollo et al. used a regression discontinuity 
design in order to track transfers from federal government to municipal government in Brazil 
and discovered that a 10% increase in windfall-type transfers, corresponded with a 10-12 point 
increase in corruption (Brollo et al., 2013). Further study of Brazilian municipal government 
found that an increase in oil revenue did in fact, result in an increase in funds allocated for 
public services and spending, however, most of this money failed to improve public 
infrastructure as it “went missing” and was likely absorbed by patronage and embezzlement by 
government officials (Caselli & Michaels, 2013). According to further research, resources have 
only led to increased corruption in countries which are not democratic, meaning that the impact 
of resources on institutions, might be conditional (Bhattacharya & Hodler, 2010). However, it 
must be acknowledged that while many countries claim to be democratic outwardly, the 
characteristics they exhibit remain anything but. Perhaps government ownership is another 
condition to consider. A study conducted among the Soviet Union’s five richest petroleum 
states – Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – uncovered that 
institutions are only weakened in oil rich countries where the government is heavily involved 
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in the petroleum industry and that strong fiscal institutions are likely to be found in oil rich 
countries in which the private sector plays a dominant role in the petroleum industry (Luong 
& Weinthal, 2010). 
  
From the arguments laid out above, it is evident that resources and oil in particular, have a 
largely negative impact on institutions, influencing corruption, taxation and public service 
provision. However, despite the impact of resources on institutions seeming generally negative, 
it must be acknowledged that this impact is largely conditional as this is not always the case.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
 
Like natural resources in many of the countries mentioned in this chapter, resource curse 
literature is vast and abundant. However, in order to provide a concise and comprehensive 
overview of the resource curse, this literature review has strived to present the most significant 
arguments of the leading scholars within the resource curse sphere of study. In order to achieve 
this, the chapter compared resource curse theory prior to 1980; when resources were largely 
considered a blessing to post 1980; when resource curse theory rapidly expanded to the largely 
negative theory with which society has become accustomed today. The resource curse was 
subsequently evaluated in relation to poor economic performance, the tendency to spark 
conflict and civil war as well as its potential to impact regime type and in particular, its 
propensity toward autocratic regimes. Finally, the resource curse is examined in relation to 
institutions and while resources have been proven to negatively impact the quality of 
institutions, this impact must be acknowledged as conditional and will be explored in great 

















Acemoglu and Robinson have analysed numerous country case studies in their book, Why 
Nations Fail. By gathering vast amounts of data throughout history, the authors have been able 
to identify factors which persist in prosperous nations and likewise, the factors present in 
‘failed’ states. The authors credit institutions as the most significant factor in determining the 
success of a state in addition to other factors which together determine whether the political 
and economic institutions are inclusive or extractive. This thesis will use Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s Why Nations Fail as a framework with which to determine the factors which 
enabled Botswana to escape the resource curse. Given that Acemoglu and Robinson’s central 
argument is that the state of a nation’s institutions plays a critical role in determining whether 
or not that country will succeed or fail, this chapter will begin with a description of institutions. 
Importantly, institutions do not exist in isolation and the nature of the institution – inclusive or 
extractive – is itself determined by a multitude of factors. These other factors which will be 
analysed throughout this chapter are state centralisation, the ability to enforce rules and 
property rights and the ability to manage creative destruction. While these factors too, influence 
the nature of a nation’s institutions, it is vital to acknowledge that these factors stand resolute 
as elements which determine a nation’s success in an individual capacity. Fundamentally, the 
purpose of this chapter is to use the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail 
to provide insight and analysis into the three predominant factors which will be used to 
elucidate how Botswana was able to escape the resource curse.   
 
Before delving into the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail, it is 
beneficial to examine the study’s theoretical approach in relation to the framework. The thesis 
uses the historical institutional approach which is similar to that of Why Nations Fail and has 
indeed, been chosen for this reason, as it allows for a clearer and more direct comparison and 
adoption of the framework. Historical institutionalism is described as an “ontologically open 
theoretical approach to research, examining empirical puzzles with a portable set of concepts 
that foreground contemporal contexts (Jackson, 2017: 259). In other words, it’s a research 
approach which focuses on the manner in which insititutions determine how political actors 
behave which subsequently, impacts political outcomes (Cartwright, 2018: 383). Historic 
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institutionalism maintains that institutional change can only take place when agents of the state 
(political actors) operating inside those institutions, are able to change them (Bell & Feng, 
2019: 6). Nevertheless, the approach also argues that these political actors are constrained by 
institutions as it is these insitutions which shape the actions of the agents in the first place 
(Hameiri, 2020: 638). A strength of this approach rests in it’s constraint of political actors 
because the fact that agents are constrained, means that institutions can be used to explain all 
other phenomenon (Hameiri, 2020: 642).  
 
Due to historical institutionalism’s insistence on political actors being the only ones capable of 
inciting institutional change, there is a branch of historical institutionalism which postulates 
that institutional change is provoked by a critical juncture. This critical juncture is used by 
Acemoglu and Robinson to explain multiple institutional changes or turning points in case 
studies throughout their book and it can be understood as an external shock that “causes 
disruption and provides opportunities for agents to reconfigure institutions” (Capoccia & 
Kelemen, 2007). Fundamentally, historial institutionalism proclaims that the origin of 
insitutions is relevant as it determines how they operate, change and exist (Rixen & Viola, 
2016: 10). Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail is premised on this approach which is 
ultimately used in this thesis to explain why Botswana was able to escape the resource curse – 
it’s institutions.  
 
3.2 Acemoglu and Robinson on Institutions: Inclusive vs Extractive  
 
Nogales Sonora and Nogales Arizona are identical in all ways but one. They share the same 
geography, climate, are susceptible to the same diseases, their inhabitants are from the same 
background, enjoy the same music and food and arguably have the same “culture” (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 19). Despite the basic characteristics of these cities being the same, the 
quality of life, education levels, healthcare and average earnings are vastly unequal and all stem 
from one key difference – their institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 19). It may be 
difficult to comprehend one factor having such significant influence, however, it is indeed the 
quality of the institutions and in actuality, one fence, which separate these otherwise identical 
cities. Nogales Sonora which is in Mexico, is characterised by poor healthcare, high infant 
mortality rates, poor average education levels, high crime rates, high levels of corruption and 
a newly established democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 18-19). The disparities between 
Nogales Sonora and just a few feet away, its counterpart, Nogales Arizona could not be more 
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extreme. Residents of Nogales Arizona enjoy an average income of roughly 3 times that of 
those in Nogales Sonora, education levels are significantly higher with the majority of adults 
having graduated from high school and the majority of teenagers, enrolled in high school, a 
decent standard of healthcare is available for all citizens with life expectancy being one of the 
highest in the world (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 18). Citizens go about their daily lives free 
from fear of their lives and from expropriation of their investments as they enjoy secure 
property rights as well as public infrastructure and services such as telephones, roads, safe 
sewage and waste removal, law and order and an overall functioning democracy (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 18).    
 
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the primary driving factor behind this disparity is 
institutions – the type of institutions, both political and economic which have been adopted and 
developed throughout the years. They separate institutions into political and economic which 
can again be separated into inclusive or extractive. The nature of the institution will largely 
impact on society as well as the economy and will determine the impact that resources have on 
the country. The authors use many country case examples to substantiate their findings which 
this thesis will use to illustrate the role of institutions, particularly in relation to Botswana, 
demonstrating the importance of institutions in determining the impact of resources.  
 
It is imperative at this point that the thesis delves into Acemoglu and Robinson’s definition of 
institutions as well as explore their varying characteristics. “Each society functions with a set 
of economic and political rules created and enforced by the state and the citizens collectively” 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). In order to understand the gravity of the influence 
institutions have on society, it is must be acknowledged that these different institutions create 
different incentives and as these institutions “influence behaviour and incentives in real life, 
they forge the success and failure of nations” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). Economic 
institutions therefore shape economic incentives, which typically include: the incentive to save 
and invest money, acquire an education, innovate and create business ventures and adopt new 
technologies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). By contrast, political institutions shape 
political incentives, as they determine how government is chosen and which part of government 
has the capacity to do what (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 94). Political institutions include 
the constitution and whether or not the country is a democracy and also determine the extent 
to which citizens can control politicians and influence their behaviour (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 55). This ability of citizens greatly impacts whether politicians are “agents of the 
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citizens” or whether they are able to use their power to pursue personal agendas and amass 
personal wealth, generally at the expense of the citizens (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). 
Political institutions play a pivotal part in any nation, as they are responsible for the political 
process which determines the type of economic institutions under which society functions 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55).  
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, “economic institutions are critical for determining 
whether a country is poor or prosperous” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 56). With this in mind, 
the gravity of the type of economic institution cannot be underestimated and it is important to 
establish the difference between inclusive economic institutions and extractive economic 
institutions. Inclusive economic institutions consist of five factors – secure property rights, 
unbiased law system, public service provision, allow new businesses to enter the market and 
finally, permit individuals to choose their own career (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 89). 
Under this type of economic institution, economic activity will be encouraged and productivity 
as well as the economy will flourish (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 89). Alternatively, 
extractive economic institutions seize income and wealth from one group in society in order to 
enrich a different group in society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 90). This generally occurs in 
the form of income being extracted from the majority of citizens in order to benefit government 
officials and includes insecure or in some cases, no property rights, the prohibiting of citizens 
in making economic decisions and failure of public service provision among others (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 90). Extractive economic institutions rarely coincide with prosperous 
economies, however, Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledge that under certain circumstances, 
extractive economic institutions can lead to economic growth. The only way for this to happen 
is if elites allocate resources to activities which they control that are highly productive and if 
these institutions allow the development of economic institutions which are somewhat 
inclusive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 106). However, it is not often that this is the case as 
extractive economic institutions are likely a result of extractive political institutions and while 
they may enjoy economic prosperity, it has never before been sustained (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 151).  
Like economic institutions, it is also important to establish the difference between inclusive 
political institutions and extractive political institutions. Essentially an inclusive political 
institution is one which benefits everyone – in other words a government which works for the 
good of all citizens, providing public infrastructure and comprising of leaders who place the 
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needs of citizens before their own (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 93). Alternatively, extractive 
political institutions are entirely the opposite as they are institutions which benefit only a small 
group – generally the political elites, while the majority of citizens’ needs are ignored, and 
public goods and services fail to be adequately provided (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 93). 
Typically, a political institution is inclusive if power is distributed broadly and the state is 
pluralistic and centralised; however, if the state is absolutist with an extremely narrow 
distribution of power, then the political institutions are exclusive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 94). With reference to the Nogales Arizona and Nogales Sonora example, Nogales 
Arizona has inclusive political institutions while the political institutions in Nogales Sonora 
are extractive.  
 
Naturally, the next question would be: is it possible for institutions to change? According to 
Acemoglu and Robinson, institutions “are deeply rooted in the past” and generally persist long 
after they are created (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 56). This is not to say that they cannot be 
changed, as Acemoglu and Robinson admit that institutions will only change if those with the 
ability to change them (i.e. politicians), want them to change – however, this is not likely, as 
generally, the politicians are those that benefit from extractive institutions and by transforming 
the institutions to be more inclusive, will lose those benefits (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
57). It is for this reasons that institutions tend to persist long after being created. One major 
factor which must be acknowledged is colonial rule and the influence it had on institutions. 
Colonial rule reinforced extractive institutions and is used to explain the “vicious circle” of 
institutions in the majority of post-colonial nations. The tendency of institutions to persist has 
been dubbed the “vicious circle” for extractive institutions and the “virtuous circle” for 
inclusive institutions – meaning that once institutions are extractive, they will remain extractive 
and vice versa for inclusive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 95). According to 
Acemoglu and Robinson, inclusive political institutions and extractive economic institutions 
will cause a nation to be unstable, however, it is when a country has both extractive political 
institutions and extractive economic institutions that the nation will fail (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 95). Needless to say, with both extractive political and economic institutions, 







3.3 Acemoglu and Robinson on State Centralisation  
 
Acemoglu and Robinson emphasise the largely positive impact of state centralisation. While 
they acknowledge the possibility of economic prosperity without centralisation, they insist that 
it will be short-lived. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, there is a strong correlation 
between state centralisation and inclusive economic institutions; as well as a significant link 
between pluralism and inclusive economic institutions which they determine using the United 
States and South Korea’s inclusive political and economic institutions as an example 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 94). Indeed, they go on to claim that institutions can only be 
considered inclusive if both the elements of pluralism and state centralisation are present, and 
even if one of these variables were to be absent, the institutions will then be considered 
extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 95).  
 
State centralisation allows the state to expand its capability and capacity in all aspects 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 213). This was evident in England after the Glorious Revolution 
in 1688 made their instituions more inclusive. Indeed, parliament was now able to raise 
revenues by enlarging its tax base, increasing state supervision of society to a level higher than 
the majority of developing countries are able to achieve today, appointing bureaucrats based 
on merit over their social standing and improving infrastructure used to run the country 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 214). Essentially, the degree of state centralisation resulting 
from the Glorious Revolution, was able to expand the capacity and capability of the state.  
 
In addition, state centralisation also enables the state to provide increased public goods and 
improved infrastructure as well as enhance unity within the state. Observe England two-
hundred years later, as an example, in the late 1800s, by continuing the process of state 
centralisation, they were able to further increase the inclusiveness of their political and 
economic institutions, amending labour market legislation in favour of workers, providing 
more public services such as unemployment and health insurance, minimum wage, state-
financed pensions and redistributive taxation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 357). As a result, 
the lower social strata were able to benefit as taxes became more progressive and the education 
system was opened to all children as the Education Act of 1870 made education accessible to 
the poor (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 358). The process of state centralisation undoubtedly 
increased the inclusiveness of political and economic institutions which benefitted the masses 




After examining Acemoglu and Robinson argument on state centralisation, there is an 
overwhelming sense that state centralisation has a positive impact on societies throughout 
history. With state centralisation, comes more inclusive institutions, an inclination to adopt 
new technologies and subsequently, advancement in relation to nations averse to technological 
change, greater capacity and capability of the state, improved provision of public goods and 
services as well as increased unity within the state.  
 
3.3.1 A State Without Centralisation:  
 
Furthermore, Acemoglu and Robinson use case studies of countries lackinfg state centralisation 
as a stark comparison.  
 
The concept of state centrality is by no means, a modern notion. According to Max Weber’s 
definition of the state, one vital condition is that the “monopoly of legitimate violence in 
society” belongs to the state (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 94). Accompanying this monopoly, 
is a degree of state centralisation which enables that state to enforce law and order, encourage 
and regulate economic activity and provide services and infrastructure (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 94). Without any centralisation, the state is unable to fulfil these duties and is bound to 
descend into anarchy. This is the case in Somalia, which has no real authority to govern and 
control the country, as power is distributed widely among various clans which are extremely 
antagonistic with no one clan able to dominate the others which has resulted in chaos and 
conflict (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 94). This lack of state centralisation has led to anarchy, 
constraining the state from enforcing even the slightest amount of law and order, supporting 
trade and economic activity or providing security for its citizens (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
94). 
 
It appears that even the smallest degree of state centralisation determines the difference 
between state collapse and economic growth. Countries with no centralisation such as Somalia 
or Afghanistan are unlikely to experience any form of growth, even under extractive 
institutions, nor are they likely to take steps toward more inclusive institutions (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 476). However, even countries with extractive institutions and a small degree 
of political centralisation, such as Burundi, Rwanda and Ethiopia, have managed to achieve 
growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 476). Acemoglu and Robinson, too, have stressed that 
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nations without a degree of centralisation are the ones which were averse to technology and as 
a result, were left behind during the Industrial Revolution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 139). 
In addition, non-centralised nations are generally those which do not enforce secure property 
rights which has devastating economic effects as an absence of property rights destroys 
economic incentive and thereby, economic activity and growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
260). 
 
In addition to having no monopoly over the use of force, nations are also less likely to take 
advantage of technological advancement, enforce secure property rights or achieve growth or 
any form of inclusive institutions without state centralisation. Even Africa’s inability to keep 
up with the rest of the world in terms of political development, technology and prosperity has 
been attributed to its late adoption of state centralisation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 130).  
 
Nevertheless, Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledge that growth can be achieved under 
extractive institutions, however, it does require a degree of state centralisation (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 108). Even so, the authors caution that growth under these extractive 
institutions is unlikely to be sustainable. They explain that rapid economic growth can be 
achieved by allocating resources and people by force, however, this cannot be maintained over 
long periods of time and if both political and economic institutions are extractive, society will 
lack the incentives needed to adapt to technological change and handle creative destruction and 
which will thereby impede upon growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 108). This can be seen 
most clearly in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Soviets enjoyed significant economic 
growth under extractive institutions by means of allocating substantial amounts of resources to 
the military which were used to develop military technologies enabling them to surpass the US 
in the space and nuclear race for a period of time (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109). The 
Soviet Union, however, failed to incorporate technological change or creative destruction, 
which condemned the possibility of sustainable growth and brought it to an abrupt end 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109).  
 
Another danger concerning growth under extractive institutions is the nature of the extractive 
political institution itself. By its nature, the “arrangements” supporting economic growth under 
such institutions are fragile and can collapse or be destroyed by infighting which the extractive 
institutions inherently produce (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109). As has been briefly 
touched upon before, extractive institutions produce a winner-takes-all environment, generally 
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ruled by an elite minority, in whose hands all power and wealth is concentrated. This sweetens 
the reward for insurgents who overthrow this elite and subsequently assume control over the 
state which lead to infighting and possibly even civil war. Along with civil war, comes 
lawlessness, and a breakdown in even the smallest degree of state centralisation which had 
remained prior to the conflict severely curtails any possibility of sustained growth (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 109). The authors additionally express concern over extractive institutions 
with inclusive aspects. They warn of the danger of economic growth being terminated as these 
economic institutions become more extractive in nature which is likely to result in the political 
elite, using their power to limit competition and even loot from others as this will stand them 
in better personal, financial stead than supporting economic progress and growth (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 109). Any economic progress is undercut by the power of elites under 
extractive political institutions and demonstrates the power of political institutions in 
determining the type of economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109-110). 
 
While centralisation is hailed as the savior of nations and institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson 
also acknowledge a darker side of centralisation - absolutism. “The process of political 
centralisation also ushers in an era of greater absolutism” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 234). 
Absolutism is rule which is not subject to the law or any other actors in society, however, in 
actuality, an absolutist will rule with the support of a small group or elite (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 233). Absolutists use institutions for their own personal gain and ironically, 
absolutists, who have highly centralised political power, as well as a state which lacks political 
centralisation, both serve as barriers to industry as they both fear creative destruction and the 
effects of technological advancement (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 233). In fact, one of the 
reasons why greater political centralisation is so often resisted, is due to the probability of 
greater centralisation leading to absolute rule (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 233). An example 
of absolutist rule can be found in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great. Attempting to 
forge a modern bureaucratic state and army, Peter stripped the Boyars – the old aristocracy – 
of their power, set up a new capital in Saint Petersburg, abolished the Duma which had been 
responsible for appointing him as czar, announced a new social hierarchy and took control over 
the church – essentially centralising political power and redirecting it towards himself 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 234). Centralisation in an absolutist sense, resulted in the 





3.3.2 The Importance of State Centralisation  
 
The brief case studies above have demonstrated that with state centralisation, come more 
inclusive institutions, an inclination to adopt new technologies and subsequently, advancement 
in relation to nations averse to technological change, greater capacity and capability of the 
state, improved provision of public goods and services as well as increased unity within the 
state. Alternatively, without state centralisation, nations have no monopoly over the use of 
force and are more likely to have extractive institutions which curtail economic growth and 
prevent the provision of goods and services ultimately increasing the possibility of conflict and 
state collapse. Nations are also less likely to take advantage of technological advancement, 
enforce secure property rights or achieve growth or any form of inclusive institutions without 
state centralisation. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou agree with Acemoglu and Robinson. 
They argue that pre-colonial political centralisation is a vital determinant of contemporary 
economic performance and that differences in pre-colonial ethnic institutions significantly 
impact post-colonial development outcomes (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012: 1).  
 
Essentially, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that state centralisation is critical for a nation’s 
success. The thesis will use this framework to analyse Botswana and indicate that the degree 
of state centralisation is an important factor explaining how Botswana escaped the resource 
curse.  
 
3.4 Acemoglu and Robinson on the Enforcement of Rules and Property Rights  
 
“Without a centralised state to provide order and enforce rules and property rights, inclusive 
institutions could not emerge” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 233). Related to state 
centralisation is the ability of a state to enforce rules and property rights. The degree to which 
these rules and property rights are imposed offers a significant indication into the success or 
failure of a state according to Acemoglu and Robinson. This section will begin by exploring 
what the authors mean by ‘rules’ and ‘property rights’, followed by an analysis of their roles 
within society and their impact on institutions and thereby the success of the nation as well as 






3.4.1 Enforcement of the Rule of Law  
 
“Each society functions with a set of economic and political rules created and enforced by the 
state and the citizens collectively” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). These rules serve to 
determine how citizens may act and interact within society and most notably influence 
incentives. This thesis will focus on rules within a political and economic sphere and emphasise 
the association between rules and institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson regard political 
institutions as the rules regulating political incentive – essentially governing who has the power 
in society and what that power enables them to do – and it is the strength of these institutions 
which determine the power and ability of the state to govern and regulate society (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 94). Likewise, economic institutions are responsible for shaping economic 
incentives such as the incentive to save money or invest, to create new technologies and the 
incentive for education (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). Institutions are integral to the rules 
which govern society and that the incentives created by these institutions decide how citizens 
and political agents function within society.  
 
The nature of the institution as well as the incentives derived from it can have vastly different 
impacts on citizens and society. Take the US as an example: entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates, 
Steve Jobs and Jeff Bezos were incentivised to further their education through the US school 
system, set up companies and acquire financing without having to overcome overwhelming 
barriers due to the inclusive nature of the US’s economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 55-56). These institutions allowed for the emergence of labour markets which enabled 
such entrepreneurs to employ qualified subordinates and the competitive US market allowed 
their businesses to expand and market their products (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 56). The 
inclusive nature of the political institutions in the US provided an air of stability within the 
country, reassuring such entrepreneurs that the rule of law enforced by these institutions could 
be trusted and that they need not be concerned over the security of their property rights 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 56). Alternatively, countries with extractive institutions fail to 
incentivise the majority of the population, but rather enrich a small elite. One example is 
Mexico which in some cases has insurmountable barriers to enter the market. These barriers 
being politicians or officials blocking entry, expensive licenses or struggling to acquire funding 
due to finance houses being in cahoots with corrupt officials (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
51). These barriers are both a blessing and a curse – a blessing to those who are in favour with 
politicians as these barriers prevent competition and enable them to monopolise industries or a 
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curse for those without political connections who are unable to contravene such barriers 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 51). Carlos Slim is an ideal example – currying favour with 
politicians, he was able to monopolise multiple industries in Mexico, becoming the richest man 
in the world in 2010 due to the nature of Mexico’s extractive institutions (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 52). However, when attempting to breach the US market, Slim violated rules 
enforced by the US and was forced to pay a hefty $454 million fine (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 52). Slim’s violation would not be charged with such heavy financial cost – or any cost 
at all – were he to have conducted it in Mexico. However, it is due to the nature of the 
institutions which determines the rules under which actors are to conduct business.   
 
This example of the entrepreneurs within the US and Mexico distinctly indicates that inclusive 
institutions create incentives which ultimately benefit all citizens such as in the US and 
extractive institutions benefit a select few, but ultimately disadvantages the majority of society 
as in Mexico. It is for this reason that Acemoglu and Robinson insist that in order for inclusive 
institutions to persist, a degree of centralisation as well as the enforcement of rules and property 
rights must exist within a society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 233). 
 
The role of centralisation in the enforcement of rules and property rights should not be 
underestimated. Acemoglu and Robinson express most clearly, that a lack of political 
centralisation is closely associated with an absence of rules and secure property rights 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 260). This can be seen most notably in Columbia – a country 
with a distinct lack of state centralisation. Columbia is characterised by lawlessness and 
insecure property rights which are attributed to its inability to enforce rules (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 424). While centralisation allows countries the ability to enforce law, it can 
also allow elites to control rules and property rights to the detriment of society. As can be seen 
in Barbados, Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba, the planter elite would not have been able to maintain 
their assets and property while simultaneously constricting the rights of workers to maintain a 
sense of law and order, were it not for the degree of centralisation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 108). A further danger is that in some cases, leaders are enforcing rules, however, the 
rules they enforce were not charted for the betterment of society. For example, Santa-Ana and 
Diaz – military men who came to power in Mexico – violated property rights, expropriated 
land and allowed monopolies and business favours to their supporters, however, none of this 
infringed upon the law outlaid in the constitution because the rules of the constitution had been 
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changed so as not to apply to them (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 47). For the betterment of 
society, it is imperative that the rules being enforced, are ones that pertain to everyone.  
 
While the enforcement of unequal rules can have detrimental effects on society, so too can the 
absence or lack of enforcement of rules, be equally as damaging, as the case of Somalia. It is 
evident that the lack of centralisation and enforcement of rules have devastating consequences 
and that essentially, without rules, a nation is bound to descend into chaos.   
 
In conclusion, it is imperative that a state has a degree of centralisation to enforce rules 
adequately, has inclusive institutions which create incentives for the whole of society and that 
the rules being enforced are fair in order for a state to prosper and work towards the betterment 
of society. 
 
3.4.2 Enforcement of Property Rights  
 
Quite simply, secure property rights make for a prosperous society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 103). In order for secure property rights to be entrenched, it is important that rules be 
enforced and the institutions which make and enforce those rules be developed (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 155). Like rules, the enforcement of property rights is closely associated with 
state centralisation and the nature of institutions which play an integral role in determining 
whether or not the property rights of citizens are secure or insecure. This section will briefly 
define property rights, followed by an examination of the effects of secure property rights and 
consequently the impacts of insecure property rights. By use of example, this section will 
demonstrate the positive impact of secure property rights and likewise, the negative 
consequence of insecure property rights, arguing that states with inclusive institutions and 
secure property rights will achieve greater prosperity over those with extractive institutions and 
insecure property rights which generally impoverish, and disadvantage society as has been the 
case in a number of countries. 
 
There is a distinct connection between property rights and institutions emphasised by 
Acemoglu and Robinson, with secure property rights related to inclusive institutions and 
insecure property rights related to extractive institutions. This thesis refers to property rights 
as an individual’s right to own, buy or sell land as they wish as well as the right to use that land 
for any desired purpose such as living, cattle grazing, farming, loaning or even as collateral on 
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a loan. Property rights also come in the form of ideas or intellectual property which are 
protected under the patent system. A patent is effectively an “exclusive right” to undertake a 
particular activity and was devised as a way to safeguard those who had such business ideas 
against others who might steal their idea and use it as their own (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
45).  
 
Having established an understanding of property rights, this section will delve into the 
importance of secure property rights and why they are a fundamental aspect of any successful 
society. Firstly, the association between property rights and institutions cannot be 
overemphasised. In order for an economic institution to be inclusive, it must have secure 
property rights among other characteristics such as a system of law and public services 
provision and importantly, these rights need to be enjoyed by the majority of the population in 
order to create a level playing field (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 89). The reason why secure 
property rights are crucial for inclusive economic institutions is because citizens with such 
rights are more likely than not, willing to make financial investments which thereby increase 
productivity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 89). A potential businessman who expects his 
profit or output to be expropriated, stolen or heavily taxed is unlikely to start his business, 
work, invest or innovate because insecure property rights do not create economic incentives 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 89). Alternatively, a potential businessman with secure property 
rights, who has the ability to exchange and contract and can rely on the state to impose law and 
enforce private contracts is more likely to benefit from the profit he makes which creates 
incentive to continue investing, innovating and conducting business activities (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 90). When citizens can trust that their property rights are secure, they are far 
more likely to engage in business activities which will ultimately increase production and 
productivity which in turn, grows and sustains the economy of the state. 
 
The stark contrast in the type of economies and markets created by property rights can be seen 
most distinctly in the differences between North and South Korea. Insecure property rights in 
North Korea meant that few had the incentive to work or invest which significantly impacted 
on their economic productivity as no new technologies were adopted, agricultural productivity 
decreased, and many suffered as a result of famines and total economic stagnation (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 87). Alternatively, South Korea had secure property rights which 
encouraged education and incentivised investment, innovation and the adoption of new 
technologies which increased productivity and earned them the title of one of East Asia’s 
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“Miracle Economies” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 87). South Korea has open markets which 
allow people to buy or sell as they please, whereas, North Korea’s markets are so restrictive 
that if people wish to buy or sell, they are forced to use the black market (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 88). “North Korean stagnation led to a tenfold gap between the two halves of 
this once-united country” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 87). By this statement it is clear that 
these two countries, albeit extremely different in leadership and institutions, essentially have 
the same geography, culture and history, yet are so distinctly separated due to the nature of 
their institutions and the difference in property rights.  
 
In addition to secure property rights contributing to the flourishing economies, they also enable 
the building of further infrastructure and increased innovation and change which arguably is 
what allowed for the Industrial Revolution to take place. As was the case in England; the 
Glorious Revolution facilitated the adoption of more inclusive economic institutions and 
therefore, secure property rights. The enforcement of secure property rights as well as the 
state’s aggressive promotion of mercantile activities aided in increasing economic productivity 
which enabled a significant increase in the construction of infrastructure such as roads, canals 
and railways which proved invaluable for the industrial growth which followed (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 117). The emergence of secure property rights led to the reorganisation of 
economic institutions, particularly, in favour of entrepreneurs and innovators. This can be seen 
most clearly through the increase in investment in roads and railway during the “transport 
revolution” which aided in reducing the cost of transport, paving the way for the industrial 
revolution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 214). Prior to the transport revolution, such 
investment was forbidden by acts of the Stuart Kings, however, following the Glorious 
Revolution, institutions were altered, and secure property rights enforced (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 215). This enforcement of secure property rights and subsequent transport 
revolution is what arguably allowed for the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in England. 
 
While secure property rights benefitted society as a whole through the expansion of 
infrastructure as well as revolutions in industry and transport, it has also facilitated individuals 
in the accumulation of personal wealth. In the late 1880s in Transkei, South Africa, a 
substantial number of natives showed interest in purchasing land and due to newly secure 
property rights, were able to do so. Within three years, the acres of land owned by natives more 
than doubled to 90 000 acres and the number of natives who owned this land increased to about 
8 000 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 304). These natives had invested in this land as well as 
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in wagons and irrigation systems in order to farm it and make money (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 302). Another account can be taken from Sonjica from the Ciskei, who in response to 
secure property rights opened a bank account and saved as much money as he could until he 
could afford oxen, agricultural gear, a plough and a small farm which he used to earn his living 
and make a profit (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 304). With the enforcement of secure 
property rights came the ability of individuals to make their own personal wealth while still 
contributing to the economy. This however, did have major impacts on those in power as 
individual wealth served to limit their authority.  
 
Lastly, it must be clarified that secure property rights must be awarded to the majority of people 
in society or else a level playing-field will not be established (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
89). 
 
3.4.2.1 The Danger of Insecure Property Rights 
 
Insecure property rights are typically characteristic of extractive economic institutions and can 
have crippling effects on a nation. As has been explored above, secure property rights tend to 
increase incentive, productivity and economic growth, while insecure property rights have the 
exact opposite impact. Insecure property rights decrease incentives to work, invest or innovate, 
leading to a decrease in productivity and economic stagnation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
87). This can be seen particularly through the North and South Korea example outlined earlier 
which indicates how essentially one unified country can evolve into two completely disparate 
countries having far-reaching, lasting consequences due to the difference in the nature of their 
property rights.  
 
Insecure property rights or in actuality, an absence of property rights has further consequences 
for ordinary citizens as it excludes those who are not allocated property rights and, in a society, 
where the property rights of all citizens are insecure, it tends to enrich the elite. In a society in 
which the property rights of a few are inhibited, such as in 18th century Britain, those who 
possess such rights are at a significant advantage. Despite Britain’s economic and political 
institutions being inclusive, convicts were barred from enjoying such inclusiveness and during 
this time, had practically no rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 316). Convicts were 
prohibited from owning property, – land or possessions - were forbidden to sue another party 
in court or even provide evidence in court which left convicts vulnerable to all sorts of criminal 
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activities against them which otherwise would be tried, but due to their criminal status, could 
not be taken to court and the convicts not awarded justice (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 316). 
Removing the property rights of a certain section of society is dangerous for those people as it 
puts them at risk of exploitation by others and eradicates the very basic human right of justice. 
While it could be argued that convicts, given their past, do not deserve property rights, this 
example still clearly indicates the distinct disadvantage experienced by those who are not 
awarded secure property rights.  
 
The above example demonstrates the disadvantage of insecure property rights for a select group 
of individuals, however, the situation is made far worse when it is the entire population who is 
denied secure property rights as was the case in Ghana during the latter half of the 20th century. 
Prohibiting property rights for the majority of a population leads to an impoverished nation; 
however, property rights are not denied because leaders believe it to be constructive economic 
policy or because they deem it advantageous political practice, but rather because it enables 
them to enrich themselves at the expense of the population and likewise, remain in power by 
buying the elites’ support (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 80). Kofi Busia, the Ghanaian prime 
minister from 1969 practiced such economics, implementing unsustainable expansionary 
policies, controlling prices through marketing boards and maintaining an overvalued exchange 
rate to name a few (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 80). Busia did not implement such policies 
because he believed them to be good economic practice, but rather because they were good for 
politics – allowing him to transfer resources to groups with political power (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 81). Busia’s price controls “squeezed agriculture, delivering cheap food to the 
urban constituencies” which aided in raising revenue to fund government spending – a practice 
which could not be sustained, resulting in a balance-of-payments crisis, foreign exchange 
issues and eventually the substantial devaluation of Ghana’s currency (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 81). In many cases where people are denied property rights, it is for the sole purpose of 
the enrichment of the leaders and elites. This is not to say that this is the case in all countries 
with insecure property rights, however, insecure property rights do lend themselves to elite 
enrichment more so than secure property rights. 
 
Correspondingly, a similar outcome was experienced by the majority of Zimbabweans under 
Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. In response to a loss of his grip on power during elections due to his 
corrupt ZANU-PF party and extractive institutions, Mugabe embarked on a sequence of land 
occupations and expropriations beginning in 2000 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 412). It was 
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a “full-scale assault” launched on white landowners and was carried out by war veterans’ 
organisations and groups of people who were allegedly combatants in the war of independence 
and while much of the expropriated land was allocated to these groups, the majority of the land 
confiscated, fell into the hands of ZANU-PF elite (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 412). It was 
not long before productivity and agricultural output collapsed and in a desperate attempt to 
redeem the economy, Mugabe began to print money in an effort to buy further support, 
however, this only worsened the tumbling economy as hyperinflation set in and the 
Zimbabwean Dollar became nothing more than a “worthless piece of paper” (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 412-413). Zimbabwe’s economic and political institutions had long been 
extractive and after independence in 1980, Mugabe simply took over the reins of these 
extractive institutions. While the country ticked over for two decades with relative peace and 
stability under these extractive institutions, it was only once property rights were made insecure 
in 2000 that the real problems began, leading to economic and arguably state collapse. This 
indicates the significance of the role of property rights in society and too demonstrates how the 
removal of property rights can lead to national disaster.  
 
As this section has thoroughly established, the absence of secure property rights which is 
usually accompanied by extractive institutions will be to the detriment of society in the majority 
of cases, leading either to economic collapse, productivity decreases, conflict, shortages in 
agricultural output or all of the above. While each country case is different and has its own 
individual aspects and reasons for the undermining of property rights, one common factor is 
state centralisation. Crucially, state centralisation is not a one-sided issue, but something far 
more complex as both the lack of state centralisation as well as the abundance of it tends to 
have a negative impact on secure property rights. The solution to this debacle offered by 
Acemoglu and Robinson is that despite potential negative consequences of state centralisation, 
it remains a necessary element of a successful society in which rules and property rights are 
protected. Needless to say, it is important to acknowledge that secure property rights need to 
be afforded to all members of society for a nation to thrive on equal opportunity.  
 
As has been analysed, the issue of state centralisation cannot be overlooked as without it, 
property rights cannot be enforced and with too high a degree of state centralisation comes the 
danger of property rights being exploited due to a lack of pluralism and unchecked power. 
Perhaps the answer should not rest on the degree of state centralisation alone, but rather on the 
degree of state centralisation in relation to the nature of institutions. Effectively, Acemoglu and 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 51 
Robinson’s argument can be reduced to simple terms – that there is a “link between inclusive 
economic and political institutions and prosperity” because through inclusive institutions, 
property rights are more easily enforced, a level playing field as well as economic incentive is 
created and as a result, economic growth and prosperity can be achieved (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012: 470). Inclusive political institutions ensure that power is distributed 
pluralistically while the government still wields enough power to enforce rules and property 
rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 471). Extractive institutions have the opposite effect 
which is why Acemoglu and Robinson conclude that a country with such institutions, is 
destined for poverty and state failure, while it is the countries with inclusive institutions which 
succeed (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 494). Therefore, it can be concluded that in order for a 
state to function at its best, it requires rules and secure property rights to be enforced – a 
combination derived from the necessary degree of state centralisation through inclusive 
political institutions coupled with fully-functioning inclusive economic institutions.  
 
Property rights are an integral part of a successful nation. As Acemoglu and Robinson have 
highlighted most fervently throughout their book, there is a distinct correlation between secure 
property rights and inclusive institutions and likewise, between insecure property rights and 
extractive institutions. Secure property rights incite economic incentives which motivate 
citizens to work, attain an education, invest and innovate which results in a thriving economy 
enabling international trade, construction of infrastructure and overall economic growth. 
Alternatively, insecure property rights do not stimulate such motivation as citizens fear any 
wealth or property accumulated is at risk of expropriation. In turn, this leads to low 
productivity, economic stagnation and commonly, widespread impoverishment at the hands of 
the elite. It must be noted that for secure property rights to be enforced, a degree of state 
centralisation is required and that importantly, secure property rights need to be afforded to all 
members of society in order for a nation to prosper.  
 
3.4.3 The Importance of the Enforcement of Rules and Property Rights  
 
After analysing Acemoglu and Robinson’s arguments on the importance of a state’s ability to 
enforce rules and property rights, it can be concluded that much of a state’s success can be 
attributed to such rules and secure property rights. Rules determine how citizens act within a 
society and property rights determine how citizens behave within the economy. Institutions are 
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fundamental in determining how society functions, with inclusive institutions creating 
incentives for everyone and extractive institutions creating incentives only for a select few or 
elite. Institutions are also central to property rights as they play a role in determining if they 
are secure or insecure which in turn, influences the incentives within the economy. 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou concur that property rights are vital for economic 
development and even take a step back to highlight the importance of political centralisation – 
arguing that the reason why state centralisation is so fundamental is because of its association 
with secure property rights (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012: 3). 
 
As has been seen, a state with the ability to enforce rules and property rights is most likely one 
with inclusive institutions and a degree of state centralisation enabling them to implement such 
rules and rights. Enforced rules and property rights which are secure are factors which prove 
advantageous for the majority of society and a state with the ability to enforce these rules and 
rights is therefore much more likely to experience economic growth and prosperity.  
 
3.5 Acemoglu and Robinson on the Capacity to Manage Creative Destruction   
 
The ability of a state to handle creative destruction speaks volumes about the nature of its 
institutions. Typically, democratic countries with inclusive institutions are far more capable of 
managing the impacts of creative destruction than those with extractive institutions, whose, in 
many cases, absolute leaders, fear the effects of creative destruction, thus, blocking it from 
taking place (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 225). Before delving into the particulars of creative 
destruction and the power it wields on the functioning of society and the economy, it is 
imperative that a definition of creative destruction be outlined, followed by an analysis of the 
importance of creative destruction and the impact it has on particular groups in society. This 
section will subsequently, evaluate the countries which have opposed such destruction and 
conclude that despite the upheaval caused by creative destruction and technological innovation, 
it is a necessary evil in attaining economic growth and overall prosperity.  
 
According to the great economist, Joseph Schumpeter, ‘creative destruction’ is the label given 
to the changes which accompany technological innovation and economic growth (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 98-99). Essentially, creative destruction describes the process by which 
new innovations in technology, make old technology, and in some cases, entire sectors, 
obsolete. In this way, new sectors are afforded resources once granted to old sectors, new 
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businesses appropriate trade from old business and new technology renders old machines and 
the skills needed to operate them, antiquated (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). This process 
of innovation and economics is founded on a basis of inclusive institutions and by its very 
nature, fashions both winners and losers in the political and economic sphere, depending on 
which side of destruction a person is situated (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). That creative 
destruction has this amount of political and economic power, makes those who stand to lose a 
significant amount of business or their political standing, fearful of technological innovation 
and economic growth which is why many in powerful positions, resist any form of change as 
well as inclusive economic and political institutions which could potentially support such 
innovation and growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). 
 
A prime example of creative destruction is the Industrial Revolution. Throughout Europe, the 
aristocracy and elites were in control of government and by virtue of the monopolies and entry 
barriers put in place by monarchs, the aristocracy were able to enjoy substantial income from 
landholdings as well as income from trading privileges (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). 
However, due to the Industrial Revolution, numerous factories were established, redirecting 
resources away from the land, decreasing land rents and increasing wages landowners paid to 
their workers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). From this example, aristocrats and elites 
appear the economic losers, while merchants and traders are now economic winners. With 
industrialisation, came urbanisation which led to the development of a distinct working and 
middle class societal division who began to challenge the landed aristocracy over their political 
monopoly (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). Industrialisation meant that not only were the 
aristocracy economic losers, but also, political losers. It is therefore understandable that in 
many cases, elites banded together in opposition to industrialisation and other forms of creative 
destruction.  
 
The top social strata was not alone in the adverse impacts of industrialisation, as many artisans 
were also negatively affected. Many artisans (which later became infamous as the Luddites) 
possessed manual skills which were now being replaced by technology and mechanisation and 
as a result, opposed industrialisation, rioting and wrecking the machinery which they blamed 
for destroying their livelihoods (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 99). Indeed, more political 
influence was at stake than ever imagined, as evidenced by the shift in political power towards 
the middle and working classes which enabled political policy to swing in their favour and get 
the Corn Laws repealed in the mid-19th century (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 224). While 
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this shift was not instantaneous, it was undoubtedly a result of industrialisation, which had over 
the years, transferred income and power away from the landed aristocracy in favour of the 
lower social strata which eventually granted them sufficient power to swing policy such as this, 
in their favour. This serves as just one example of the undeniable power of creative destruction.  
 
Despite creative destruction’s negative impact on various groups of society, its overall impact 
is largely positive. Most vitally, economic growth without creative destruction will cease to be 
sustainable (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109). This type of growth, linked to a lack of 
technological innovation and usually associated with extractive economic institutions has been 
discussed earlier and has found that despite growth being possible under such conditions, so 
long as a state’s economic institutions are extractive and creative destruction is resisted, the 
growth will be limited. A prime example being the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 20th 
century, in which growth was achieved without technological change and rather by means of 
allocating resources into the military, space and nuclear sectors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 
109). Although growth was achieved, and the Soviets were able to challenge and at some 
points, even better the US during the nuclear and space race, this growth was not bolstered by 
broad technological innovation of any kind and therefore proved unsustainable as the Soviets 
fell behind the US from the 1970s onward (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 109).  
 
Apart from limited economic growth, the managing and accepting of creative destruction is 
also critical for a state’s ability to modernise. Without technological innovation and indeed, 
industrialisation, countries failed to modernise and fell behind their industrialised counterparts 
who could produce more efficiently and were thus in a superior position where trade was 
concerned (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 243). The defiance of technological change and 
desperation to preserve economic and political position, thwarted economic progress and often 
led to entrenched economic backwardness as seen most notably in the Austro-Hungarian 
empire which continued to use the significantly less efficient, charcoal in the production of 
iron, opposed to the more efficient, coal which was used in 90% of the world’s iron output as 
well as textile weaving which was mechanised in other parts of the world, yet continued to be 
executed by hand in all Austro-Hungarian territories, until it’s collapse in the early 20th century 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 243-244). Alternatively, much of the US and Australia’s 
success and ability to modernise can be attributed to their inclusive institutions which have 
allowed for the introduction of new technological innovation and creative destruction, placing 
them in a politically and economically superior position to many other countries which have 
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failed to manage creative destruction to the same extent (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 340). 
It can therefore, be concluded that despite the political and economic upheaval which results 
from creative destruction, the sustainable economic growth and modernisation with which it 
comes, outweigh the negative societal and economic impact on the select few elites.  
 
Despite creative destruction being beneficial for society and a country overall, it is those who 
are in a position to resist or accept creative destruction who stand to lose the most should it be 
accepted. It is for this reason, that so many countries resist creative destruction as it is the elites 
and aristocrats who fear economic and political power loss, should economic and technological 
growth not be blocked (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 100). An example of this can be seen in 
the Ottoman empire, which was characterised by highly extractive institutions and an absolutist 
ruler who opposed the introduction of the printing press for fear that greater access to books 
may make the population harder to control as it would take the power of knowledge out of the 
hands of the elite and may produce ideas which oppose political authority and the status quo 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 232).  
 
Tsar Nicholas the first of Russia and his finance minister, Kankrin too feared creative 
destruction and embarked on a quest to maintain the political and economic status quo while 
blocking industry and railway expansion. Kankrin reversed the policy of his predecessor to 
establish a Commercial Bank for lending to industries and instead, used all the funds directed 
to the Commercial Bank to reopen the State Loan Bank which only lent to those who owned 
land of meaningful proportion (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 245). Subsequently, all industrial 
exhibitions were prohibited, and severe restrictions were placed on the number of factories 
which could be established with no new cotton or woolen mills being allowed to open which 
halted the expansion of industry (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 246). Due to a surge of 
revolutionary movements throughout Europe at this time, repression of industry served to 
reduce the number of potentially rebellious workers in the city with the government going so 
far as to ban the congregating of homeless people as they feared this would result in an uprising 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 246). Kankrin further opposed railway expansion, labelling it 
an unnecessary luxury and “socially dangerous mobility” rather than a necessity – a policy 
which was sustained by his successor, Kleinmichel who was so adamant about forbidding 
railway expansion that he had newspapers censor any mention of railway development 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 246-247). This example illustrates how rulers willingly resisted 
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creative destruction to the point of damaging their economies in order to remain safely in a 
position of power.  
 
Creative destruction is feared predominately for its potential to disrupt current political and 
economic power bases and it is not difficult to understand why many leaders and elites have 
and will continue to resist it. Seeing as creative destruction has the largest impact on a country’s 
elites, it should come as no surprise that those in charge of extractive institutions are the ones 
who are able to resist it most successfully, as absolutist rulers and extractive institutions go 
hand in hand. The fact remains: those who resist technological innovation, do so at the expense 
of their country’s economic growth and development and those who have proved capable of 
accepting such innovation and creative destruction, have been able to modernise, placing their 
nation in a position capable of competing economically with the rest of the world, much to the 
overall benefit of their country and citizens. 
 
3.6 Thesis Trajectory 
 
The trajectory of this thesis can be seen in the flow diagram above. The following chapter will 
demonstrate how Tswana culture and institutional structures in the pre-colonial period in 
Botswana created a society which had an embedded degree of state centralisation and sense of 
respect for a central authority as well as relatively inclusive institutions as evidenced by the 
enforcement of the rule of law and secure property rights. Due to limited colonial rule, these 
two factors persisted and made for even more inclusive institutions. As a result, the foundations 
were laid for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to rise to power at independence as a 
central authority, with a sufficient level of state centralisation and relatively inclusive 
institutions which is what stood them in good stead and enabled them to manage the discovery 
of diamonds effectively as well as the creative destruction with which it brought, thereby 
escaping the resource curse. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
This thesis is based on the premise that with inclusive institutions in place, a resource-abundant 
country is unlikely to fall victim to the resource curse. As this thesis highlights, institutions do 
not exist in isolation, but rather, the nature of political and economic institutions are determined 
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by a number of factors, namely, state centralisation, the enforcement of rules and property 
rights and the ability to handle creative destruction. While there are other factors which 
influence the nature of institutions, it can be argued that these are the three most fundamental, 
as not only do they play a role in determining whether or not institutions are inclusive or 
extractive, but they also have the furthest-reaching social, political and economic impacts. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail provides a detailed account of the characteristics 
of successful and unsuccessful states, using a myriad of country cases throughout the history 
of civilisation and concludes that it is the nature of institutions which accounts for such 
disparity. Acemoglu and Robinson are not alone in their analysis as many other scholars 
similarly maintain the importance of institutions in determining political and economic success. 
Thorbeck goes so far as to suggest that widespread economic prosperity, which reaches even 
the poorest segments of society, can only be achieved when good institutions (those with state 
centralisation and secure property rights and rules) are in place (Thorbeck, 2013). While being 
a blessing, countries with resources are also at risk of being threatened by those very resources 
(i.e. the resource curse). Using the Why Nations Fail as an analytical framework, this thesis 
will explore whether the nature of Botswana’s institutions can be accredited with ensuring that 
the country avoided the resource curse. In so doing, the thesis will evaluate not only the state 
of Botswana’s institutions, but also the accompanying factors of which the nature of institutions 
comprises. Now that each of the aforementioned factors has been analysed, the thesis will set 
out to explore each in relation to Botswana in order to determine the impact of such factors in 
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Different institutions create different incentives and it is imperative to recognise that as these 
institutions “influence behaviour and incentives in real life, they forge the success and failure 
of nations” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 55). This chapter will demonstrate how Botswana 
was able to emerge as a relatively inclusive institution at independence namely due to two 
factors in particular – state centralisation and the enforcement of rules and property rights. 
Analysis will be conducted on the above factors by way of examining the emergence of a 
central authority in Botswana as well as the rules of law and property rights enforced in the 
country. This chapter will demonstrate how these two factors laid the foundation for the rise 
and power of the BDP which ultimately lead to relatively inclusive institutions in post-colonial 
Botswana.  
 
4.2 The Importance of Inclusive Institutions  
 
The type of institutions established in a country is dependent on several factors – namely, state 
centralisation and the enforcement of rules and property rights - factors which, in the majority 
of countries, lie reliant on the type of institutions set up by colonial powers. Colonially 
established institutions often remain in-tact because it is those who have the power to change 
institutions who stand to lose the most from it. Fundamentally, it is resource-abundant countries 
with inclusive institutions which are sufficiently equipped with the ability to escape symptoms 
of the resource curse, while those with extractive institutions are more susceptible to the 
resource curse.   
 
4.3 Emergence of a Central Authority  
 
As has been identified, a central authority is of the utmost importance for the creation of 
inclusive institutions. This section will be divided into two main sections; the first covering 
Tswana culture and traditions within pre-colonial Botswana and the second, the impact of 
Botswana’s colonial legacy. This section seeks to explore the transition from informal to formal 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 60 
institutions in Botswana by way of analysing the culture of the Tswana, ultimately arguing that 
their traditional hierarchical structures, sense of legitimacy and centralised authority of chiefs 
combined with the limited colonial influence due to historical factors is what laid the 
foundations for the merging of Tswana and modern institutions and rise in political and 
economic power of the BDP at Independence.   
 
4.3.1 Tswana Culture and Traditions: Informal to Formal Institutions 
 
4.3.1.1 Background of Tswana  
 
It is commonly held that throughout the 18th century, Tswana migrated into the area of 
Botswana which they inhabit today and by the turn of the century, in 1800, the Tswana had 
conglomerated into several tribal polities with chiefs (Seidler, 2010: 8). Despite some of these 
tribes fragmenting or certain groups establishing their own tribes, the Tswana tribes on the 
whole, remained remarkably connected; sharing a common language, common beliefs and 
even the common practice of cultivating tribal membership by way of integrating non-Tswana 
tribes into their tribe, with such tribes being assimilated into Tswana culture (Acemoglu et al., 
2001: 9). All elements of political, social and economic life were organised in terms of the 
cultural norms held by Tswana tribes and similarly, the Tswana, like most traditional tribes, 
internalised these cultural norms and institutions through the teachings of previous generations 
or sanctions set out by the tribe (Schapera, 1955: 36).  
 
The Tswana are the largest ethnic group within Botswana and are divided into eight sub-
divisions or tribes: the Batawana, Bakgatla, Barolong, Batlokwa, Bangwaketse, Bamalete, 
Bakwena and the largest of these, the Bamangwato – and importantly, these tribes are not 
dependent on birth, but rather on allegiance (Wiseman, 1977: 73). Despite these tribes being 
separate from one another, their culture, traditions and religion remained relatively similar 
(Holm, 1987: 28). In addition, the Tswana tribes were unified by wars with neighbouring ethnic 
groups and the Boers from South Africa, which served to entrench a tradition of inter-tribal 
cooperation (Hjort, 2010: 692). Democratic principles too, are an integral part of Tswana 
culture with pre-colonial traditions being centered on the ‘kgotla’. Kgotla essentially allowed 
every male adult to have a say in decision making by contributing to the debate around a 
particular issue or decision (Hjort, 2010: 695). Every administrative unit had its own kgotla 
which meant that the decisions around policies and laws were made collectively, involving 
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leaders, chiefs and individuals within communities (Hjort, 2010: 695). This further embedded 
the culture of consultation and cooperation and compounded with the similarities between the 
Tswana tribes, allowed them to unify as a centralised unit. 
 
4.3.1.2 Tswana Are Relatively Homogenous and Authority is Centralised 
 
Botswana has always been a largely homogenous society with little ethnic conflict. This was 
not only uncommon of African ethnicities, but due in part to Botswana’s lack of a monarchy 
which in many African societies, tended to be more divisive and disputatious, rather than a 
source of unity (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 38). Additionally, Botswana’s leaders 
have never expressed any concerns or attempted to prohibit any form of intermarriage between 
tribes. This lack of aversion to intermarriage on behalf of leaders is what has contributed to 
tribes incorporating other members which has broken the divide of tribal lines and helped to 
create a homogenous Tswana society (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 38). Moreover, the 
government ensured that tribes were not treated differently in terms of their access to resources. 
“The resources of the country were shared equitably” between all citizens and each inhabitant, 
through measures such as kgotla, were afforded their say and contribution to the running of the 
country regardless of ethnicity (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 38). Additionally, 
Botswana’s lack of one particular, dominant ethnic group has meant that they have been able 
to incorporate each individual leader of the Tswana tribes into a sort of “elite coalition” at the 
time of independence which resulted in an “ethnic balancing in the country on the part of 
leadership” which contributed to homogeneity and peaceful transition to independence 
(Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 38).  
 
The fact that government in Botswana both prior to colonisation and after colonisation had 
significant degrees of centralisation, suggests that post-independent rulers, the BDP, 
recognised the merit in the type of rule practiced by their predecessors. Indeed, scholars have 
acknowledged that post-independent government has been strongly influenced by the “political 
history of the Tswana” (Hjort, 2010: 695). The Tswana roots have been able to influence 
current government due to the limited exercise of power by the British. Prior to colonisation, 
Tswana chiefdoms were highly centralised with hierarchical structures and a nationalistic 
culture and due to the limited influence of the British, these Tswana power structures were able 
to remain in place after independence (Hjort, 2012: 695). This is an anomaly among post-
independent African states, as power structures were generally captured and configured into a 
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form satisfying to the coloniser, enabling them to extract the most revenue by whatever means 
necessary (Hjort, 2010: 695). These structures and institutions were therefore transformed into 
being largely extractive, which in turn, made it difficult for those post-independent 
governments to return to their previous power structures. It is arguably this return to Tswana 
structures which enabled this degree of post-independent centralisation and success.  
 
4.3.1.3 Link Between Culture and Institutions 
 
In terms of institutions, it is fair to say that cultural norms equate to informal institutions. 
According to Seidler, these informal institutions are important for two reasons: the first being 
that informal institutions are highly ranked within the hierarchy of institutions because citizens 
tend to act in accordance with informal institutions above formal institutions, which in many 
cases, means that informal institutions have more power as they constrain formal institutions 
(Seidler, 2010: 8). Secondly, informal institutions are inclined to remain intact for long periods 
of time, be it generations and even centuries as they tend to withstand change (Seidler, 2010: 
8).  
 
Arguably, it is the Tswana culture which has fostered the development of inclusive political 
and economic institutions. There is particular emphasis on the link between economic growth 
and culture with Landes claiming that “culture makes all the difference” and that the success 
of an economy lies only upon the attitudes driven by cultural factors (Landes, 1998: 516). Hjort 
builds upon Landes argument, claiming that it is the Tswana culture which has contributed to 
“state legitimacy, good governance, democracy, commercial traditions, well-established 
property rights and inter-ethnic unity” – all factors which have determined Botswana’s post-
independent economic success (Hjort, 2010: 688). It could be questioned whether culture is a 
legitimate measurement of institutions, however, it could be argued that culture is an essential 
transmission mechanism from historical to current institutions or that the evolution of 
institutions is not only dependent on the issues or problems in society, but also changes 
depending on the culture which is prevalent within that society (Hjort, 2010: 706). Therefore, 
it is the cooperative, consultative and collective nature of the Tswana tribes which have had a 
significant impact on the formation of inclusive political and economic institutions. 
Additionally, it is as a result of the limited colonial influence of the British, that Tswana culture 
and institutions were able to remain intact and thereby influence the post-independent BDP 
and the inclusive institutions which they embraced. 
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4.3.1.4 Constraints on Rule 
 
Leadership in Tswana tribes has long been considered pragmatic and effective and can be 
attributed to two constraints on rule. The first of which is the culture of consensus which was 
established through the kgotla or traditional assembly which commanded that chiefs consult 
with all parties involved prior to making important decisions, that a platform for debate was 
provided and that chiefs hear all arguments and opinions on the matter before it is made into 
law (Seidler, 2010: 9). This ensures that all tribesmen are represented and prohibits chiefs from 
making decisions or passing legislation which could be potentially harmful or has not been 
thoroughly considered. The second constraint was that chiefs had to engage in economic 
activity in order to preserve political support and remain in power (Seidler, 2010: 9). Due to 
the close relationship of political and economic power which lay in the hands of the chief, it 
was of utmost importance that resources such as cattle were allocated in return for political 
support (Seidler, 2010: 10). Many tribesmen were dependent on chiefs economically and for 
resources like cattle and as a result, their support for chiefs would waver, were chiefs not to 
engage in economic activity benefitting the tribe or failing to allocate economic resources to 
supporters. Additionally, a tribesman was only initially able to take up chieftainship as a result 
of owning many cattle and being a wealthy man (Seidler, 2010: 10). It is therefore likely that 
in order to be wealthy, a tribesman had engaged in economic pursuit or trade and in so doing, 
gained the knowledge necessary to lead a tribe to economic prosperity.  
 
4.3.1.5 Legitimacy of Rule 
 
A chief cannot rule on pragmatism alone, as legitimacy is required first and foremost. In the 
case of the Tswana, the chief’s authority was based on traditional norms of succession and 
respect from tribesmen. The idea that traditional authority creates legitimacy is an ancient one 
and can be traced to Weber, who considered traditional authority as one of three legitimate 
forms of rule. In this case, the obedience of tribesmen is not based on rational calculations, but 
rather the traditional norms which they have always known and respected (Weber, 1992: 22). 
In other words, it is the culture itself and the traditional norms to which tribesmen have become 
accustomed that provoke a sense of obedience toward a chief and grant him legitimacy. The 
fact that traditional norms provide legitimacy and ultimately gives him his power, means that 
it is in the interest of a chief to preserve such norms; although a chief may also attempt to 
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expand his power by other means – such as with the introduction of Christianity (Seidler, 2010: 
10).  
 
It could be argued that the introduction of Christianity was not for religious purpose alone. 
While many chiefs welcomed these beliefs and adopted them themselves, Chief Khama III 
included; it appears that the adoption of the Christian religion had political motive, as chiefs 
were able to use their relationship with missionaries to secure further trade with Europe and 
win the favour of European officials (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 12). Christianity did not substitute 
traditional beliefs, but instead coexisted with them (Seidler, 2010: 10). This tactic ensured that 
tribesmen were not overwhelmed by the adoption of Christianity and guaranteed that chiefs 
were granted legitimacy through securing economic prospects via missionaries which helped 
them remain in power.  
 
In addition, the legitimacy of chiefs was garnered through their personal and economic 
relations with subordinate officials. This kind of rule, vested in political and economic support 
from political subordinates, could be classified as ‘patrimonial’ as the chief’s political support 
is based on patronage and clientelism (Seidler, 2010: 11). While patrimonialism typically has 
negative connotations, this is not the case in Botswana, as chiefs could be publically challenged 
and ousted were they to be considered incompetent (Seidler, 2010: 11). Alternatively, the 
politics between tribe and chief were largely considered “stable and harmonious” due to the 
power limitations on chiefs (Schapera, 1955: 84-85). Interestingly, many scholars have argued 
that patrimonial rule conflicts with formal institutions and that the only way in which 
patrimonialism is beneficial is when it is accompanied by an effective institutional framework, 
good governance and long-term goals to achieve economic development (Robinson, 2009: 5-
6).  
 
4.3.1.6 Legal System 
 
From a legal perspective, the chief was in charge of settling all legal and judicial disputes and 
concerns with town chiefs having similar, yet restricted abilities –the kgotla being the place 
where such hearings typically took place (Schapera, 1955: 271). Legal norms were founded in 
religion and were further amended and developed over time by chiefs (Schapera, 1955: 40). 
The law was adhered to and respected by the Tswana as the chiefs proved their loyalty in the 
interests of the people and therefore had sufficient legitimacy to enforce laws. Importantly, all 
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Tswana were considered equal before the law as there was no legal distinction between chief 
or tribesmen (Seidler, 2010: 11). This too serves to indicate the inclusive nature of the pre-
colonial Tswana state and further entrenched respect and legitimacy in chiefs as they were not 
above the law.  
 
4.3.1.7 Institutions of Social and Economic Life in the Pre-Colonial Period 
 
Pre-colonial Tswana was a traditional society centred on an agricultural economy which tended 
to reside around a large capital. Settling around a capital was uncommon among African tribes 
as they were inclined to be scattered over sizeable regions, however, by settling around a 
capital, Tswana were more capable of being involved in political and economic activity, as the 
capital served as the political and economic hub of every tribe (Seidler, 2010: 12). These towns 
were typically concentrically bordered by land used for agriculture and beyond this land, lay 
the regions used for herding (Seidler, 2010: 12-13). According to economics, a high population 
density or urbanisation as in the case of Tswana settlements, is essential for “early institutional 
development” as it fosters market expansion and better enables the enforcement of secure 
property rights (Seidler, 2010: 13).  
 
From analysing Tswana culture in the pre-colonial period, it is evident that much of the 
practices, characteristics and informal institutions laid the foundations for the formal 
institutions which were to be established in the independent period. The Tswana have long 
been cooperative as seen by their relatively homogenous nature and custom of incorporating 
non-Tswana into their tribes as well as by tribal intermarriage. The Tswana are also a 
consultative people as seen by their traditions of kgotla which continue to exist in post-colonial 
Botswana. Chiefs ruled with respect and legitimacy and built a society in which their rule was 
constrained and no tribe member was above the law. Leadership too was centralised and existed 
within hierarchical power structures which constructed the basis on which Seretse Khama was 
able to rise to power within the BDP at independence. Additionally, the consultative and 
cooperative culture of the Tswana led to and thereafter continued to reinforce the inclusive 
informal institutions which would later result in the inclusive formal institutions Botswana is 
hailed for at independence. 
 
While similarities can be drawn between the pre-colonial and independence period, there is an 
in-between period which cannot be ignored. It is widely acknowledged that institutions 
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established during colonisation not only tend to eradicate the informal institutions which 
existed prior but also establish the institutions which prevail post-colonisation. In this regard, 
Botswana is unique and therefore extremely fortunate as its pre-colonial Tswana structures 
were able to withstand colonial rule. The reason for this is limited colonial influence which 
ultimately allowed for the merging of Tswana and modern institutions at the time of 
independence.  
 
4.3.2 Impact of Colonial Legacy  
 
While British rule was considered ‘indirect’, it was not without consequence and this section 
will highlight the particular ways in which Bechuanaland and the Tswana tribes were impacted. 
Thereafter, this section will consider more closely, the impact that colonial rule had on 
institutions, by breaking them down into political institutions and economic institutions. 
 
Deeming Britain’s involvement in Botswana, ‘colonial rule’ may be an exaggeration, due to 
the fact that Bechuanaland was a protectorate not a colony. However, despite British rule being 
distant – ruling from Mafikeng in South Africa – Bechuanaland and Tswana tribes were not 
unaffected. In order to obtain a better understanding of British rule in Botswana, it is important 
to heed the following three characteristics of Britain’s colonial rule. The first being that 
colonial administration played a meagre role in Bechuanaland, having little to no influence 
over the Tswana and indigenous populations (Lange, 2009: 9). Secondly, institutional power 
remained in the hands of the chiefs who exerted legislative, judicial and executive control 
(Seidler, 2010: 16). The British had little contact with tribesmen and indigenous populations, 
as their pre-colonial power structures remained firmly in place with the chief being at the top 
of the hierarchy and the only channel through which the British could interact with local tribes 
(Seidler, 2010: 16). Chiefs enjoyed acting as intermediaries between colonial district 
commissioners and tribesmen as this position, came with personal benefits as they were able 
to act as rent-seekers with regard to any exchanges between tribesmen and the colonial 
administration (Lewis, 2006: 7). Lastly, the colonial administration disregarded resource 
exploration in Botswana (Seidler, 2010: 16). Three quarters of Britain’s funds financed purely 
“administrative costs” and the remaining quarter supported the “upgrading [of] tribal militants” 
(Seidler, 2010: 16). This was a result of the threat of German invasion from the west and 
potential Afrikaner invasion from the south which the British feared was imminent – the threat 
of German expansion being one of the fundamental reasons for Britain’s colonisation of 
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Bechuanaland to begin with (Beaulier, 2003: 231). Essentially, these three characteristics of 
Britain’s involvement in Bechuanaland demonstrate that this involvement was limited and 
while they kept contact with chiefs, the core institutional structures of Tswana society remained 
untouched. 
 
4.3.2.1 Political Institutions in the Colonial Period 
 
Political Institutions in Colonial Botswana remained relatively untouched from their pre-
colonial days, with only the role of the chief undergoing some minor tweaks. Despite 
colonisation, the tradition of kgotla, the requirement of consensus and consultation and 
traditional authority was not altered (Seidler, 2010: 18). Alternatively, the same cannot be said 
for the position of the chiefs, as their roles were slightly transformed by colonial rule. Some of 
these differences being that while they still presided over the tribal courts of the kgotla, any 
cases which were serious offences such as manslaughter were to be reported and heard before 
the British Administration, with this administration also doubling as the court of appeal were 
a verdict from a tribal court to be questioned and taken further (Seidler, 2010: 18). Another 
difference is that with colonial rule, came an entrenched belief in Christianity which reformed 
the religious role of chiefs and as cash and payment as a reward for labour became more 
embedded in Tswana culture, the chief was no longer able to call upon tribesmen for unpaid 
labour (Schapera, 1933: 406). However, chiefs were more than compensated for their role 
through the commission earned from tax collection as well as the rents they earned from traders 
and the tributes granted to them from migrant workers returning home to their tribe (Schapera, 
1936: 230-231). Effectively, the political institutions did not alter in nature as they remained 
inclusive in all aspects. 
 
4.3.2.2 Economic Institutions in the Colonial Period 
 
The informal economic institutions underwent few changes as a result of colonial rule in terms 
of property rights. The notion of communal unused land, privately owned livestock and 
cultivated land remained firmly in place and the colonial administration was satisfied that 
chiefs continue to enforce these rights in the tribal areas (Seidler, 2010: 19). Despite the 
colonial administration and the more formalised institutions with which it came, it did not alter 




Colonial institutions made land even more of a divisive issue after the introduction of 
technological development. From the 1920s, further boreholes where required and 
subsequently drilled, in order for water to be provided for more cattle herds (Seidler, 2010: 19). 
These boreholes or wells, were privately owned and seeing as water was in great demand for 
livestock, the unused land around these wells which before was considered communal property, 
could now be purchased by wealthy Tswana for their cattle (Good, 1999: 188). This continued 
well into the 1960s and only benefitted wealthy cattle owners, which resulted in economic 
inequality. Institutionally, the British and Tswana respected and enforced the same property 
rights which had become embedded in the Tswana’s pre-colonial informal institutions and the 
Tswana could still rely on their chiefs to enforce these rights, however, the only difference is 
that the more formal institutions brought by the colonial administration, allowed for private 
ownership of communal land to be awarded to those who could afford it, leading to economic 
inequality as the rich Tswana became even richer.  
 
Despite the colonial administration making land ownership more contentious, it did however, 
create markets which furthered economic activities for the Tswana. This was also promoted by 
the establishment of cash as a currency which existed together with livestock as a form of 
exchange (Seidler, 2010: 21). As cash became more commonly used, even chiefs began to 
accept cash or livestock as payment for tribute or fines (Schapera, 1955: 65). As cash was 
introduced into society, so too was trade further entrenched by means of imports and exports. 
Europeans began establishing trading stores in Botswana which opened up new markets in 
which basic goods were imported (Seidler, 2010: 21). The Tswana also began exporting cattle 
and other goods at an increasing rate, primarily to South Africa which served as a significant 
form of cash income (Seidler, 2010: 21).  
 
4.3.2.3 How Britain Transformed Institutions from Informal to Formal 
 
This section briefly described the influence of British colonialism on the development of 
Tswana institutions in the colonial period demonstrating the transformation between Tswana 
institutions in the pre-colonial period compared to the colonial period and how they changed 
into the institutions that allowed for the BDP to emerge successfully at independence. While 
British colonisation had no negative impact regarding the inclusive nature of Tswana 
institutions nor did it replace the local, informal institutions of the Tswana, it did, however, 
influence the trajectory of Tswana institutions. In this regard, there are four factors which are 
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responsible for shaping the development of Tswana institutions from the informal institutions 
which they were in the pre-colonial period, to the more formal institutions which emerge after 
colonisation.  
 
These factors include the introduction of colonial taxes, which came in the form of a hut tax 
and later, a native tax which significantly impacted Tswana institutions as it afforded the chief 
political and economic powers like never before, now that they received a 10% commission of 
all the tax which was collected for the colony (Good, 1999: 188). Secondly, the increase in 
employment prospects of European mines outside of the Protectorate resulted in the migration 
of roughly half of all able men between the ages of 15 and 45 to neighbouring South Africa 
and the Transvaal (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 14-15). Thirdly, strengthened contact with traders 
and missionaries led to a larger variety of goods being introduced into the markets and due to 
the new tax initiatives, the use of cash became more prevalent, with the Tswana economy 
becoming cash-based (Schapera, 1955: 56). Finally, the interest of tribe-elites in further 
economic prosperity and the tendency towards further urbanisation too impacted on Tswana 
institutions as chiefs were aware of the impact of British rule and sought to steer the process in 
a direction favourable for tribesmen; forbidding labour recruiters to work in tribal regions, 
prohibiting the sale of alcohol in these areas and outlawing the entry of “poor white and Indian 
traders” into tribal lands (Schapera, 1936: 236).   
 
Despite the relatively limited influence of British rule on Botswana and over Tswana 
institutions, the manner in which Tswana institutions were influenced – the above factors – did 
alter the social and economic life of the Tswana to a significant degree and certainly served to 
formalise the Tswana institutions. Thus, enabling the institutions at independence to resemble 
a far more formal structure than that of the Tswana institutions in the pre-colonial period.  
 
4.3.2.4 Development of Institutions  
 
A vital concept of institutional development rests of the hypothesis of the ‘imported state’. 
According to this theory, the quality of political and economic institutions as well as economic 
performance is dependent on the extent to which post-colonial institutions conflict with pre-
colonial institutions. So the more conflict between the institutions, the poorer quality of the 
post-colonial institutions and alternatively, the more integrated the pre-colonial institutions into 
post-colonial institutions, the higher the quality and efficiency of these post-colonial 
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institutions (Englebert, 2000). Effectively, the extent to which local institutions are “integrated 
into the post-colonial institutional framework and the more formal institutions of the modern 
state are embedded into a society’s social networks based on its history and culture”, the more 
effective and efficient the post-colonial institutions will be and the more likely they are to foster 
and promote economic growth (Seidler, 2010: 23). Given that the integration of local, informal 
institutions plays a pivotal role in the functioning of post-colonial institutions and much of 
Botswana’s success is attributed to its institutions, it is important to consider their development.  
 
The development of Botswana’s institutions can be characterised into two distinct, yet equally 
important stages – the first being the development of institutions under colonial rule which 
lasted roughly 80 years and the second, being the development of institutions during the 
independence period, which lasted only 20 years and saw institutions develop at a much faster 
rate than during the colonial period. The initial phase of institutional development was 
prompted by the introduction of European style institutions by the British. In addition, these 
European institutions exposed the Tswana to the English language, Christian values and 
introduced a local labour market (Seidler, 2010: 23). The second phase of institutional 
development was a far more conscious effort towards modernisation and development and saw 
leaders choose which institutional aspects to build, which pre-existing institutions to keep and 
the extent to which European style institutions would influence these institutions (Seidler, 
2010: 23). Ultimately, any newly created institutions had their base in European institutions 
and were however, adapted to suit Tswana customs and culture, such as kgotla which was 
incorporated into the new, formal institution (Seidler, 2010: 23). This amalgamation of 
institutions is what led to them being well-received and inclusive. 
 
The success of post-colonial institutions in Botswana can be attributed to limited colonial 
influence. By comparing the state of post-colonial institutions in the majority of colonised 
African countries, it is evident that harsher and more wide-scale colonial influence, did no 
favours for influencing or producing strong, inclusive political or economic institutions. This 
comes down to a lack of culture being incorporated into the colonial and post-colonial 
institutions. Unlike Botswana, the local institutions in many former colonies were eroded and 
forcefully replaced by European institutions in what was often a “brutal” institutional take-over 
instead of being amalgamated into the existing institutional structure or local culture which 
resulted in “weak institutional structures and low state legitimacy” (Seidler, 2010: 24). 
Essentially, this gap between pre-colonial, informal institutions and post-colonial, formalised 
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institutions was so great that a quintessential casual sequence ensued in most colonised African 
countries: one of initial excitement at independence, followed by a subsiding of the delight in 
the new leader’s charisma, the new, formal institutions begin to lack legitimacy in the eyes of 
the people as they prefer to follow the pre-colonial institutions until ultimately, leaders realise 
how little power they really inherited (Seidler, 2010: 24). Contributing to the lack of legitimacy 
is the ethnic heterogeneity modelled on the borders which were drawn arbitrarily on behalf of 
the colonial powers (Seidler, 2010: 24). In a bid to remain in power despite growing issues of 
legitimacy, leaders turn to neo-patrimonial rule as it conforms to the pre-colonial style local 
institutions which citizens seemingly desire (Englebert, 2000: 23). However, this leads to wide-
scale market mechanism distortions and a distribution of resources based on political motives, 
thus promoting corruption and clientelism (Englebert, 2000: 25).  
 
4.3.2.5 Colonial Legacy Matters 
 
The impact of colonial legacy on institutions is significant and can lead to “violence and 
dictatorial tendencies” for two reasons (Mhlanga, 2015: 93). The first is colonial interpellation 
– the passing down of extractive and authoritarian-like power structures which are 
subsequently assumed by the new post-colonial African leaders which in a number of cases, 
has simply extended the dictatorial-type rule which was experienced under colonisation, only 
now, under African leadership (Mhlanga, 2015: 95-96).  The second explanation for violence 
and dictatorial tendencies in post-colonial African leaders is the nature of the anti-colonial 
struggles which needed to take place in order for independence to be achieved. The violent 
nature of colonialism meant that for many African countries, it was only through “violent 
means by which colonialism was dislodged” as colonialism required violent measures in the 
form of liberation struggles in order to extricate colonial power structures (Mhlanga, 2015: 96). 
Unfortunately, it is this sort of take-over by force which in many post-colonial African 
countries has entrenched a sense of violence and oppression as a means of rule.  
 
In addition to this violent nature of rule, the manner in which power was transferred by colonial 
powers, in many African countries, resulted in further violence and future unrest. This was due 
to the fact that colonial powers generally conferred their power upon dominant ethnic groups 
within their colonies (Mhlanga, 2015: 120). These dominant ethnic groups subsequently 
‘replaced’ the colonial power as they fitted into the power structures left behind by colonisers 
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which in some post-colonial African countries, had divisive effects and failed to eradicate 
colonial-type power structures (Mhlanga, 2015: 120).  
 
Elements of colonialism too, managed to persist in post-colonial states as too often, newly 
independent African states inherited their constitutions from their colonial power. Indeed, 
conferences were held in various parts of Britain in which constitutions for former British 
colonies were drawn up and subsequently handed down to colonies along with the granting of 
their independence (Mhlanga, 2015: 119). On one hand, colonisers relinquished their power 
over their colonies, while at the same time, continuing to have a hold over them by instilling a 
constitution to their satisfaction.  
 
In contrast, Botswana’s liberation from British rule came much more peacefully and with no 
need to violently overturn colonial power structures. Additionally, Botswana’s power 
structures remained traditional and rooted in Tswana convention (Mhlanga, 2015: 121). Along 
with tradition, upon independence, Britain did pass power directly to the largest ethnic tribe in 
the protectorate, the Bangwato tribe to which Seretse Khama was the heir (Mhlanga, 2015: 
120). However, because of limited colonial influence, deeply rooted Tswana structures and 
Khama’s determination for democracy, the effects of such a transfer of power were in no way 
devastating. 
 
Botswana was fortunate enough to not have had extractive institutions nor violent and 
dictatorial power structures installed by the British which placed it in an already advantageous 
position amongst its peers come independence. In addition, Botswana was blessed with 
effective, democracy-focused, servant leaders who encouraged wide-scale development, 
launching the country into prosperity and success – upon which the next section will focus.  
 
More specifically, Botswana was fortuitous in its post-colonial leader, Seretse Khama. In 
essence, Seretse was a good leader and recognised the importance of conserving tradition, 
while also asserting a need for change, which led to the amalgamation of traditional Tswana as 
well as modern institutions. This section has briefly shown how traditional Tswana institutions 
developed over the colonial period, ultimately indicating that despite colonisation, Botswana’s 
institutions remained entrenched in Tswana values which enabled Botswana to emerge at 




4.4 Rules of Law and Property Rights  
 
Without the enforcement of rules or law, it should come as no surprise that a country will 
descend into anarchy. It too should be evident that inclusive institutions are closely associated 
with effective rule enforcement, as well as a degree of state centralisation, as without it, there 
is no authority capable of enforcing such laws. The ability to enforce the rule of law also goes 
hand-in-hand with the enforcement of private property rights, as without it, rights cannot be 
enforced, and economic incentive cannot be created. Enforcing rules and property rights makes 
for more inclusive institutions as these laws and rights pertain to every member. This section 
will examine Botswana’s legal system and policy making as well as the role of chiefs and the 
influence of Tswana culture, revealing that throughout Botswana recent history - prior to 
colonisation and at present – it is fully capable and in fact, does enforce rules. Likewise, 
Botswana’s ability to enforce rules, has impacted on its ability to enforce property rights, 
thereby strengthening its institutions to be more inclusive. Ultimately, this section will describe 
how it is the enforcement of rules and private property rights combined with the emergence of 
a central authority which has made Botswana’s institutions inclusive, thereby laying the 
foundations for the rise and power of the BDP at independence.  
 
4.4.1 Rule of Law in Botswana 
 
4.4.1.1 How Did the Enforcement of Rules Emerge in Botswana? 
 
Since the 19th century, the Tswana have had an “extraordinarily well-developed legal system”, 
with courts incorporating comprehensive legal processes and even awarding native's rights of 
appeal in many cases (Hjort, 2010: 697). Fair rulings could be made, and the rules of the 
country applied to all members of society (Crowder, Parsons & Parsons, 1990: 10). This 
Tswana centered legal system based on Tswana values and the idea that no one is above the 
law remained in place despite colonial rule and can be seen in post-colonial Botswana today 
(Hjort, 2010: 697). The survival of Tswana based legal custom is again attributed to the limited 
influence of the British during Botswana’s period as a protectorate (Hjort, 2010: 697). In the 
same way that limited colonial influence was a rarity among ‘colonised’ African countries, so 
too, is the “proto-democratic character of Tswana culture and political institutions” a rare 
occurrence (Hjort, 2010: 697). Tswana culture could not be more different to the Zulu and 
Bemba tribes, south and north of Botswana, respectively. Unlike the Tswana, Zulu rule has 
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been described as “directive”, with Zulu chiefs displaying “coercive” and “overtly 
authoritarian” characteristics (Hjort, 2010: 697). Similarly, the Bemba tribe, which formed one 
of the Northern tribes of modern day Zambia, was characterised as “warrior people”, who’s 
economic and political systems were governed by a “subject and chief” relationship (Richards, 
1939: 17). Indeed, Bemba polities were exceedingly authoritarian, with no member being able 
to achieve significant economic or social status without being related or connected to the royal 
family (Hjort, 2010: 697). In fact, many African tribes were similar to that of the Zulu and 
Bemba and unlike the Tswana, did not have any form of kgotla or popular assembly nor was 
opposition tolerated to the extent that it was among the Tswana anywhere else in pre-colonial 
Africa (Hjort, 2010: 697).  
 
4.4.1.2 The Influence of Tswana Culture on Rule of Law  
 
Perhaps it is this influence of Tswana culture which enables Botswana to enforce the law and 
rules to the successful degree that it does due to the inclusion of society in the rule-making 
process. The chiefs and tribal leaders have been incorporated into the House of Chiefs and the 
early Tswana practice of kgotla has transitioned into a type of customary court (Botswana’s 
Kgotla System, 2017). Through the kgotla, a “culture of popular consultation evolved” and 
decisions were reached collectively with consideration given to the opinions of the people 
(Hjort, 2010: 695-696). Through this system, local communities are able to request a meeting 
with a chief, government official or even the president depending on the nature of their concern. 
This type of customary court, with influence from the public, is what has aided in limiting tribal 
hostility, while encouraging social cohesion and goodwill among the various tribes 
(Botswana’s Kgotla System, 2017).  
 
In addition to Tswana culture, the rule of law in Botswana was augmented by the adoption of 
the Constitution at the time of independence. With it, came a republican form of government 
and “three organs of state namely legislature, the executive and the judiciary” (Booi, 2006). 
The Constitution is consulted with regard to any law in Botswana with “ga le rebe motho, re 
leba molato” – a Setswana saying meaning “the law is applied without taking into account the 
status of the person being tried” – being applied as a guiding principle (Booi, 2006). Due to the 
historical role of chiefs within Tswana society, the Constitution has founded the House of 
Chiefs (Booi, 2006). Together with the National Assembly, the House of Chiefs makes up the 
bicameral Parliament and while the role of the House of Chiefs is simply an advisory one 
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without legislative or veto power, it does have the power to “summon members of parliament” 
and any bill which stands to impact tribal organisation, property or customary law must pass 
through the house prior to it being discussed (Booi, 2006).  
 
4.4.2 Property Rights in Botswana 
 
According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, the contrast in the nature of economic 
institutions can be accredited to a states’ ability or inability to enforce property rights 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). In a later study, Acemoglu et al. claim that the 
institutionalisation of Botswana’s property rights is what sets the country in an advantageous 
position, above that of their African counterparts (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003). This 
therefore provides a sense of the importance of secure property rights and luckily for Botswana, 
their property rights too were rooted in Tswana tradition – a culture in which the idea of private 
ownership has long been established (Hjort, 2010: 691).  
 
Tswana culture has long emphasised the importance of private property rights in relation to 
cattle, land and resources such as water. Importantly, private property rights of resources did 
not exist in Botswana in the same way as they currently do, but rather existed as more of a 
‘right to use’. It was common practice among rural tribes in Sub-Saharan Africa that natural 
resources were communally owned, and each household was apportioned land and water 
contingent on each persons’ needs by the chiefs (Hillbom, 2008: 203). Essentially individuals 
were awarded “private user rights” to arable land and water, with each household or individual 
owning and controlling its own production with the exception that cows are grazed 
communally (Hillbom, 2008: 203). Interestingly, pre-20th century Tswana land tenure saw all 
resources and land belonging to the tribe, being kept by chiefs, who, at the time, were also in 
control of land policy (Hillbom, 2008: 203). This changed post-independence as the Tribal 
Land Act was instigated in 1968 which altered the customary Tswana land terms, as land then 
became communal property and the power of chiefs to allot responsibilities was granted to 
Land Boards (Hillbom, 2008: 203). Despite land being communally owned or in some cases, 
controlled by chiefs, it is important to note that very few instances of land exploitation took 
place, indicating a respect for property rights.  
 
Indeed, even pre-colonial Botswana is praised for embracing the “full modern notion of 
property rights” (Hjort, 2010: 698). While these notions are similar to the ones which are 
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commonly enforced today, they did, however, exclude the right to sell (Hjort, 2010: 698). Once 
a homestead was built, the household inhabiting it, thereafter possessed the exclusive rights to 
that property which could then be passed down through generations or family members – by 
no measure could a tribesman be forced to give up their property after that land had been given 
to them (Hjort, 2010: 698).  
 
Another way in which Tswana culture was extraordinarily modern in relation to property rights 
was that these rights also pertained to women. Since early colonial times, women were eligible 
to hold land in their own capacity; they were entitled to own fields and homesteads over which 
their husbands had no control (Hjort, 2010: 698). Additionally, all land-owning individuals 
were afforded the right to transfer their land to someone else or to lend it out – a right which 
incentivised investment in land (Hjort, 2010: 698). Such property rights confirm that Tswana 
culture is forward-thinking and has modern notions of property rights. It is due to this notion 
of property rights that a market economy for cattle has been established and that property rights 
have been institutionalised. Since everyone in Botswana, elite or servant, was able to own cattle 
as an individual right, many servile groups were liberated (Hjort, 2010: 699). However, despite 
the possibility of improving financial status through cattle ownership, it was easier said than 
done due to the large amount of capital required.  
 
Private property rights or in the early pre-colonial days, private user rights at the very least, 
have long existed in Botswana. These rights are modern and inclusive in nature which has laid 
the foundations for a flourishing economy, in which all members of society are able to 
participate. This section will now evaluate the history of trade and enterprise in Botswana, 
demonstrating how the enforcement of private property rights enabled the economy to emerge 
prosperous at independence.  
 
The existence of property rights had a significant economic impact as it facilitated trade among 
the Tswana and between outsiders because citizens believed that that any contracts they enteres 
into, will be enforced. Credit could be acquired, and the interests of the creditor secured by the 
process of kgotla, in which property owned by the debtor would be granted as compensation 
(Hjort, 2010: 701). Property rights also incentivized trade to the extent that Tswana tribes 
monitored trans-Kalahari trade routes between Zambezia and the Cape and capitalized on 
trading opportunities (Hjort, 2010: 701). Such economic activity was taking place as early as 
the mid-19th century – given that few other African tribes were as economically active at this 
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time, it is questionable whether trade and economic activity of this extent would have been 
facilitated by the Tswana were property rights not to have been enforced.  
 
The rule of law and private property rights have long been enforced in Botswana since the pre-
colonial period and has made Botswana’s institutions more inclusive. The enforcement of the 
rule of law has meant that leaders have enough legitimacy to enforce laws as well as the 
legitimate use of force which puts citizens at ease as they know that they are protected by the 
law and any contracts they have entered into, will be enforced. Likewise, Botswana’s rules and 
laws are inclusive as they pertain to all members of society. Botswana’s private property rights 
too, are inclusive as no citizen is economically excluded and all are given equal opportunity to 
participate in economic activities – the ability to participate as well as the knowledge that rules 
will be enforced, providing economic incentive. These principles along with the pre-colonial 
culture of trade and enterprise, created the foundation for further trade and flourishing economy 




As has been shown in this section, the emergence of a central authority coupled with the 
enforcement of the rule of law and private property rights has resulted in very inclusive 
institutions in Botswana. This sense of state centralisation and inclusive institutions was 
embedded in Tswana culture which had been in place since the pre-colonial period and was 
able to survive the colonial period due to limited colonial influence. Since it was long 
entrenched in Tswana culture and this culture remained in-tact, a foundation was created in 
which the BDP could rise to power and continue the implementation of inclusive institutions 
which were created in the pre-colonial period. The following chapter will examine the BDP’s 
emergence at independence, the way in which leaders have maintained inclusive institutions 












The BDP was formed in the 1960s and rose to power at Botswana’s independence. The Party 
is largely hailed as a success for the country, leading it to growth and prosperity. The Party has 
lost its overwhelming majority in recent times, but still remains firmly in power which will be 
discussed near the end of the section. The primary period which this section covers is that of 
the independence period and early post-colonial rule with a focus on the rise and power of the 
BDP. The section argues that it is due to the emergence of a central authority and rules and 
property rights in the pre-colonial and colonial period which contributed to the inclusive nature 
of the country’s institutions, thus building a foundation on which the BDP was able to rise to 
power at independence.   
 
5.2 End of Colonial Rule and BDP Origins 
 
Khama’s exile and absence had a largely positive impact on the Tswana people. His 
banishment ultimately sparked the organisation of an independence based political movement 
which was established by his supporters and succeeded in shaking the hold of the British over 
the Protectorate (Seidler, 2010: 22). The colonial administrator and subsequently, final British 
Resident Commissioner, Peter Fawcus, became a significant confederate of the Tswana 
independence movement and by 1961 had founded political conglomerates built on a 
“preliminary constitutional arrangement that was approved in London” and included a 
European Council, an African Council and a mixed Legislative Council (Seidler, 2010: 22). It 
is important to note that at this stage, the Tswana institutions and culture of consultation was 
already incorporated into the administrative and legislative corporations (Seidler, 2010: 22). 
The newly established African Council embarked on the reformation of the Tswana political 
institutions and sought to implement democratic processes as a substitute for the patrimonial 
style rule of local chiefs (Seidler, 2010: 22). In addition, invaluable experience and practice 
was gained by the soon to be post-colonial politicians and bureaucrats in administration and 
legislative departments as a result of the formation of the African Council, with the first post-




After being welcomed back into the country, Seretse Khama founded the BDP party in 1962 – 
a party which was “explicitly national, non-tribal and non-racial” – and rose to unimaginable 
popularity as a result of Khama’s reputation and popularity as well as their tactic of building 
the party’s structures at grass-roots level (Seidler, 2010: 22). The BDP had offices in each 
constituency and prior to elections, BDP leaders travelled the Protectorate in pursuit of 
recruiting new members, discussing BDP ideals and spreading information pertaining to the 
new constitution which would be employed under BDP rule (Seidler, 2010: 22). The BDP went 
from strength to strength and in 1965, won 81% of the vote (Lewis, 2006: 12). However, 
Independence was only formally granted in September 1966 and in 1969, the country became 
the Republic of Botswana, ruled under the BDP with Seretse Khama as its first president 
(Parsons & Robinson, 2004: 13).  
 
Although independence was gained peacefully this was by no means, a small feat; Botswana 
was considered an impoverished nation at the time of independence and while it had detached 
itself politically from Britain, it was dependent on its finances for the first five years of 
independence (Parsons & Robinson, 2004: 13). Despite Botswana being financially deficient, 
it had achieved the kind of independence which has proved impossible in the majority of 
colonised African countries – a peaceful transition and a largely ethnically homogenous 
population with the majority considering themselves as Tswana and sharing a common 
language (Robinson, 2009: 9).  
 
5.3 How Has the BDP Maintained Power for so Long? 
 
The BDP’s rise to and consolidation of power has outlasted the rule of many political parties. 
This section seeks to ascertain why this has been the case and which factors have contributed 
to the BDP’s strength. The first factor which will be explored is the BDP’s first president, 
Seretse Khama and the reasons for his appeal, legitimacy, good governance - which laid the 
foundations for the long-standing rule of the BDP - and the Tswana foundations which allowed 
for him to emerge with sufficient authority and inclusive institutions.  
 
Subsequently, the section focuses on the extent to which Khama’s successors, Masire and 
Mogae have continued to centralise power in the BDP, followed by an analysis of the 
centralised nature of Botswana’s elite. Thereafter the section questions the degree of 
centralisation in contemporary Botswana as it concentrates on the leadership of Ian Khama and 
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the growing factionalism in the BDP. Essentially, it is doubtful whether the BDP would have 
been able to consolidate power so successfully and continue to enforce inclusive institutions 
were it not for the level of centralisation and enforced rules and property rights since the pre-
colonial period which resulted in entrenched inclusive institutions and set the base for the rise 
of a centralised power in the BDP at independence and the continuation of inclusive 
institutions.  
 
5.3.1 Seretse Khama: Background and Appeal 
 
As a president, Seretse Khama has been described as a “generous and astute leader” 
(Henderson, 1990: 56). Khama descended from a long line of Bamangwato chiefs who were 
all renowned for their “benevolence and integrity” which contributed significantly to the values 
of “deliberative democracy and market economic performance” which resulted in Botswana’s 
later political and economic success (Rotberg, 2003: 29-30).  
 
When it came time for him to attain an education, he attended school in neighbouring South 
Africa, followed by college at Fort Hare where he received a BA general degree (Henderson, 
1990: 28). Later, he was sent to study law in England at Balliol College, Oxford University in 
London where he subsequently met his wife, a white woman named Ruth Williams – a 
marriage that sparked much contention in Botswana and South Africa and led to his exile 
(Henderson, 1990: 28-29). During his exile in England, Khama aligned himself with many 
members of British political parties as well as students from Africa in an effort to muster 
political support for his return to Botswana (Henderson, 1990: 30). In order to return from 
exile, Khama relinquished his chieftaincy, on the condition that he could still partake in 
Botswana’s political arena and was allowed to return in 1956 (Henderson, 1990: 30-31). Upon 
returning to Botswana, Khama took up the position of Tribal Secretary which allowed him to 
exert a degree of power and despite his experiences, in no way was he seen to hold a grudge 
(Henderson, 1990: 32). His foremost concern for the country was the “issue of stability and 
ideal of racial harmony” – two factors which played an important role when forming the BDP 
(Henderson, 1990: 32-33). 
 
Khama was appealing as a leader in a number of ways. Firstly, he was a well-known name 
around the entire protectorate, given his descent and personal history, and at this time, there 
was little by way of infrastructure in terms of roads and telecommunications (Henderson, 1990: 
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37). Secondly, his personal commitment to the country and its future enabled him to further his 
support because he was willing to campaign in every region – even those in which he was 
unwelcome (Henderson, 1990: 37). Thirdly, his lineage and birthright, meant that he was able 
to “appeal to chiefs as an equal” – despite not actively seeking their support, he was careful not 
to alienate them either (Henderson, 1990: 37). Fourthly, Khama never allowed the BDP to be 
divided by infighting or financial issues in the same way that some of their rival parties were 
such as Matante’s split from Mpho in 1962 (Henderson, 1990: 37). Lastly, Khama appealed to 
traditionalists and had a “delightful personality that could inspire individual loyalty to himself 
and his ideas” as well as an ability to make people feel “valued and useful” – this attitude stood 
in stark contrast to the aristocratic approach leaders had taken before him, as he readily shook 
the hands of rural villagers, exchanged anecdotes and cheerfully addressed any disputes 
(Henderson, 1990: 37-38).  
 
Khama also ensured his cabinet was balanced and that no “special political influence was given 
to the Central District (which comprised of over a third percent of the country’s population) 
(Henderson, 1990: 37). Khama’s tribal lineage secured him a degree of legitimacy and along 
with his strategic political efforts, he was able to penetrate society and gain traction as a strong 
political candidate.  
 
5.3.2 Khama’s Legitimacy  
 
Seretse Khama’s embedded degree of legitimacy, outlined previously combined with his noble 
attributes and a passion for his people enabled him to become an exceptionally effective leader, 
secure in his own government. This sense of security granted him the efficacy to act boldly and 
exert effective leadership by way of substantial influence in the final stages of negotiations for 
the internal self-government constitution (Henderson, 1990: 39).  
 
Some important decisions made in the early days of BDP rule include keeping the expatriate 
civil services workers in office so as not to lose the skills they had acquired and using them to 
run a well-functioning bureaucracy, rather than replacing the existing civil servants with newly 
educated Botswanan civil servants (Henderson, 1990: 39). These bureaucrats were either ex-
patriates or Tswana civil servants who had received an education in London or South Africa 
(Seidler, 2010: 25). Foreigners or those having received a foreign education were considered 
more competent as they were more aware of the functioning of effective political institutions 
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and the problems of which the administration should steer clear such as racism or tribalism 
(Seidler, 2010: 25). Despite the number of civil service jobs increasing by 20% each year, in 
1964, an alarming 75% of people employed as top and middle management, were expatriates 
– a statistic which remained relatively high even by 1977, with 33% of these senior and middle 
management positions being filled by expatriates (Parson, 1984: 41-42). ‘Localisation’ of 
Tswana civil servants into management positions was not done in haste, which is arguably how 
Khama and those who have succeeded him, have managed to maintain the high standard and 
efficiency of Botswana’s civil services (Lange, 2009: 15).  Keeping expatriate workers in office 
ensured that the civil service ran smoothly in newly independent Botswana, while new civil 
servants were adequately trained and well-equipped for their roles when they took over. Many 
newly decolonised countries are eager to eradicate all aspects of their previous colonial power, 
including civil servants, however, Khama deciding to keep expatriates in office during the 
transition of power and until training of new civil servants was complete, was a beneficial 
decision for the country as an effective bureaucracy increases the penetrative capacity of the 
state – a decision which is testament to his wisdom and his willingness to wait for the correct 
timing to achieve his goals (also evidenced by his time in exile).  
 
5.3.3 Limiting Role of Chiefs and Centralisation 
 
Khama’s decision to limit the role of traditional chiefs in Botswana society not only increased 
the degree of state centralisation, but also started the country on the journey of modernisation. 
The disempowerment of chiefs took place towards the end of the colonial period and began 
with the establishment of separate district councils which were elected to govern and oversee 
the former tribal areas – by this point, chiefs were offered the opportunity to act as ex-officio 
chairpersons for these district councils over their respective tribal areas, now known as districts 
(Seidler, 2010: 25).  
 
While the role of chiefs was becoming increasingly restricted, the Chieftaincy Act of 1965 
outlined the traditional power of chiefs in an independent Botswana; declaring that chiefs will 
continue to enjoy judicial power in customary court, maintain their ownership rights over stray 
cattle, their ability to regulate tribal affairs, arrange kgotla gatherings, as well as the authority 
to allocate land and other rights (Seidler, 2010: 25). Crucially, it was the president who held 
the power to suspend or appoint chiefs and once chiefs had agreed to these new terms of their 
role, their powers were limited gradually through a series of acts such as the 1968 Tribal Land 
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Act which saw the right to allocate land being taken away from chiefs and granted to the newly 
created land boards (Adams et al., 2003: 58). Within a short period of time, the powers of chiefs 
to collect revenue and taxes, too were reassigned to tax authorities and local government until 
finally, their role as ex-officio in the district councils were extirpated as well (Picard, 1985: 
66). The limiting of the chiefs’ power and authority came as a stark contrast to tribal and 
colonial life which the majority of citizens were used to. While, the colonial period had 
introduced change in a variety of ways, to which the people had responded relatively well, the 
actions taken to minimise and effectively, disempower the role of the chief, was one which 
opposed the very tradition that they had honoured for almost two-hundred years. But this 
limiting of chiefs, did however mean that chiefs could no longer challenge the authority of the 
state which further strengthened state centralisation. The limiting of the role of chiefs as well 
as the transition from patrimonial rule to bureaucratic administration was a peaceful 
transformation by virtue of two factors. The first factor is Khama’s legitimacy. His status 
coupled with the ethnically homogenous nature of the Tswana people, granted him an 
augmented sense of legitimacy for his presidency and for his actions, meaning that he received 
support for his decision to limit the role of chiefs, making the transition easier as the country 
became a sort of “modernised traditional kingdom” (Englebert, 2000: 14). This innate sense of 
legitimacy for Khama and his government altered the traditional sense of authority as it was no 
concern that that the vice-president was not a former chief which indicates how the Tswana 
had already begun to transition from their previous tribal views of authority (Lewis, 2006: 14-
15). According to Weber, Botswana had transformed from a “legitimate domination of 
traditional authority” into a “rational-legal authority” centred on rules (Seidler, 2010: 25). The 
second factor to which this peaceful transformation can be attributed, is that the expeditious 
development of the state administration was implemented by competent bureaucrats. While 
maintaining a largely expatriate civil service at independence (as outlined previously), 
Botswana’s bureaucracy was able to function effectively. The disempowerment of chiefs was 
therefore not a significant concern of citizens as they were largely satisfied with Khama’s 
governance and high standard of civil service which resulted from his rule. According to 
Khama, this decision to limit the role of chiefs was made in the best interest of democracy, as 
he did not want to set the precedent that political office could be guaranteed through hereditary, 
but rather on merit alone (Henderson, 1990: 42). Importantly, his next in command, Quett 
Masire, warned Khama of the dangers of undermining the powers of traditional leaders such 
as chiefs as this had the potential to threaten the very nature of power and authority in Botswana 
(Henderson, 1990: 41). The difficulty for Khama was in striking a balance between maintaining 
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the support of the chiefs and making sure not to allow them too much power. Essentially, 
Khama needed power to be centralised in one entity – himself and the BDP – and not too 
broadly shared among all tribal chiefs. Had it not been for Masire’s advice, it is questionable 
whether Khama’s acquisition of power would have been as respected, as citizens may have 
recognised the hypocrisy of political position given his birthright into chiefdom. Limiting the 
role of chiefs was a wise decision on behalf of Botswana’s first independent leader, as it further 
strengthened the centralisation and capacity of the state and allowed for elements of traditional 
Tswana structure to remain in place, albeit in a more minor capacity, while enabling the 
implantation and foundations of a democratic government to be laid and subsequently coexist 
in unity – an element of Botswana which, to this day, is not only an anomaly but also a factor 
proving critical to their post-colonial governing success. 
 
5.3.4 Khama and Democratic Practices 
 
In keeping elements of traditional Tswana society, Khama placed great emphasis on the 
tradition of kgotla. The idea of kgotla facilitating “discussion and reflection leading to some 
kind of consensus” was an appealing notion for Khama as it is inherently democratic 
(Henderson, 1990: 45). Coupled with kgotla, was his determination to rid Africa of racism, an 
ideal he upheld most fervently, seen not only in his marriage, but his reign as president. He 
was committed to “ridding southern Africa of racism” – a virtue he pursued in his speeches 
throughout his time as president as well as in action when required as evidenced by deploying 
Masire to Francistown in 1969 in order to suppress the “pro-Rhodesian white community” 
(Henderson, 1990: 45). In line with his support of democratic tendencies like kgotla, was his 
firm belief that there could be no independence until there was majority rule. He expressed this 
notion at the Commonwealth Conference of 1969 and in so doing, offered his support in this 
regard to countries in a similar position such as Lesotho – endeavouring aid in Lesotho’s 
constitutional crisis in 1970 by clearing a path for mediation on behalf of the Commonwealth 
Secretary General (Henderson, 1990: 46). Involving himself in the affairs of neighbouring 
countries indicates that Seretse’s desire for a democratic and non-racist society goes far beyond 
just his own country, but for his whole continent – which again, stands as testament to his 
personal character.  
 
The kgotla is still very much in use and is used primarily as a means to communicate new 
legislation with citizens (Seidler, 2010: 26). Keeping this type of informal institution in use, 
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increases political legitimacy and feedback from communities in this way, enables leaders to 
give their people what they are asking for, which in turn, further strengthens legitimacy (Lewis, 
2006: 14). A 1979 study found that trust in local institutions such as kgotla was far higher than 
in national level institutions such as the District Council or Land Board; as the less educated, 
rural populations had little understanding of national government (Picard, 1985: 66-68). It has 
also been claimed that informal institutions have significantly more influence regarding the 
regulation of social life (Williamson, 2000: 596). Taking this into account, it is evident that 
maintaining Tswana culture and influence in the local level political institutions has granted 
Khama and his post-colonial government legitimacy, which has enabled him to incorporate 
European style institutional structures at a national political level which has modernised and 
benefitted Botswana greatly, while still preserving fully-functioning, efficient and most 
importantly, inclusive political institutions.  
 
5.3.5 Khama as a Leader 
 
In essence, Khama was a good leader for newly independent Botswana to which much of 
Botswana’s development and later success, can be attributed. He recognised the importance of 
conserving tradition, while also asserting a need for change, leading to the amalgamation of 
traditional Tswana as well as modern institutions which arguably became Botswana’s biggest 
asset. Khama was fiercely loyal and held the loyalty of his associates as paramount – even 
going so far as to dismiss one of his minsters on the basis of disloyalty (Henderson, 1990: 52).  
 
From delving into various aspects of Seretse Khama’s leadership as Botswana’s first post-
colonial president, it is overwhelmingly evident that he was a man not only of character and 
morals, but also one which sought to uphold the ideals of democracy and freedom. Indeed, he 
was both visionary in his governing approach as well as acutely in tune with the Tswana people 
– deciding to include traditional elements into his government which incorporated the 
principles upon which their society is based, while at the same time, allowing for development 
and modernisation is arguably the most significant factor contributing to Botswana’s success. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that Khama did not rule alone but was fortunate to have Quett 
Masire as his vice president. Essentially, Khama achieved a suitable blend of institutions by 
building on the inclusive institutions of the pre-colonial Tswana and successfully modernising 
them while continuing to ensure that they remain inclusive in nature. It is also questionable 
whether Khama would have been able to consolidate the political and economic power that he 
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did in the BDP were it not for the inclusive institutions and central authority which existed 
before his rule. Indeed, without such a foundation, even a leader as fair and efficient as Khama 
would have struggled to implement inclusive institutions and respect for a central authority at 
the beginning of independence.  
 
5.3.6 Masire and Khama  
 
Serving alongside Seretse Khama, Quett Masire became the first vice-president in Botswana 
in 1965 and later went on to take over the presidency, serving from 1980 until 1998 (Green, 
2017). Masire was fundamental in independent Botswana’s early years as he and Khama 
worked extremely well together. Masire was an early supporter of Khama’s and as far back as 
1961, ardently supported his decision to form the BDP which was fortunate for Khama as it is 
believed that without the backing of Masire, or if Masire were to have supported an alternate 
political figure at the time, Khama would have had a far greater struggle on his road to president 
(Henderson, 1990: 33). The two met at a Legislative Council meeting and found an instant 
connection due to their similar interests and although the formation of the BDP was Khama’s 
idea, the organisation of this formation came down to Masire (Henderson, 1990: 34). As the 
BDP grew in popularity and prominence, Khama very much assumed the role of the figurehead 
authority, while allowing other party members such as Masire to take on a larger role in the 
chamber as well as the handling of financial questions as he had a more technical understanding 
of intricate financial matters (Henderson, 1990: 35, 41). It could be argued that without Khama, 
it would be questionable if Masire would have been able to assume the presidency. It has been 
argued were Khama not to have ruled as peacefully as he did or be as effective in altering the 
attitudes of citizens with regards to political office, it is unlikely an environment such as the 
one which prevailed, would have been created in order to enable Masire to be elected president 
(Henderson, 1990: 55). 
 
5.3.7 Masire’s Presidential Successes 
 
Masire had many successes throughout his reign. In this regard, there are three successes in 
particular which defined his presidency and should be mentioned. The first of which was his 
handling of the seven-year drought which began one year after he assumed the presidency and 
severely impacted grain production – falling from 58 kilograms in 1980/1981 to a mere 7 
kilograms by 1983/1984 (Green, 2017). In response, Masire was pro-active in enforcing the 
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Labour Based Relief Projects which sought to build dams, fences and houses; dig trenches and 
plant gardens all as a measure for increasing employment and therefore ability to pay for food 
(Green, 2017). It must be noted, that no Botswanan died as a result of the drought and that 
Masire’s efforts were made more effective by the fact that Botswana’s drought received little 
attention due to it coinciding with both the Ethiopian and Sudanese droughts which accrued a 
vast number of deaths (Green, 2017). Given the inconsequential media coverage as well as the 
length and severity of the drought, to have not had even one drought-related death while, 
simultaneously turning the drought into a stimulant of development of infrastructure, Masire’s 
legitimacy as a leader was further entrenched as was that of his government.  
 
His second biggest achievement, was the continuation of the economic success achieved by his 
predecessor. Much of this economic growth can be attributed to Botswana’s diamond mines 
and production, however, it was the decisions made by Masire which helped to sustain this 
growth. Firstly, due to Debswana – the half government, half De Beers owned company – 
controlling all diamond production, mining was effective and substantial revenue was enjoyed 
by Botswana (Green, 2017). Further details of the role of De Beers in Botswana’s diamond 
mining will be provided in chapter 6. In Addition, Masire’s decision to peg the Pula to a number 
of other currencies aided in keeping the country’s exports competitive despite currency 
devaluations throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Green, 2017). Due to devaluations causing 
import costs to increase, the majority of African countries attempted to overvalue their 
currencies in a bid to reduce such costs – but this had devastating economic effects later on 
(Green, 2017). Botswana was able to avoid the impacts of an overvalued currency as well as 
reduce the impact of the decrease in global diamond prices which would otherwise have been 
calamitous (Green, 2017).  
 
Lastly, and one seemingly simple, yet powerful achievement was Masire’s voluntary 
resignation of presidential office – again, an indication of the sense of legitimacy with which 
he ruled. Moreover, it was the peaceful transition of power to his successor Festus Mogae 
which set the precedent for more peaceful transitions of power to come (Green, 2017). A 







5.3.8 Mogae’s Presidential Successes 
 
An important area in which Mogae should be praised is his adoption of issues which failed to 
be adequately addressed by his predecessor. These issues include the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
the vast levels of income inequality and poverty. On the issue of HIV/AIDS, the disease is 
estimated to impact one third of Botswana’s economically active members (Coleman, 2010: 
10). In a bid to curb these statistics, Mogae embarked on the implementation of various 
strategies such as providing anti-retroviral drugs to women who are pregnant in order to prevent 
the transmission from mother to child and subsequently, the provision of anti-retroviral drugs 
to any HIV/AIDS positive member of society (Coleman, 2010: 10). Such an initiative proved 
fruitful and by 2003, it was evident that the “prevalence of HIV in the youth population was 
stable”, which indicated that Mogae’s efforts were successful (Coleman, 2010: 10). In addition, 
Mogae instituted a programme in which the government pledged to pay for the upkeep of any 
child orphaned as a result of AIDS (Coleman, 2010: 10). By the strategies undertaken, it is 
evident that Mogae not only addressed the HIV/AIDS problem at its root, but also its after-
effects.  
 
Furthermore, Mogae has taken it upon himself to implement programmes which aim to 
alleviate poverty in Botswana. Poverty was a larger challenge than what might be thought, 
seeing as Botswana as a country is considered wealthy, with a healthy GDP and flourishing 
economy, which stands in contrast all the more to those who are living at or below the poverty 
line. Mogae feared an uprising as a result of alienation between elites and the poverty stricken 
who feel that they are not receiving any benefit from Botswana’s diamond wealth (Coleman, 
2010: 10). In 1994, the percentage of the population who lived below or at the poverty level 
was an alarming 47% which subsequently nudged President Mogae to enforce programs aimed 
at alleviating poverty by 50% by 2012 (Coleman, 2010: 10). Within a few years, by 2003, it 
was reported by the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction that the poverty rate stood at 37% 
(Coleman, 2010: 11). Even more impressive is the fall in the poverty rate between 2003 and 
the 2009/2010 year which decreased by 36%, accompanied by a fall in the level of inequality 
by 4 percentage points (The World Bank, 2015a: 46). These positive statistics were made 
possible due to Mogae’s poverty programmes as well as the country’s thriving economy which 
aided in the funding of such programmes (Coleman, 2010: 10-11). These policies as well as 
the general running of government were highly praised at the end of Mogae’s first term in 
office. Indeed, in 2003, Botswana was awarded the top spot for “good governance” among 
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African countries by the World Economic Forum which took into account “rule of law, 
corruption, and enforcement of contracts, and also used evaluations from business leaders 
(Coleman, 2010: 10). Likewise, Botswana fared first among all other African countries with 
regards to macro-economic performance, policies relating to institution building and reduction 
of poverty by Economic Commission for Africa (Coleman, 2010: 10).   
 
5.3.9 Did Masire and Mogae Further Centralise Power in the BDP? 
 
Through to the emergence of a central authority at independence and the legitimacy and rule 
of Khama, the state continued to be strengthened, keeping power centralised in the BDP. Due 
to Masire and Mogae also having relatively good leadership qualities and policies, the authority 
within the state has remained centralised. Masire’s effective management of the drought in 
Botswana demonstrated the capabilities of the state to look after its people in the face of dire 
issues which resulted in furthering citizens’ faith in the state. Likewise, the economic 
prosperity that persisted under Masire too, was testament to the BDP’s abilities, thus increasing 
faith in the BDP, further cementing it as a strong, central authority. Mogae also further 
centralised power within the BDP through his programmes. Most notably, his concentration on 
HIV/AIDS and policies aimed at the alleviation of poverty were both successful and served to 
indicate that the BDP was capable of meaningfully addressing such issues. This too led to 
further faith and confidence being placed in the BDP, which secured their authority and 
centralised their power to a greater degree. It must, however, be acknowledged that despite 
their abilities, majority support and centralisation of power in the BDP, factions were beginning 
to sprout within the BDP under Mogae.  
 
5.3.10 Elites and Centralisation 
 
Botswana’s political elite is small in number and largely close-knitted socially, due in part to 
its size, but also to its common upbringing of receiving a Christian education abroad 
(Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 34). The cohesive nature of the elite also aids in the further 
centralisation of power as it served to maintain the power among a small group.  
 
Their racial and ethnic origins were varied, however, much like the homogeneity within post-
colonial Botswana, this did not make much of a difference as they were essentially part of the 
same “Tswana stock” with a largely common language, education, culture and social 
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background (Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2009: 3). From the above, it would be fair to say that 
Botswana’s elite are small, but cohesive – a powerful combination. More importantly, 
Botswana’s elite also have common, well-defined economic interests and are not challenged 
from anyone below (the general citizenry) (Dunning, 2008: 260). This is advantageous for the 
elite as it means that they do not face any opposition from citizens regarding their economic 
interests which in turn, means that no resource rents are having to be spent by elites in order to 
suppress objections to their interests which as Dunning argues, is why democracy has prevailed 
in Botswana because no dictatorial or autocratic measures have needed to be taken concerning 
citizens (Dunning, 2008: 261).  
 
These questions remain, firstly, how did this elite emerge? Why are they such a cohesive 
group? Lastly, why have they received little opposition? To answer the first question, it is vital 
to acknowledge first and foremost, that prior to the discovery of diamonds, Botswana was an 
agricultural based society, largely dependent on cattle ranching. Most of the political elite arose 
from the cattle economy as assets were unequally distributed.  
 
As a 1980s study found that 45% of Botswana did not own cattle, while a mere 7% owned 
roughly half of the national herd (Nengwekhulu, 1998: 359). Cattle ranching, besides the 
production of diamonds, is a leading economic sector in Botswana as it contributes roughly 
80% of “gross agricultural output in rural areas, where approximately 70% of Botswana’s 
population live” (Nengwekhulu, 1998: 359). The predominant issue here is that the assets and 
profits of cattle ranching are so unequally distributed, that it has led to the emergence of an 
elite. A class of elite so distinct that it has aptly been dubbed the “beefocracy” (Robinson & 
Parsons, 2006: 120-121). Progressing to the reasons why the elite are so cohesive, a number of 
theories have been offered, however, a few stand out.  
 
Firstly, it is possible that this cohesion stems from the “historical legacy of benign neglect” by 
the British, who, by ruling from Mafikeng, South Africa, implemented strategies of indirect 
rule which “were not as divisive of the elite as they were elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Dunning, 2008: 261). Robinson and Parson suggest that perhaps this cohesion originates from 
the Tswana’s common enemies such as the Boers, the British and the Union of South Africa 
which threatened to encroach on their land and caused them to stand in unity as a kind of 
“defensive modernisation” (Robinson & Parsons, 2006: 122). Other scholars have argued that 
it stems from a more recent time period – of Khama, at independence attempting to unite chiefs 
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and leaders of all the Tswana tribes in order to achieve a “national, legal-rational state” 
(Dunning, 2008: 261). Whatever, the reason, it is evident that Botswana’s elite have been tight-
knit and cohesive since independence as well as in the colonial period.  
 
Lastly, to address why the elite has received such little opposition, it is imperative that Khama’s 
reign as well as the distribution of diamond rents be considered. The first reason why this may 
be comes down to Seretse Khama who when ascending to the presidency encouraged and 
persuaded many of the other Tswana chiefs to “follow him in the project of state-building at 
the national level” which consolidated power within the group which reinforced their authority, 
rendering them virtually untouchable (Dunning, 2008: 263).  
 
Alternatively, a lack of opposition from below stems from the ability to allocate diamond rents 
at the first sign of discontent and invest heavily in infrastructure (to be discussed in chapter 6). 
Were it not for the small size and cohesive nature of the elite in Botswana, or for the revenue 
from diamonds which has arguable enabled the group’s economic interests to remain intact, it 
is questionable whether this group would firstly, wield the power that it does and secondly, 
remain unopposed by the general citizenry. In contrast to elites from other resource-abundant 
countries, the interests of Botswana’s elites lie in different areas. What is usually the case, is 
that the elite’s economic interests align with the resource possessed by the country, however, 
in Botswana, the elite’s economic interest remains in the cattle economy rather than diamond 
mining.  
 
By the early 1970s, the income received from diamond mining far outweighed that from cattle 
ranching which also makes this decision more puzzling (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 
2003: 102). There are two reasons which explain why this is the case. Firstly, elites did not feel 
their power or position threatened by the growth in the diamond industry due to the already 
developed institutions at independence (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 103).  
 
Due to the Tswana institutions remaining intact despite colonial rule, there was an element of 
political stability which persisted after independence – this continuity of pre-colonial Tswana 
institutions is what much of Seretse Khama’s legitimacy can be attributed to and helped to 
sustain elites in their positions of authority (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 103). The 
reason why this is not the case for the majority of African countries post-independence is 
because the majority of post-colonial leaders introduce developmental policies which seek to 
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undo the policies laid down by colonisers, thus, thrusting old elites into obscurity, making place 
for new elites (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 103). However, the scenario in 
Botswana was different because in the same way that old institutional structures remained, so 
too, did the elites. The second reason outlining why elites did not assume diamond production 
as their economic interest was due to constraints placed upon them. These constraints derived 
from the very nature of the institutions themselves, one being the kgotla which limited the 
overall power of elites and forced them to take responsibility for their actions, making them 
accountable to Botswana’s citizens (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 103). If it were 
not for this standard of accountability it is questionable whether elites in Botswana may have 
attempted to expropriate diamond revenue in addition to cattle ranching.  
 
Not that elites have not been problematic or disruptive to the successful running of Botswana 
as a country. The cohesive, tight-knit nature of elites have also served to further centralise 
power in the BDP as not only do the elite maintain power within a small, unified group, but 
they also fervently support the BDP. While they may enjoy unfair privileges, they have also 
not received any opposition – perhaps, due in part to the fact that they use diamond rents to 
invest in social projects that spur development.  
 
The real question, however, is what would happen to Botswana’s elite were the BDP to be 
ousted from government? Botswana, having never had a non-BDP independent government, 
makes this an impossible question to answer. Dunning makes an interesting point when he 
questions whether the elites may turn to more authoritarian style measures, using diamond rents 
to hold onto power or would that not be necessary since the economic interests of the ‘new’ 
elite may be in line with those of the current elite and both could coexist (Dunning, 2008: 266-
267).  
 
5.3.11 Is Power Still Centralised in the BDP? 
 
It is fair to ask whether, or rather why the central authority and inclusive institutions that were 
firmly in place at the time of independence and were sustained in the early independence period 
have been able to persist? BDP support has wavered over the decades and growing factionalism 
within the party risks destroying the hegemony of the BDP. At the first signs of factionalism 
the son of Seretse Khama, Ian Khama was introduced into the party by Mogae, who would 
later become president. Essentially, it was a fear and loss of state centralisation within the BDP 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 93 
which resulted in Mogae attempting to consolidate power by introducing Ian Khama. 
Unfortunately, Ian Khama had the opposite effect, losing the BDP the landslide majority and 
support they had and failing to further consolidate power within the party. The fact that such a 
measure was taken, and Ian Khama was introduced, shows the importance of state 
centralisation and the need and desire to maintain it. Before Ian Khama assumed office, BDP 
popularity was decreasing but the party always won a clear majority, however, during Khama’s 
presidency and thereafter, the BDP has had much closer competition. This section will review 
the introduction of Ian Khama to office, his presidency and the extent to which the BDP has 




Factionalism is a dangerous prospect and indicates a decrease in the power of the state. 
Factionalism became an increasing occurrence amongst the BDP and political elite as Ian 
Khama rose to power. The following two issues became particularly troubling in this regard as 
they have weakened the legitimacy of the BDP and negatively impacted the degree of state 
centralisation as evidenced by a decrease of BDP support in elections. These issues are Ian 
Khama’s personality and his pre-occupation with maintaining control. 
 
5.3.12.1 Risk of Growing Factionalism in the BDP 
 
By 1998, Botswana boasted a stable democracy with over thirty years of consistent economic 
growth, respected democratic elections and was firmly cemented as the largest producer of 
diamonds by value since the 1980s which had contributed to a healthy GDP for quite some 
time by the time Mogae took over (Coleman, 2010: 8). Despite this success, BDP power was 
eroding, as seen by a 10% decrease in support and thirteen seat loss in the 1994 elections which 
seemed to be corrected in the 1999 elections with Mogae running for the presidency, where the 
BDP won by a landslide, occupying thirty-three out of forty seats (Coleman, 2010: 9). As a 
means of further consolidating power within the hands of the BDP, Mogae decided to include 
Ian Khama – the son of Seretse Khama – as Vice-President of the party in order to garner the 
support of the rural citizens (Coleman, 2010: 9).  
 
This move was the cause of far greater division than it was consolidation as Khama, being a 
former military man combined with his lack of political experience, “perceived high-handed 
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manner, and his public disdain for career politicians” made him unpopular among many BDP 
officials (Coleman, 2010: 9). Such was the protest to this decision, that a group of BDP officials 
attempted to pass a motion to abolish the clause in the Constitution allowing for the automatic 
succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency (Coleman, 2010: 9-10). Despite Mogae’s 
good intentions to consolidate further support, his plan worked only to divide his party. 
Considering this tradition of automatic succession has been in place since independence and 
that no concern was expressed over it for almost forty years, such an attempt speaks volumes 
about Ian Khama.  
 
5.3.12.2 Ian Khama’s Personality 
 
“During his Presidency General Khama has used the techniques and capacities of personal, 
militaristic rule to an exceptional degree” (Good, 2010: 318). He was a military man and unlike, 
his father, did not place the same amount of emphasis on democracy. This section will briefly 
examine Ian Khama in a personal capacity as well as his ascent to power, followed by an 
evaluation of his time in office, with particular emphasis on the militarisation of Botswana 
during his time as president and the degree to which the democratic values which have long 
underpinned Botswana have been undermined by his actions.  
 
In 1977, at the age of twenty-four, Ian was appointed as Brigadier in the Botswana Defence 
Force (BDF) by his father, Seretse – a nepotistic move which sparked tension as he was 
awarded the position above more “experienced and better-educated officers in the then “Police 
Mobile Unit” (Good, 2010: 319). This indicates that not only was Ian unaccustomed to earning 
his position on merit, but with such a militaristic background, he was acclimated to stricter, 
more authoritarian tendencies – a proclivity which would arise in his reign as president. It was 
abundantly clear that Ian had ascended to this position on his own terms and that he viewed 
himself as above the law. This is evident from his refusal to relinquish his chieftaincy, despite 
this being a well-known term of law which his own father was forced to respect decades earlier 
(Good, 2010: 319). Along with his own conditions, he “brought with him his close attendants 
from the BDF” – an issue which would later spark conflict – however, Mogae acquiesced his 





5.3.12.3 Ian Khama’s Preoccupation with Control  
 
Ian Khama’s fear of losing control resulted in him using less than savoury tactics. However, it 
is these tactics which have caused him to reduce the legitimacy of the state, having the opposite 
effect on his maintaining of power. One example is the murder of John Kalafatis in 2009. 
Kalafatis was the second murder in a week and the media reported that these attacks were 
carried out by agents of the state (Good, 2010: 316). The Botswana Congress Party (BCP) took 
the opportunity to chastise the BDP, saying that the party and the DIS (Directorate of 
Intelligence and Security Services) were responsible for the murder stating that the DIS, was 
“a law unto itself” (Piet & Modise, 2009). Within Khama’s first year as president, there had 
been twelve shooting incidents involving the police and eight fatalities (Good, 2010: 316). The 
DIS are meant to be held accountable, however, the tribunal was overseen by Ian Khama’s 
cronies (Good, 2010: 316). In addition to the DIS being untrustworthy, the police have been 
tasked with shielding the DIS from scrutiny as well as in the destruction of evidence (Good, 
2010: 318). Citizens lost faith in public protectors – a dangerous first step in the autocratisation 
of the country which in one year alone, cost Khama a significant degree of legitimacy.  
 
Khama’s paranoia regarding staying in power rings true regarding his desire to maintain 
control. This was evident from his restrictions on alcohol consumption, strict rules regarding 
clothing of bureaucrats and cell phone censoring. Worse yet, was Khama’s insistence on the 
surveillance of civilians by way of monitoring their personal communication. In order to 
achieve this, a surveillance network was installed which enabled the state to have access to all 
mobile and electronic mail entering and leaving Botswana and if people failed to provide 
details of their identity, their mobile access would be disconnected (Good, 2010: 321). These 
tactics were a way for Khama to exert further control and influence over the population, 
solidifying power more firmly in his own hands and demonstrates the deep reach of the state 
in the private lives of citizens. Khama argued that “democracy demanded discipline” which 
was why many of the above measures needed to be taken (Good, 2010: 321). However, it 
appears the pursuit of democracy was used simply as an excuse for Khama to wield further 
power. This level of control indicates the level of authority of the state, demonstrating that 
power was centralised to a significant degree within Khama, however, the manner in which he 
exercised authority led Botswana’s institutions to be more extractive than inclusive which is 




In addition, Khama made sure that he was able to exert control over the media and 
communications by ensuring a “very close and trusted friend”, Venson-Motoi, was appointed 
Minister of Communications which placed him in control of “the government’s radio, 
television, and print networks with their unique nation-wide coverage” (Good, 2010: 322). 
Similarly, Gloria Kgosi, a close relative of Isaac Kgosi who was chief of the DIS, was made 
BTv presidential reporter in charge of covering all media regarding the president (Good, 2010: 
322-323). While ensuring that there will be little to no negative media attention, controlling 
the media and communications in such a way is also indicative of underhanded practises, often 
of questionable legality. Moreover, a president who feels the need to fill the positions around 
him with friends, family and those he assumes will be loyal, signals that he either desires an 
even greater degree of control or that he was aware that he was not fit for rule and did not want 
anyone around him to realise this.  
 
Mogae included Khama in the BDP to consolidate support, however factionalism increased 
upon his ascent to power and for reasons unknown, he even affiliated himself with one of the 
factions within the party (Botlhomilwe & Sebudubudu, 2011: 99). Even more problematic was 
his dislike of elections for positions of executive authority within the party. Rather than hold 
elections, Khama prefered to use a ‘compromise list’, as he claimed that elections were 
divisive, however, it was evident that such a list was used to appoint the BDP’s Central 
Committee in 2011, handpicked by Khama (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 42). 
Furthermore, when two distinct camps formed in the BDP, the first being led by Jacob Nkate, 
the minister of education and General Merafhe, which was “actively supported by Khama” and 
the second, led by Kwelagobe and Kedikilwe, which Khama likewise, openly opposed (Good, 
2010: 323). Thus, actively working against the consolidation of his party.  
 
5.3.12.4 Ian Khama as a Leader 
 
Khama was “reclusive, divisive, secretive and isolationist” as a leader and during his time in 
office, undermined democracy and the rule of law (Good, 2010: 324). As president, he failed 
to address even one press conference and in July 2009, when asked by the Botswana National 
Youth Council to engage in a debate with his opposition in the lead up to the national elections 
in October, the President not only refused the invitation but sought to end the debates entirely, 
ordering the Youth Council to cancel the debates (Good, 2010: 323). Nevertheless, the support 
of the people for the BDP was able to sustain the votes and he won the 2009 election. Despite 
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being brought into the BDP to consolidate power and put an end to factionalism, Ian Khama 
did the opposite, solidifying already existing factions and further entrenching them. Much of 
the public disdain was reflected in the 2014 elections when the BDP share of votes fell just 
below 50% for the first time in half a century (Njanji, 2019). Factions were deepened further 
in 2018 when Khama’s personally chosen Vice-President, Mokgweetsi Masisi took over the 
presidency and began reversing some of Khama’s policies such as the “ban on elephant trophy 
hunting” which in particular, aggravated Khama, prompting him to renounce Masisi as 
autocratic and turning to support their opposition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), 
before forming his own opposition party, the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) (Njanji, 2019).  
Even at the end of his time as President, Ian Khama’s renouncing of Masisi has led to further 
factions within the party as people are unsure as to who to support. Though increasing the 
militarisation of Botswana and thereby undermining the democracy which had long been in 
place, Ian Khama managed to maintain the flow of income from diamonds and retain enough 




Due to the degree of state centralisation in Botswana in addition to the effective enforcement 
of rules and property rights, Botswana emerged as an inclusive institution at independence. 
This was primarily a result of Tswana culture which has long enforced inclusive institutions 
and limited colonial legacy which enabled pre-colonial Tswana culture and structures to 
survive the colonial period and lastly, a merging of Tswana and modern institutions by the 
BDP in the independent period which has resulted in the implementing and endurance of 
inclusive institutions which have benefited the country. Indeed, it was the existence of a central 
authority and inclusive political and economic institutions in the pre-colonial period which laid 
the foundations for the rise and power of the BDP at independence and is the reason why the 
BDP emerged and has subsequently been able to hold onto power in Botswana for so long and 
ruled in a largely effective manner. However, it must be acknowledged that just because 
Botswana has been able to escape the resource curse up until now, does not mean that it will 
necessarily continue to escape it. It is possible that poor leadership and adverse decisions in 
the future could reverse the country’s good progress and Botswana could begin to experience 
the negative impact of resources. The following chapter will examine the degree to which these 




Chapter 6: Impact of Institutional Development and Management 




The impact of resource discovery can either be detrimental or propitious and vitally, it is 
institutional development that determines such an outcome. This chapter will therefore 
demonstrate how Botswana’s emergence as a centralised state with inclusive institutions at 
independence resulted in the BDP having the capacity to manage diamonds and their 
potentially destructive consequences and avoided the Resource Curse. This chapter too, will 
focus on diamonds in Botswana, exploring their unique features and emphasising the benefit 
of their discovery as seen through the diversification of the economy, creation of industries and 
development of infrastructure as a result of diamond revenue. Subsequently, Botswana’s 
attitude toward creative destruction will be evaluated, with particular attention on the post-
colonial innovation and developments spurred by diamond revenue. Additionally, the 
significance of creative destruction will also be discussed, with a keen focus on the interests of 
the BDP, followed by a consideration of the challenges which still persist in the country despite 
such competent handling of creative destruction. The chapter will be laid out in the above 
fashion in order to demonstrate the progression of how institutions impact the management of 
resources after their discovery and thereafter, the impact of resource revenue on industry and 
development and the creative destruction with which it brings. Ultimately, this chapter 
expresses the importance of institutions regarding resource discovery, how resource revenue 
bolsters other sectors of the economy leading to creative destruction, how the institutions 
determine how that creative destruction will be handled and finally, in the case of Botswana, 
how their developed, inclusive institutions resulted in the country successfully managing the 
discovery of diamonds and the creative destruction which came with it, that ultimately, served 
to strengthen the state.  
 
6.2 Diamonds  
 
This section will consist of two subsections. The first of which concerns the impact of 
institutional development and the discovery of diamonds, while the second addresses the 
unique features of Botswana’s diamond industry which helped the industry to emerge 
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successfully. Once the above has been established, the section will conclude that if it were not 
for the discovery of diamonds and more importantly, if it were not for the inclusive institutions 
in place which resulted in a cohesive, coherent state capable of handling the discovery of 
diamonds, Botswana would not be as prosperous as it is today.  
 
6.2.1 Impact of Institutional Development  
 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, Botswana was able to emerge as a relatively 
inclusive institution at independence due primarily to two factors: state centralisation and the 
enforcement of rules and property rights. Due to limited colonial influence, these factors 
persisted in Botswana and laid the foundations for the rise and power of the BDP and thereby 
the continuation of relatively inclusive institutions. It is these institutions which the BDP 
adopted as well as the peaceful and unanimous conditions under which the party was formed 
which resulted in the BDP running a relatively coherent state at independence, thus enabling 
the party to manage the discovery and subsequent revenue of diamonds in a positive manner. 
Crucially, it is this competent handling of the discovery of diamonds which contributed to 
diamonds being a blessing as they were used favourably to the benefit of the country, 
essentially escaping the resource curse. 
 
Indeed, the importance of Botswana escaping the resource curse, cannot be understated. As 
was explored in the literature review, a resource curse is likely to occur in resource-abundant 
countries in one of the following three manners -  impacting economic performance, impacting 
conflict and civil war or lastly, impacting political regime type and democracy.  
 
6.2.1.1 Economic Performance 
 
According to Wheeler, countries rich in resources are more likely to be characterised by slower 
economic growth than their non-resource counterparts (Wheeler, 1984). Similarly, resource 
abundant countries have been found to experience a decline in the efficiency of their domestic 
capital formation (Gelb & Associates, 1998) with income per capita growing three times more 
slowly than in a country without resources (Auty, 2001: 3). In addition, resource-abundant 
countries are more likely to have higher levels of corruption (Leite & Weidmann, 1999) as well 
as poorer human development levels and increased poverty (Ross, 2003). As is evident by this 
point the outcome of diamonds in Botswana could not have had a more opposite effect. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
Diamonds had an enormously positive impact on economic growth as indicated by the increase 
in the aggregate growth rate of GDP by 50% between the 1979/80 financial year to the 1986/87 
year (Jerven, 2010: 83). Likewise, diamond revenue quickly came to account for a third of the 
country’s GDP and half of the government’s revenue (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 273). By no 
means did Botswana experience slow growth or declining income per capita as a result of the 
discovering of diamonds. Botswana also lacks the high levels of corruption found in many 
resource-abundant countries, however, this is likely to be largely due to a centralised authority 
with a firm grip on power without a clear political opponent. Sadly, it must be acknowledged 
that Botswana does not have particularly high levels of human development and is 
characterised by a high level of poverty due to very few people being employed in the diamond 
sector.  
 
Interestingly to contrast many of the scholars from the late twentieth century period, Stevens 
argues that it is not the presence of resources themselves which result in a resource curse, but 
rather the quality of economic institutions which determine the likelihood of such curse-like 
symptoms. According to Stevens, the quality of economic institutions in addition to the 
management of those institutions and of the country as a whole will determine such a fate 
(Stevens, Lahn & Kooroshy, 2015: 9). Following this argument, it is evident that Botswana has 
avoided the resource curse because of its well-functioning, inclusive institutions which has 
enabled it to handle the discovery of diamonds extraordinarily well, thus avoiding the resource 
curse.  
 
6.2.1.2 Conflict and Civil War 
 
Another school of thought pertaining to the resource curse, is that resources result in conflict 
and civil war for two reasons in particular. The first being that resources make governments 
weaker due to corruption and they consequently struggle to hold down rebellions or uprisings, 
while the second reason is that resources increase the value of other groups to capture the state 
which too results in violence and conflict (de Soysa, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Le Billon, 
2005). Unlike some resource-abundant countries, Botswana is again an anomaly. A lack of 
conflict arising from the discovery of diamonds in Botswana could be due to a number of 
factors. One such factor being that Botswana is a relatively homogenous society with little 
ethnic conflict. Another being that due to the BDP holding such a majority (particularly at the 
time of discovery and establishment of the diamond industry), there was little opposition and 
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therefore very few other groups vying for power. However, the reason for a lack of conflict is 
most probably a combination of the above factors combined with the foundation of strong, 
inclusive institutions which allowed for the successful handling of diamonds as well as for the 
impact of diamonds to benefit the whole society. 
 
6.2.1.3 Political Regime Type and Democracy 
 
Quite simply, many scholars have found that an increase in resources leads to a decline in 
democracy and a tendency toward authoritarianism (Wantchekon, 1999). Similar to the 
argument for conflict and civil war is that scholars claim that it is because states are weakened 
by resources that they turn toward such authoritarian practices (Ross, 2013: 8).  However, in 
the case of Botswana, the government has neither weakened, nor turned to authoritarian 
tendencies in the period closest to the discovery of diamonds. While the authoritarian 
tendencies demonstrated by Ian Khama cannot be ignored, they were only displayed in 
Botswana’s more recent history, decades after the discovery of diamonds and therefore do not 
relate as directly to these arguments of scholars. The strength of the state and firm grip on 
democracy despite the discovery of diamonds can be attributed to the significant degree of state 
centralisation, general upholding of democratic values and practices by Khama at the time of 
the diamond discovery and the inclusive institutions which stood to ensure diamond revenue 
benefited the entire country and its people.  
 
6.2.1.4 Institutions and Resources 
 
Harping back on the point made by Stevens, scholars in the resource curse field have also found 
the impact of the quality of institutions on resources to be irrefutable. If a country has weak 
institutions, they are more likely to suffer the “voracity effect” which leads to resources having 
negative impacts, resulting in groups vying for resource rents which are subsequently 
squandered such that the resources fail to have a beneficial effect (Tornell & Lane, 1999).  
 
Alternatively, resources have also been found to have a negative impact on institutions. 
According to a number of scholars, resources stunt the evolution of institutions in a number of 
ways. Either as a result of their volatile nature, governments have difficulty in planning, thus 
negatively impacting institutions (Karl, 1997) or the expansion of government revenue makes 
it harder for the government to manage (Hertog, 2007). Additionally, governments lose 
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accountability when they rely on resource revenue instead of taxation income (Beblawi, 1987) 
and resource rents also entice low-quality political candidates which can also negatively impact 
government and its institutions (Ross, 2001b).  
 
Due to the significant effect of institutions on resources and vice-versa, much of the successful 
management of diamonds and its revenue in Botswana must be attributed to its inclusive 
institutions. Were it not for such embedded state centralisation and enforceable rules and 
property rights, it is questionable whether the BDP would have arisen with the autonomy, 
majority and endemic strong, inclusive institutions that it did. This authority and institutions 
aided the BDP in its handling of diamonds which enabled the country to defy the odds and the 
resource curse.  
 
6.2.2 Unique Features of the Diamond Industry in Botswana 
 
In addition to the favourable features of sound institutions and a coherent authority under which 
Botswana’s diamonds were discovered as outlined above, there are a number of unique 
characteristics of Botswana’s diamonds and landscape which too had a positive effect on the 
diamonds and thus served to avoid any resource curse-like symptoms. This section will 
therefore delve briefly into the background of diamonds in Botswana, followed by an analysis 
of the aforementioned characteristics of the nature of diamonds, time of discovery, type, 
location, lootability as well as the leadership at the time of discovery which all impacted greatly 
on the degree to which diamonds were a blessing for Botswana. The section will also 
acknowledge the negative impact of such an industry, but will conclude that despite the 
negatives, Botswana would not have been nearly as economically successful without diamonds 




While some gold had been mined in Botswana until 1964, it was the discovery of diamonds in 
1967 at Letlhakane which changed the trajectory of Botswana’s future forever, sparking the 
intensive mining and development of minerals in Botswana (Tomlinson, 1975: 272). A short 
while later, one of the biggest diamond pipes in the world was discovered in the country in 
Orapa – a pipe so large, that it covered 112.5 hectares and by 1971, was able to “treat 7 250 
tonnes of diamond-bearing material a day” (Tomlinson, 1975: 272). By 1974, Orapa was 
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producing 3 million carats of industrial diamonds with a market value of R22 million 
(Tomlinson, 1975: 272). It is also important to note the foreign attention as well as support 
Botswana now received courtesy of its newfound status as one of the world’s largest diamond 
producers (Tomlinson, 1975: 272).   
 
Over a quarter of a century later, Botswana more than stands its stead in the diamond mining 
industry. While the country is not the largest producer of diamonds in the world, it remains the 
largest producer by value of diamonds in the world (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 262). Due to 
low domestic costs of production in comparison to their sales value, diamonds were 
enormously profitable for Botswana and by the 1980s, had far overtaken the beef industry, 
accounting for 40% of the country’s exports by 1981 and 87% by 2001 (Taylor & Mokhawa, 
2003: 263). Indeed, diamonds quickly became a significant part of Botswana’s economy, 
accounting for one third of GDP and half of all government revenue (Taylor & Mokhawa, 
2003: 273). Indeed, growth from diamond mining was exponential and proved invaluable to 
the country as seen by “the aggregate growth rate of total GDP almost doubling from 1979/80 
to 1986/87” with 70% of this increase attributed solely to the mining sector (Jerven, 2010: 83). 
Additionally, government came to rely far more heavily on diamond mining for its revenue 
during this period, with over 50% of government revenue originating from mining in 1985/86 
(Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 110). The growth in this sector was so significant, that without 
diamonds, Botswana would be in a very different position. During the 1973/74 to 1978/79 
period, the combined value added from both the manufacturing and agricultural sector grew by 
2% per year on average which would have resulted in a GDP growth nowhere near necessary 
to keep up with the population growth (Jerven, 2010: 82). Without diamond mining, the 
economy would not have grown nearly as much nor as fast as it did in Botswana which would 
have made it significantly more challenging for the country to invest in infrastructure or be 
anywhere close to the financial status which it currently stands. Indeed, it is evident that 
diamonds in Botswana have had an undeniably positive impact with no indication of a resource 
curse. The next section outlines the characteristics of Botswana’s diamonds which have 
contributed to its success.  
 
6.2.2.2 Features of Botswana’s Diamonds  
 
While establishing that the presence of diamonds had enormously beneficial impacts for 
Botswana, it is important to dissect some of the features which resulted in Botswana’s 
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diamonds being so beneficial. There are three main features which explain why this is the case. 
The first of which is the nature of Botswana’s diamonds. Botswana’s diamonds are kimberlite, 
meaning that they are more difficult to mine and require expertise and apparatus to extract 
(Jerven, 2010: 93). This ensures that the diamonds can only be mined by corporations that have 
the expertise and equipment which have been hired and authorised by the government to mine, 
preventing any individuals from being able to extract and loot diamonds which would be a loss 
for the state and could easily lead to conflict as well as serve as a source of funding for conflict. 
The second reason is that the population of Botswana is very small relative to its diamond 
wealth which means that the revenue from diamonds goes further to aiding the development 
and provision of infrastructure and resources per capita (Jerven, 2010: 93). Lastly, Botswana 
is extremely fortunate that diamonds were discovered after independence and not while they 
were still a British protectorate (Jerven, 2010: 93). This has enabled Botswana to benefit solely 
from their diamond deposits without their colonial power being entitled to revenue nor be left 
with the extractive institutions which typically characterise resource-abundant colonies. Again, 
limited colonisation in Botswana was beneficial, as it enabled Botswana’s pre-colonial 
structures to persist, thus allowing for the discovery of diamonds to take place in an 
environment of strong, inclusive institutions which enabled them to be managed successfully. 
Furthermore, Jerven identifies the biggest contributing factor to sustainable development as 
macroeconomic and political stability (Jerven, 2010: 93). As has been demonstrated by 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework, sustainable development is a typical outcome of 
macroeconomic and political stability - both prominent factors of inclusive institutions. 
Macroeconomic and political stability has been achieved in Botswana because diamonds have 
provided “a steady and secure stream of revenues” which has enabled widespread economic 
growth and development (Jerven, 2010: 93). It is therefore evident that while diamonds alone 
are not always a blessing for a country, the effective control and production of them as well as 
some of their specific characteristics, secures steady revenues which aids development and 
long-term stability. Two more characteristics of diamonds themselves which contributed to 
Botswana’s escape of the resource curse and ultimately diamond success will now be 
discussed. 
 
6.2.2.3 Type of Diamonds – Location and Lootability 
 
Overall, it must be acknowledged that Botswana has been particularly fortunate with regards 
to its diamonds and conditions surrounding their discovery and nature. Thorough research into 
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resource curse literature has revealed that there are a number of factors which determine the 
likelihood of particular resources causing conflict which serve to explain why diamonds were 
a curse in Sierra Leone, but not in Botswana. Again, it is evident that in addition to the 
opportune conditions in which Botswana’s diamonds were discovered and extracted, they were 
also fortunate in the type of diamonds with which they have been blessed. The reason why 
diamonds have led to civil conflict in a number of countries is because diamonds can be used 
by rebel groups to finance their war efforts and private income as was the case in the Sierra 
Leone civil war (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005: 538-539). As shown by Acemoglu and 
Robinson, countries with extractive institutions are more likely to have a lower degree of state 
centralisation, thus creating an environment in which rebel groups are able to rise up – an 
environment made even more dangerous when resources are able to be taken for the funding 
of such groups and their conflicts. Moreover, it has been found that the majority of countries 
with diamonds have experienced conflict, the chance increasing ever more so when those 
diamonds are ‘lootable’ (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005: 539). While the relation of 
resources and conflict is a whole other domain of resource curse study, there are certain factors 
which make the possibility of conflict far more likely such as the location and concentration of 
diamonds. Primary diamonds are found underground and require skills and machinery to mine 
which is why they are typically mined by large corporations with much of the revenue going 
to the government (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005: 543). Alternatively, secondary 
diamonds are more easily discovered and can be extracted with hand tools such as shovels and 
sieves (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005: 543). Primary diamonds are usually ‘point’ 
resources because they are found in particular areas in contrast to secondary diamonds which 
are normally ‘diffuse’ resources since they are scattered over areas opposed to being in one 
specific zone (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005: 543). Primary diamonds are typically non-
lootable diamonds as they are harder to extract and are therefore less likely to cause conflict, 
while secondary diamonds are lootable and therefore have a higher likelihood of falling into 
the wrong hands such as rebel groups which results in conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 
2005: 559).  
 
The location of resources (proximate or distant in relation to the country’s centre) in 
conjunction with the concentration of diamonds (point or diffuse) also plays a role in the type 
of civil conflict which is likely to erupt should diamonds be at the centre of combat. According 
to Le Billon, point resources have a greater possibility of resulting in coup d’ètats and state 
control when they are in close proximity, but with secession attempts when resources are 
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distant (Le Billon, 2001). Alternatively, diffuse resources tend to cause riots and rebellion when 
in close proximity, and warlordism if distant (Le Billon, 2001). However, the level of ease with 
which resources can be looted must always be the first point of consideration as no conflict of 
any kind is likely to be experienced if diamonds are not easily lootable. By briefly analysing 
the various diamond characteristics which are likely to cause conflict, it is evident that 
Botswana is fortunate in comparison to many of its diamond mining counterparts because its 
diamonds are point, non-lootable resources which significantly minimises the chance of their 
diamonds to cause conflict which has arguably been a contributing factor to their largely 
peaceful society and escaping of the resource curse.  
 
6.2.2.4 Further Advantageous Characteristics  
 
Besides being blessed with diamonds of an auspicious nature, Botswana was fortunate in two 
additional respects – the one being inclusive institutions at the time of discovery and the other, 
good leadership which sought to benefit their society as a whole. By the time of independence, 
Botswana “had already started to build a relatively democratic polity” with efficient, inclusive 
institutions in place (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 104). One such institution firmly 
in place was that of private property rights which was further reinforced by the discovery of 
diamonds – as were the other institutions reinforced by this flow of revenue (Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 104). In addition, due to the scope of the BDP’s coalition, revenue 
from diamonds were spread broadly with the extent of this revenue raising the “opportunity 
cost of undermining the good institutional path” in other words, no elite attempted to increase 
their rents at the cost of political upheaval (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2003: 104).  
 
The second aspect in which Botswana was fortunate was the excellent leadership they had in 
Seretse Khama. Were Seretse not to have altered subsoil mineral rights away from tribal lands 
to the government, it is highly probable that diamonds would have been a source of tribal 
conflict as some tribes would have benefited over others simply by luck (Acemoglu, Johnson 
& Robinson, 2003: 105). Not only could this have resulted in conflict, but it would have 
cemented ethnic and tribal lines which would have prevented Botswana from having a largely 
homogenous society. It is evident that aside from Botswana being fortunate enough to have 
large diamond deposits, it was also fortuitous in terms of the time of discovery, the nature of 
the diamonds, the inclusive and well-developed institutions which were already in place which 
helped to ensure the success of the diamonds and the good leadership of Seretse Khama who 
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recognised the importance of changing subsoil mineral rights in order for diamond revenue to 
flow through the state and therefore benefit all tribes. These factors combined proved especially 
vital to the overall success of diamonds in Botswana and subsequent escape of the resource 
curse.  
 
6.2.2.5 Role of De Beers 
 
In addition to the features specific to the diamonds themselves and conditions present in 
Botswana under which they were discovered, there is one external feature which proved critical 
to the country’s diamond success and that is the association and involvement with De Beers. 
De Beers is a South African corporation which handles the selling of Botswana’s diamonds, 
ensuring that they are sold at high prices (Jerven, 2010: 90). This coalition between De Beers 
and Botswana is believed to be the “most successful commodity buffer stock arrangement in 
the world” (Maipose & Matsheka, 2008: 530). Unlike the majority of resource-abundant 
African countries, Botswana did not nationalise their diamond mining operations, but opted 
instead to entrust the development and exploitation of diamond mines to De Beers which had 
far more experience in such matters than the Botswanan state. The agreement initially was not 
as favourable as it is now, as De Beers owned an 85% stake in Botswana’s diamond mines in 
relation to the Botswana’s 15% stake (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263). This was later changed 
to be far more favourable for Botswana, when in 1975, negotiations with the company resulted 
in them having a 50-50 share in the diamond mines, which not only meant that Botswana’s 
government received more revenue, but that they also had more influence over diamonds 
(Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263).  
 
Interestingly, diamonds were not the only mineral mined in post-colonial Botswana, as copper 
and nickel were also among the government’s mines in the 1960s. The largest of the non-
diamond mining operations, labelled the Shashe Project was launched and overseen by the 
government and involved the mining of copper and nickel which unfortunately, proved 
unsuccessful and had a “record of disaster” (Jerven, 2010: 91). This was due to prices of nickel 
and copper being consistently low throughout that time period as well as a combination of 
development costs exceeding the budget and various managerial problems and technical issues 
which severely hindered the success of the mines (Jerven, 2010: 91). Given this outcome of 
Botswana’s fully government owned and controlled mines, it can be questioned whether 
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Botswana’s diamonds would have been so effectively mined and produced if it too was 
controlled solely by the government and were it not for De Beers. 
 
At its core, De Beers is an African company. It was established in South Africa, born of the 
diamonds fields in the late 19th century and throughout the last 132 years, have maintained the 
majority of their operations in Africa, with only two of its operations being international 
(Oppenheimer, 2008: 211). Former chairman of De Beers, Nicky Oppenheimer, claims that 
responsible mining companies are aware of the fact that in order for their corporations to 
prosper, it is essential that the countries in which they function have long-term stability 
(Oppenheimer, 2008: 212). In order for this to be achieved, mining companies are required to 
contribute to economic and community development as this should guarantee that country’s 
stability as well as allow that company prolonged access to their mines (Oppenheimer, 2008: 
212). According to Ernest Oppenheimer, chairman of De Beers from 1926, it was important 
for any company with which he was involved to make money, but that money needed to be 
made in a “manner which would make a permanent contribution” to the country within which 
it operated (Oppenheimer, 2008: 212). This is arguably how De Beers operated in Botswana.  
 
Furthermore, De Beers insisted that mining companies assume a role beyond that of monetary 
contributor. Its chairman, Ernest Oppenheimer claims that good governance alone is 
insufficient as protection for their investment, but rather that in order for an investment to be 
entirely secure, the investor “must become a partner with the host government in driving 
development, both on the macro scale through tax and royalty revenues, and at the micro level 
through positive engagement with the needs of the community” (Oppenheimer, 2008: 212). 
The idea behind this is that companies will ultimately benefit from the countries within which 
they operate, having improved infrastructure and good governance and that in turn, that good 
governance will have positive long-lasting effects on resources which will benefit both the 
government and the mining company. De Beers has put this into practice and in conjunction 
with its partner companies in various African countries, contributes on average 4.6 billion 
Dollars to their economies each year (Oppenheimer, 2008: 213).  
 
De Beers’ approach to Botswana was no different. De Beers became a vital partner to the 
Botswanan government, forming a successful coalition known as the De Beers Botswana 
Mining Company, Debswana for short which oversaw the mining and management of diamond 
sales, sharing diamond revenue with Botswana which contributed to development programmes 
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and sustainable investment (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 38). Essentially, Botswana’s 
partnership with De Beers was entered into out of necessity due to the country’s lack of 
knowledge and experience with the exploitation of diamonds (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 
2011: 38-39). This partnership which was contracted shortly after independence, marked the 
beginning of the countries policy of being open to private investment – an approach which was 
more business-friendly than many other sub-Saharan economies at the time, yet has continued 
to aid the country (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 39). This decision to partner with De 
Beers is widely recognised as “one of the wise decisions the country’s founding leaders took” 
(Meyns, 2010: 49). This partnership was further made necessary by the nature of the diamonds 
as they were deep underground and not easily accessible, which is where De Beers’ expertise 
proved essential (Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe, 2011: 39). Ultimately, this partnership was 
particularly favourable for the Botswanan government, as De Beers carried out the work of 
mining and managing the sales of the diamonds, while Botswana received the revenue for them 
– revenue which was substantially increased in the mid-1970s as the government’s stake in 
Debswana was reevaluated to 50%, with the government effectively receiving 75% of the 
profits from mining through the taxation, dividends and royalties earned (Sebudubudu & 
Botlhomilwe, 2011: 39). From this, it is evident that the involvement of De Beers was positive 
for diamond mining and profits and that in conjunction with the characteristics of the diamond 
sector as a whole, the sector was nothing but fruitful. While this appears to be the case, it is 
also important to acknowledge the negative impacts of such a sector. 
 
6.2.2.6 Negative Impacts of Diamonds 
 
While the impact of the effective mining, production and sales of diamonds have had largely 
beneficial impacts for Botswana, there are some negative aspects of a diamond-based economy 
which should be acknowledged. The first is related to the Dutch Disease and centres on the 
potential problem of not having a diversified economy due to an abundance of resources. This 
has been the case in Botswana, as the mining of diamonds has overtaken the economy and all 
other sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture and has also meant that their economy has 
not broadened or diversified in any significant manner (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263). An 
undiversified economy with a predominant focus on the diamond industry is somewhat 
problematic for Botswana as it has resulted in alarming unemployment levels. This is due to 
the fact that the diamond industry is capital-intensive and employs relatively few people 
(Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263). The largest industry employing the fewest number of people 
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has thus contributed to the high unemployment rate, rising income inequality and overall 
poverty which characterises much of Botswana’s population.  
 
In addition, due to diamond mining consisting of so large a portion of the economy, any threat 
to the sector is highly dangerous. An example of this is seen through the blood diamond 
dilemma which took place in the 1990s which saw many international companies threatening 
to cease trade with African diamond miners on the basis of their diamonds being ‘unclean’ or 
illegally traded from conflict-torn countries (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 264). Conflict 
diamonds all originated from Africa - Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to be precise – which posed a potential threat to the reputation of 
Botswana’s diamonds, forcing Botswana to launch campaigns to persuade the public that their 
diamonds were in fact legitimate and ‘clean’, such as Diamonds for Development which sought 
to emphasise the positive impact of diamonds on the country (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 264). 
Lastly, the problem with diamond mining is that it is potentially volatile. The sale of diamonds 
is subject to exchange rates and international diamond prices which are unfortunately both 
highly unpredictable and can have significant impacts on resource rents (Iimi, 2007: 691). This 
can be seen by the 28% change in mineral revenue between 1988 and 2003 which resulted from 
varying exchange rates and the 21% change in diamond revenue in that same period, courtesy 
of changes in international diamond prices (Iimi, 2007: 691). It is therefore evident that while 
diamond mining can have enormous financial and economic benefits for a country, there are 
also negative aspects which characterise a reliance on this industry. In the case of Botswana, 
the positives outweigh the negatives as not only is diamond mining, its dominant economic 
sector, it is also its only significant economic sector due to its small agricultural industry which 
would not be easy to expand due to unfavourable land conditions. 
 
Were it not for the above explored features of Botswana’s diamond industry and conditions 
surrounding its discovery, it is questionable whether the country would have been as 
economically successful or as successful in its escaping of the resource curse. This sentiment 
is echoed by a number of scholars as they provide sound reasoning for why they doubt 
Botswana would have been prosperous were it not for diamonds. Jerven argues that the 
instability of Botswana’s agricultural and manufacturing sector as well as their somewhat 
disaster-stricken copper and nickel mining operations suggest that a “dependable flow of 
revenue” and therefore stable economy, would not have been likely were it not for diamonds 
(Jerven, 2010: 93). He even goes so far as to propose that Botswana’s leaders could easily have 
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fallen into the same trap which consumed many of Africa’s elites in the 1980s and 1990s in 
which scarce resources and unstable, diminished government revenues drove elites to corrupt 
and destructive rent-seeking measures (Jerven, 2010: 93). As has been shown by Acemoglu 
and Robinson, such measures are far more likely to occur in countries with extractive 
institutions. That Botswana’s elites did not turn to such practices and that the economy 
remained stable is testament to Botswana’s institutional qualities and emergence of a central 
authority. Essentially, the country’s success and escape of the resource curse comes down to 
its institutional development in conjunction with the auspicious features of their diamonds, 
conditions of discovery as well as the successful partnership with De Beers and effective 
leadership by its post-colonial leaders. The section will now consider the impact of diamonds 
on creative destruction. 
 
6.2.2.7 Diamonds and Creative Destruction 
 
This section seeks to highlight the positive outcomes of diamonds in Botswana which serves 
to indicate that the resource curse was avoided and that the state was strengthened by the 
discovery of such diamonds. Subsequently, the section will emphasise the link between 
diamond revenue and creative destruction ahead of the following section which concerns 
Botswana’s management of diamond revenue and the creative destruction to various sectors 
with which it brought.  
 
The indicators that Botswana has not suffered a resource curse are the income and GDP growth 
levels outlined previously as well as the infrastructure and development which has occurred 
from diamond revenue. Diamond revenue has for the most part, served to increase economic 
and social development as well as attempt to diversify the economy – all of which will now be 
evaluated. 
 
The impact of diamond revenue on infrastructure has been monumental. Largely due to the fact 
that diamond revenue accounted for 80% of Botswana’s exports in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, the government has thus been able to finance significant infrastructural 
development (Botswana, a Dazzling Trajectory, 2019).  
 
One such development is in the education of children – particularly those at a primary school 
level. By the early 1990s, 90% of children in Botswana of primary school age and 30% of 
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children of secondary school age were enrolled in an educational institution courtesy of the 
government (Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 158). In addition to educational facilities, 
revenue from diamonds also went to funding further infrastructure for public facilities such as 
water and health care. This is reflected by 80% of rural villagers having “access to potable 
water” and 85% of people being within 15km of a health care facility (Botswana Out of the 
Desert, 1993: 158). In fact, diamond revenue had such an impact on infrastructural 
development that Mogae enjoys reminding people that “at independence we [Botswana] had 
three kilometers of tarred roads” but now the country has over 3 000 kilometers of tarred road 
(Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 158). These statistics are a real triumph for Botswana after 
only two decades of diamond revenue and demonstrate the positive impact of such revenue on 
a multitude of sectors in the economy.  
 
The appeal of a stable democratic environment also attracted foreign investment. Botswana’s 
Trade and Industry Promotion Industry (TIPA), pushed the country to establish offices in 
European countries such as Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom as well as the United 
States and Hong Kong in order to attract foreign investment (Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 
159). TIPA, which in 1998 was replaced by the Botswana Export Development and Investment 
Authority (BEDIA), focused on securing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and by 2004 had 
attracted 20 foreign companies to locate to Botswana, creating further employment 
opportunities (Ajayi, 2006: 60). It is safe to say that without the economically favourable 
environment created by diamond revenue and the peaceful political climate within which 
Botswana’s diamond industry exists, it is unlikely that the country would have received 
investment of this nature. This again, demonstrates the positive impact of diamonds on 
Botswana and the effective manner in which they were handled.  
 
In addition, diamond revenue has been used by the government to set up foundations to 
incentivise local investment. The Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), funded by foreign 
exchange reserves from diamond income gave direct financial aid to new and existing 
businesses, with a focus on enterprises in the manufacturing sector that were labour intensive 
to encourage employment (Sebudubudu, 2005: 86). Such investment is incentivised by offering 
various packages. One such package is the Automatic FAP which permits businesses who 
invest in certain sectors to receive a five-year tax holiday as well as reimbursement of wages 
provided to unskilled workers and certain costs of training them (Botswana Out of the Desert, 
1993: 159). An alternate package, “Case-by-Case FAP”, allows businesses grants for capital 
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equipment upfront and reimburses select training costs in addition to providing grants to 
“augment sales and pay for substantial portions of unskilled labour wages” (Botswana Out of 
the Desert, 1993: 159). These policies have not only resulted in further economic development 
but have also served to address the high unemployment rate, providing jobs for citizens and 
training for unskilled labour, thereby improving their skills and ability to find a job after the 
construction is finished, but with higher earning potential. The majority of the funding for 
programmes such as these is derived from diamond revenue which indicates that without this 
revenue, development and employment creation on this level could not have taken place.  
 
In the same way that diamond revenue was used to incentivise investment and economic 
development in Botswana, so too was it used in attempts to diversify the economy. The 
Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) is a significant supporter of local development – 
creating over 12 500 jobs by the early 1990s and is an ardent believer in the importance of 
diversifying Botswana’s economy out of diamonds due to them being only a small portion of 
the domestic market (Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 160). Instead, the director of the BDC 
insists that the corporation adopt a focus on exports such as processing leather-ware from cattle, 
advancing the jewelry manufacturing sector to include diamond cutting, glassware from soda-
ash as well as meat processing and the selling of abattoir by-products and cotton production 
(Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 161). Botswana has also attempted to diversify their 
economy by beginning mining exploration for alternate minerals as well as through the 
promotion of tourism attractions such as game reserves and national parks – the most prominent 
attraction being the Okavango Delta – which has provided much employment contributed 
significantly to economic development. Indeed, in a 10-year period from 1989 to 1998, 
international tourists in the Okavango Delta increased by 45.7%, resulting in a 101.4% spike 
in revenue, amounting to 445 billion US Dollars in 1998 (Mbaiwa, 2003: 449). While the 
economy is not as economically diverse as many leaders would like it to be, substantial efforts 
have been made to broaden it. 
 
Interestingly, Botswana is not alone in their attempts to invest diamond revenue into their 
economy. De Beers through Debswana has contributed to social investment in the country 
through donations as well as in social issues such as HIV/AIDS (Gapa, 2016: 63). The main 
area in which De Beers contributes is to education facilities and junior schools, in particular, 
as they feel that education opportunities is one of the most important for national development 
and that the burden of training Botswana’s youth should “be shared by all prospective 
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beneficiaries” (Botswana Out of the Desert, 1993: 160). In addition to De Beers’ Donation 
Fund contributing to social investment in the country, they also contribute by way of their 
employment and training policies. The company is the largest employer of Botswanan citizens 
outside of the government, with 73.8% of employees in key roles and management positions 
being local citizens (De Beers, 2009: 46). Through this social investment, it is evident that 
revenue from diamonds has had such a positive effect that not only has it resulted in the 
government establishing programmes to use the income for development and social 
investment, but the money has also enabled an outside company, De Beers to do the same. 
Such is the advantageous impact of diamond revenue. 
 
From the above evaluation of the impact of diamond revenue on Botswana, it is clear that 
diamonds have had a positive overall impact on the country as seen by its investment in 
infrastructure, social and economic development. Not only has diamond revenue served to 
advance society through targeting access to education, water sources and healthcare facilities 
but it has also enabled an advancement in the manufacturing sector, attraction of foreign 
investment and attempts to diversify the economy. Few negative impacts of diamond stand 
against these beneficial outcomes of diamond revenue in Botswana, indicating that Botswana 
has indeed, escaped all symptoms of the resource curse. However, while it is safe to say that 
Botswana avoided the resource curse, the same cannot be said for the creative destruction 
which diamond revenue brings.  
 
Creative destruction is the upheaval to a sector caused by a significant change such as 
innovation or in Botswana’s case, the discovery of diamonds. Importantly, this upheaval is not 
necessarily negative, but depends on the manner in which the change was managed. In 
Botswana, the discovery of diamonds and income from such diamonds was handled very well 
and thus the changes diamond revenue brought had positive social and economic impacts for 
development as evidenced above. The following section will delve deeper into other forms of 
creative destruction brought about by diamond revenue and outline how it has been managed. 
However, this section has shown that Botswana has certainly not experienced a resource curse 
and that through the social and economic development which took place due to the presence of 






6.3 Management of Diamond Revenue and Creative Destruction   
 
Due to the emergence of a central authority at independence and inclusive institutions which 
had long been entrenched, the BDP was able to successfully manage the creative destruction 
arising from the discovery of diamonds as well as the disruptions diamond revenue caused in 
the development of alternate industries in Botswana. This meant that because creative 
destruction was handled with efficacy, the outcome of innovations, investments and upheavals 
had a positive, rather than a negative effect which ultimately served to strengthen the state. 
This section will begin with an evaluation of how Botswana, due to being historically coherent, 
has not been reluctant to accept and adapt to changing innovation and creative destruction even 
throughout the pre-colonial period. Subsequently, the section will analyse the way in which 
Botswana has handled modern creative destruction in further detail. Modern creative 
destruction being changes and innovation after independence, with a focus on the decades 
closer to 2000. Thereafter the section will consider the significance of accepting such creative 
destruction, especially in what this means for the BDP in terms of their hold on power. Finally, 
the section will explore the impact of inclusive institutions on creative destruction, 
demonstrating that it is because of inclusive institutions that creative destruction has been 
managed so effectively. The section will thereby conclude that while the country is not without 
challenges and leadership in recent times becoming more authoritarian in nature, the future 
positive acceptance of creative destruction cannot be guaranteed. Despite this possibility, it 
must be acknowledged that through its centralisation and inclusive institutions, Botswana is 
largely successful, has avoided the resource curse and has benefited from diamond revenue, 
development and creative destruction which has further strengthened the state. 
 
6.3.1 Creative Destruction in Pre-Colonial Botswana 
 
Botswana has long been accepting of change and in pursuit of economic development and 
modernisation. This section will consider the manner in which Botswana has managed creative 
destruction in the pre-colonial period which is from the time the Tswana migrated to what is 
considered Botswana today in the early 1800s until the time of colonisation in the 1880s. As 
early as 1805, Tswana chiefs have recognised the merit of external, European interpolation in 
the form of trade. Indeed, instead of remaining an insular tribe, shutting out outside contact and 
influence, the Tswana engaged and in fact, encouraged international trade, selling ostrich 
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feathers and ivory as a source of income and means to acquire weapons in the form of guns 
(Seidler, 2010: 8).  
 
While international trade is commonly viewed as a positive economic prospect and manner in 
which countries accumulate wealth, trade can double as a form of creative destruction, taking 
business away from local agents and introducing a secondary power into the economic system. 
This can be seen by the Ming and Qing dynasties forbidding international trade in the mid to 
late 17th century as the government feared trade would spur technological innovation, enrich 
merchants and politically destabilise the nation, jeopardising their hold on power (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012: 250-251). This later proved disadvantageous for these dynasties as their 
economies shrank and weakened their countries, however, it did prolong and tighten the 
leaders’ grip on power – much to the detriment of society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 251). 
Therefore, by Botswana inviting international trade and contact with Europeans, leaders were 
able to cultivate economic growth and development despite it being at the expense of a small 
degree of creative destruction. Indeed, Botswana has seemingly viewed creative destruction as 
a small price to pay for modernisation as evidenced by their pursuits from the early 19th century. 
King Khama III, grandfather of Seretse Khama and leader of the largest Tswana tribe, the 
Bamangwato, sought to implement institutional changes which would modernise the tribe’s 
political and economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 132). The functional, 
modern institutions of Botswana in the present-day can be ascribed to the efforts of Khama III 
to improve and modernise his tribes’ pre-colonial institutions which serves as testament to the 
benefits of development and creative destruction. Khama too, accepted and encouraged further 
change by converting to Christianity. Missionaries followed early European traders in the 
beginning of the 19th century, with the London Missionary Society embarking on a very 
successful mission in 1817 (Seidler, 2010: 10). Although traditional beliefs remained intact, 
many tribesmen, including prominent tribal figures such as Khama and Chief Lentswe adopted 
the Christian religion; particularly for the sake of increasing trade prospects and improved 
relations with European officials through healthy relationships through Christian missionaries 
(Seidler, 2010: 10). While figures such as Khama may have adopted Christianity as a result of 
genuine belief, the evidence suggests that it was a more a means of securing trade and beneficial 
political relations, indicating that the reception and acceptance of change – or in this case, an 
alternative belief – while overruling the current religious tradition (to an extent), can have 
beneficial impacts for other sectors in society and that by embracing change instead of rejecting 
it, the whole society may be advantaged.  
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6.3.2 Creative Destruction in the Colonial Period 
 
The keenness of the Tswana to trade, to modernise and even to adopt an alternate religion in 
order to improve trading prospects and benefit society demonstrates how well change and 
societal and economic upheaval was accepted and handled in the pre-colonial period. This 
attitude too, extended into the colonial period, however, it must be acknowledged that many 
changes in this period were initially forced due to British rule. However, due to an embedded 
attitude of acceptance of creative destruction and pursuit of modernisation, these changes were 
accepted relatively peacefully.  
 
Colonisation brought with it various adjustments and structural modifications to which the 
Bechuanaland leaders and protectorate as a whole, responded largely positively. This creative 
destruction came in the form of infrastructure, tax systems, technological innovation of 
agriculture, education, increased urbanisation and the adoption of modern currency which has 
overall developed Botswana’s economy and society and despite disrupting certain elements of 
pre-colonial Tswana society, ultimately aided its growth and development.  
 
Tswana chiefs supported the expansion of railways in Bechuanaland by the British as they 
believed it would supplement the expansion of trade and mobility throughout the protectorate 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 449). While chiefs were skeptical of such railway construction 
to a small degree, this uncertainty came not from the fear of creative destruction of which the 
tsars and Russian officials were frightened, but rather from a sense of apprehension that 
railways would be purely under the control of the British and not the chiefs themselves 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 449). However, despite this fear, the Tswana chiefs conceded 
the railway construction which has continued to bring benefit throughout the colonial and post-
colonial period. Similarly, chiefs too accepted the British’s introduction of a tax system of a 
“hut” and later, a “native” tax (Seidler, 2010: 17). It must be noted, that chiefs were recipients 
of 10% of tax collections as their portion of commission, however, despite this benefit, taxes 
did go into the improving of infrastructure and indeed, alteration of Tswana institutions (Good, 
1999: 188). Chiefs could have resisted this introduction of taxation, however, the advancement 
in infrastructure and transformation of institutions which this taxation income afforded the 
protectorate, was essentially advantageous for the chiefs and the tribesmen and so chiefs chose 




Furthermore, chiefs chose not to resist the introduction of technological development in the 
form of boreholes and wells, but rather to welcome their implementation despite the disruption 
they brought to traditional agriculture and communal ownership. While wells were in existence 
prior to the colonial period, it is in the colonial period when the scale of cattle farming or the 
‘beefocracy’ really began to accelerate and with it, came the need to invest further in water 
provision for herds and cattle, spurring the technological advancement of boreholes (Seidler, 
2010: 19). These newly established wells and boreholes were owned privately as it allowed for 
them to be better cared for and more regularly serviced than if they were under government 
control, however, this came at the expense of the general tribesmen as only the wealthy were 
able to invest in such technology and thereby, receive the greatest advantage (Good, 1999: 
188). Government could have resisted such technological advancement and with it, an altering 
of the cattle herding profession, yet they allowed such change to take place, which was 
ultimately to society’s benefit as more cattle farmers were able to get easier access to water for 
their herd, thus aiding growth in the cattle industry and greater economy. 
 
Botswana chiefs’ support of technological advancement can also be seen through their 
acceptance of missionary schools and education for all Tswana. Chiefs believed education was 
“a tool to modernise and to adopt new technologies” because missionary schools inside and 
outside of Bechuanaland, which many Tswana attended, were institutions promoting European 
interests which would aid Tswana in being internationally competitive and encourage 
entrepreneurship (Seidler, 2010: 20).  
 
A fear of creative destruction and innovation would have inhibited the Tswana chiefs from 
allowing such education and European intervention or at least, attempts to suppress schooling 
and such education, however, it is because chiefs chose not to resist such destruction and not 
to impose only insular teachings, that the country and many Tswana tribesmen were able to 
benefit from their education, contributing to the nation’s economy. A clear example can be 
seen through the number of entrepreneurs these missionary schools produced, one of which 
being Quett Masire, Botswana’s second president, who after becoming a school teacher, 
decided to apply his knowledge of modern dryland farming techniques in the 1950s which 





In the same way that Tswana chiefs did not resist schooling, so too, did they not oppose further 
urbanisation brought on by the actions of the Europeans. As this thesis has addressed, Tswana 
tribes have been urbanised to an unusual degree since the pre-colonisation period and that 
through taxes and education introduced by British rule, tribesmen have had to migrate to find 
work to pay such taxes and a number of missionary schools lie outside of the protectorate which 
has resulted in the cyclical migration of many young Tswana as well which has altered the 
traditional household-based Tswana convention. Despite not being familiar with this new way 
of life, implemented by the various policies and structures created by the British, chiefs neither 
feared nor challenged the social upheaval which is caused. Perhaps this was due to the innate 
belief of chiefs that these alterations were fundamentally to the advantage and development of 
society and the economy.  
 
Another innovation which became widely accepted and proved economically progressive was 
the adoption of cash as a currency. Instead of using only cattle in exchange for goods and 
services, once the British introduced cash in the form of the Pound; cash and cattle could be 
used in all financial exchanges (Seidler, 2010: 21). In addition to the introduction of cash, the 
British also set up trading stores, thus creating a market for basic goods which in turn, inspired 
the establishment of small labour markets and business ventures by local Tswana in the 
urbanised areas (Schapera, 1936: 230). Again, it is evident that by being accepting of change 
and in this case, economic progress, Bechuanaland was able to experience far more economic 
growth and development than it would have been able to achieve, were the chiefs fearful and 
resistant to this creative destruction.  
 
In the pre-colonial and colonial periods, it is evident that Botswana has accepted and indeed, 
effectively managed the creative destruction which has arisen from changes and advancements 
throughout the periods. Indeed, they have refused to let creative destruction hold the society 
and economy back from modernisation and have as a result experienced economic growth and 
development. The reason for this successful management can be attributed to chiefs having a 
significant enough degree of state centralisation as not to feel threatened by the possibility of 
such destruction as well as inclusive institutions which have aided leaders in accepting such 
change and allowing modernisation and advancement to be accessed by all in society which 
has not only strengthened the state, but also led to growth and development to the benefit of all 




As this thesis has observed, much of Botswana’s post-colonial success can be credited to its 
pre-colonial Tswana structures and tendencies and thereby, the continuation of such structures 
into its independence. In the same way that pre-colonial and colonial Tswana leaders have 
accepted and effectively managed creative destruction, so too have Botswana’s independent 
leaders accepted, encouraged and handled it in a similar manner. The following section will 
analyse in greater detail the manner in which creative destruction has been managed in the 
post-colonial period, with a particular emphasis on ICT (Information and Communications 
Technology), innovation and knowledge patents and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises).  
 
6.3.3 How Has Botswana Managed Creative Destruction Since Independence? 
 
This section will analyse the manner in which creative destruction was handled in post-colonial 
Botswana in regard to three primary areas – information and communications technology 
(ICT), innovation and knowledge production and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The reason for these three sectors being evaluated is because they are more modern in nature, 
unlike other sectors which have been present in earlier periods such as agriculture and beef and 
are thereby less likely to cause as significant a disruption since they have been developing 
constantly over time. Therefore, by considering these three more recent sectors which are likely 
to cause the most amount of societal and economic upheaval in more detail, the analysis 
provides a greater indication of how Botswana has dealt with post-independent creative 
destruction. The section begins with a brief consideration of the major changes to political and 
economic institutions at independence, which could have caused disruption, but didn’t due in 
combination to the already inclusive institutions and the BDP emerging as a centralised enough 
entity at independence as not to cause outburst or disruption in response to such changes. 
Thereafter the ICT, innovation and SMEs sectors will be evaluated, concluding that creative 
destruction in those areas was handled effectively and disruptions were minor due to the degree 
of central authority held by the BDP.  
 
First and foremost, at independence, leaders made a conscious decision to install and evolve 
current political and economic institutions into modern state institutions. Leaders spared no 
time for this institutional transformation as it was undertaken immediately with the transition 
to ‘modern’ institutions being achieved within a short 20 years (Seidler, 2010: 23). The 
transformation focused primarily on the Tswana capitals and sought to modernise the informal 
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institutions in particular, while continuing to use Tswana roots as a basis for these modern, 
more formalised institutions (Seidler, 2010: 23). While many countries resist modernisation 
for the fear of the unknown that it may bring with it, Botswana welcomed the prospect of 
modernisation despite the changes and disruption it brought to colonial period institutions and 
individual positions. A clear example of which can be seen in the establishing of Acts and 
government bodies such as the Chieftaincy Act of 1965 or the Tribal Land Act of 1968 which 
saw the power of chiefs diminish and newly founded land board take charge of land allocation 
and related concerns (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 453). Surprisingly Tswana chiefs appeared 
supportive of these changes and relinquished the majority of their power with little objection 
or frustration as they maintained hold over certain of their prior duties and power such as 
residing over the customary courts (Seidler, 2010: 26). Little opposition and a smooth 
institutional transition indicate no fear of modernisation nor creative destruction.  
 
In the same way that there was little opposition for the transformation of political institutions, 
so too, was there little resistance for the transformation of economic institutions. One such 
example can be seen through the marketing boards for cattle established by the newly elected 
BDP. The majority of marketing boards in African countries were set up by colonisers for the 
purpose of extracting wealth from resources within the country and were unfortunately 
particularly extractive in nature, much to the detriment of the African colony and its people as 
evidenced by Sierra Leone, who’s leader Siaka Stevens chose to keep marketing boards 
extractive; only this time, he and his cronies were the benefactors rather than the British – a 
sad reality which was present in many post-colonial African countries (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012: 379). However, as with most aspects in Botswana, the marketing boards were set up to 
a far more positive end.  
 
Firstly, these boards were set up by Botswana’s post-colonial leaders and not by their colonial 
power and secondly, they served to aid the industry they controlled. The Botswana Meat 
Commission was set up by the BDP in 1967 and indeed, played a role in aiding cattle owners 
and ranchers; helping to develop the cattle economy, stimulating exports and undertaking 
measures in disease prevention which served to promote the cattle industry and the significant 
economic growth and development which occurred as a result as well as increase support for 
inclusive economic institutions in Botswana (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 452). While many 
leaders have feared economic development and the potential change it can bring, by being 
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accepting and encouraging of such development, the country has benefited by the economic 
growth such a sector was able to produce.  
 
6.3.3.1 Creative Destruction and ICT 
 
Not only have leaders made concessions for advancement and modernisation at the start of 
their post-colonial reign, they have maintained this support for continued technological 
advancement throughout the latter part of the 20th century until now. In 1996, the Telecoms 
Act came to fruition and sought “better costs, quality and service variety” and opened up an 
environment for private cellular companies to compete which not only provided citizens with 
access to cellular telephones, but also allowed them options and competitive pricing (Patterson, 
2001: 291). In addition, the government has established two agencies which are concerned with 
technological advancement and implementation of technological innovation within the country 
– the Government Computer Board (GCB) and the Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation (BTC) (Patterson, 2001: 290). Through these organisations, the BDP has built a 
country-wide network and fiber optic system which is of an international standard that 
challenges that of any other country and one which is superior in comparison to many African 
countries (Patterson, 2001: 291). Moving on from the steps taken toward technological 
advancement in the early 2000s, it is important to note that Botswana has continued to 
emphasise and invest in the ICT sector. A reason for this emphasis is that Botswana views ICT 
as a crucial element of globalisation and therefore linked its ICT policy to their “broader 
economic vision and overall national strategy, named ‘Vision 2016’” (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009: 
1551). This strategy aims to place Botswana in a position above the rest of African countries 
due to its emphasis on ITC, through which it hoped to become a “regional powerhouse” in the 
ITC sector (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009: 1551). Part of this strategy is the education of all those 
in schools (both teachers and students) and the majority of those in the workplace to be 
equipped with technological skills enabling them to use computers and current technological 
programmes (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009: 1551). It must also be acknowledged that not only is 
investment in ICT a means of diversifying Botswana’s extremely diamond-dependent 
economy, but technological innovation and ICT investment are vital ways of achieving greater 
efficiency for businesses, further integration of local economies into the world economy and 
also improvement in public service provision (Lane et al., 2004). In addition, the government 
introduced a national Information and Communication Technology policy as well as an e-
government initiative which aimed to make services more openly available for citizens and 
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which government officials hoped would spark the private sector and the public to incorporate 
ICT more fully (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009: 1551). The Botswanan government has made further 
efforts to encourage the adoption of ICT by decreasing the cost of communication in the 
country and through liberalising the telecommunications industry in order to create more 
competition which resulted in competitive pricing and lower tariffs (Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009: 
1551). Again, it is evident that rather than fear the potential changes that technological 
innovation bring, Botswana has embraced and indeed encouraged them and in doing so, has 
achieved technological status equal to countries on a global standard. 
 
6.3.3.2 Creative Destruction and Innovation  
 
In addition to technological innovation, Botswana has also reached a remarkable level of 
multifaceted innovation. An African study on the impact of government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality as two of the institutional factors which have the most significant effect on 
innovation finds that due to the strong, effective nature of institutions, Botswana’s level of 
innovation is higher in comparison to the majority of other African countries (Oluwatobi, 
Efobi, Olurinola & Alege, 2014: 390). To clarify, innovation in this study is in regard to the 
creation of knowledge in any sector which in turn, is likely to serve as the impetus for economic 
growth and advancements in sectors such as commerce, transportation, education and 
telecommunications to name a few – sectors which will further enhance development and 
economic growth (Oluwatobi et al., 2014: 390). Innovation is quintessentially important, 
especially for African countries as it has been found to contribute to 85% of economic growth 
in addition to “augment[ing] the state of human capital development in Africa” (Oluwatobi et 
al., 2014: 391). Using the number of technical and scientific journal articles which were 
published by 2009 as a statistical basis, Africa appeared to lag behind the rest of the world, 
producing only 0.64% of the world’s journal articles; a score which is extremely disappointing, 
especially when compared with Europe’s 36.84% (Oluwatobi et al., 2014: 391). 
 
Despite poor statistics, it must be acknowledged that Botswana accounts for a significant 
portion of the innovation in Africa – producing 51 journals of a scientific nature per year and 
ranking 14th in this category in spite of its small population (Oluwatobi et al., 2014: 401). It 
has been argued that this high rating and by African standards and significant number of 
published journals, can be attributed to its low rate of corruption. The study concludes that the 
lower the rate of corruption or the higher the ability of the country to suppress corruption, the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 124 
more positive the impact on innovation within that country (Oluwatobi et al., 2014: 406). With 
this in mind, it must be noted that Botswana proved the least corrupt of the African countries 
reviewed in this study and had a high institutional rating, regulatory quality ranking and 
political stability rating which indeed, rank among the highest of the African countries and 
additionally, a high rate of government effectiveness which is third among African countries 
(Oluwatobi et al., 2014: 401). It is these factors which stand Botswana in good stead as a 
significant producer of scientific and technical knowledge innovation in Africa. 
 
Botswana also has an average of fifteen to thirty patents registered each year according to the 
Registrar of Companies in Botswana along with a multitude of intellectual property 
professionals in the form advisors, licensers and lawyers (De Beer, Armstrong, Oguamanam 
& Schonwetter, 2014: 344-345). That so many intellectual property professionals exist, and 
patents continue to be registered every year suggest that intellectual property plays an 
important role in Botswanan business and overall economy. Botswanan leaders too, are aware 
of the critical role of intellectual property, taking steps since the 1970s to improve its general 
intellectual property (IP) framework as well as improving infrastructure necessary to foster IP 
development and undertaking objectives such as “Botswana’s Vision 2016” and an integration 
between the University of Botswana (UB), parastatals and the Ministry of Infrastructure, 
Science and Technology (MIST) (De Beer et al., 2014: 345). Undertaking objectives such as 
these is evident of the emphasis Botswana places on the furthering of publically funded 
research and the need to continue improving and encouraging such research. 
 
The value of publically funded research can be measured both socially and economically and 
has a multitude of benefits. According to a study, the greatest benefit, in the opinion of the 
respondents, is the increase in information which is made available to companies which 
increases and improves their knowledge, followed by an increase in the number of trained 
graduates and researchers, subsequent to an improvement in scientific knowledge and 
capability of problem solving as well as enhanced social knowledge and increased scientific 
equipment and methodologies, development of networks and social interaction, better quality 
of life and living standards to name but a few (De Beer et al., 2014: 362). From this it is clear, 
that a myriad of benefits can be secured from an increase in publically funded research and 
while 66% of participants in this study felt, that Botswana does not implement policies which 
infringe upon such research, there is more that can be done to stimulate this research (De Beer 
et al., 2014: 364-366). Botswana’s support for both technical and scientific knowledge 
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innovation and intellectual property as well the initiatives it has embarked on, indicate that 
instead of fearing the potential creative destruction which can arise from such innovation, 
Botswana has encouraged it and in turn, benefitted from the knowledge it has cultivated.  
 
6.3.3.3 Creative Destruction and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
 
As this thesis has shown, countries and leaders who fear creative destruction are opposed to 
the development of private enterprises as they do not control them which often leads to 
countries restricting business to the point at which it leads to a shrinking of the country’s 
economy. However, this cannot be said for Botswana as it has taken active steps in the 
promotion and development of SMEs within the country.  
 
According to the OECD, a SME is commonly characterised as a business enterprise which has 
up to 250 employees (OECD, 2018). SMEs can be broken down further into small enterprises 
which have 10-49 employees, medium enterprises which have 50-249 employees and micro-
enterprises which consist of 1-9 employees (OECD, 2018). However, the definition differs 
depending on each individual country, although it is typically measured by either or a 
combination of the number of people employed, the annual turnover or the value of the 
enterprise’s fixed assets (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 403). SMEs have become increasingly 
important in recent years and particularly for smaller, more informal economies such as in 
Africa, with SMEs regarded as diversifiers of economies through creating further employment 
(Machacha, 2002: 277).  
 
In African countries, governments and big companies dominate the economy, yet it is the SMEs 
which are the “real engine[s] of economic growth” (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 403). This is 
because the informal sector is so large due to a shortage of jobs in the formal sector with the 
informal sector employing an alarming three to six times the number of employees compared 
to the formal sector (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 403). Honing in on Botswana, the government 
has identified the importance of SMEs within the economy and have come to emphasise the 
importance of such enterprises, particularly with regard to their impact on social and economic 
development (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 403). Subsequently in the early 2000s, Botswana 
began providing financial aid to SMEs in order to help sustain these enterprises as well as 
stimulate and encourage the establishment of further SMEs which would lead to additional 
economic growth and development (Machacha, 2002: 277). Moreover, further investment into 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 126 
SMEs was also part of an effort of the Botswanan government to diversify its economy in order 
for it not to be so heavily invested in diamond mining as the only industry for economic 
development in the long run (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 403).  
 
A study on SMEs in Botswana in the early 2000s, found that small SMEs lacked an adequate 
standard of ICT and information management policies which was attributed predominantly to 
a shortage of skills, a lack of e-commerce infrastructure and high expense of internet access 
and connectivity (Moodley, 2001: 96). Alternatively, the medium sized businesses were far 
better able to incorporate ICT into their businesses, using all types of ICT from Microsoft 
Office to internet and websites (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 409-410). Despite integrating ICT 
into their enterprises to a far greater extent than small enterprises in Botswana, the medium 
SMEs still struggled to compete with SMEs from developed countries in international markets 
(Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 410). This was due in part to a lack of e-commerce infrastructure 
within the country as well as a lack of employees with the necessary skills to maintain and 
create interactive websites for the enterprises (Mutula & van Brakel, 2006: 409-410). Although 
Botswana’s medium sized enterprises struggled to compete on a global scale, they remained 
competitive on an African level and continued to incorporate ICT to the best of their ability 
which stood them in good stead going forth from the early 2000s. That Botswana has not only 
encouraged SMEs, but also provided financial aid in order for them to expand and increase 
economic growth and development is evidence that Botswana is supportive of private 
enterprises and the innovation derived from them, which further indicates that its leaders are 
not resistant to innovation and change nor the prospect of creative destruction. 
 
It is evident through Botswana’s encouragement and efforts to develop the ICT, innovation and 
SME sectors that it has continued to view modernisation as important in spite of potential 
disruptions such development can bring. While modernisation and the positive handling of 
creative destruction has long been accepted in Botswana, perhaps the predominant reason for 
the BDP’s promotion and management of creative destruction is due to their innate sense of 
authority. Having won by initially a vast majority and later, by a lesser majority as well as the 
circumstances under which the BDP arose at independence – an entrenched central authority 
of tribe leaders which transferred to Khama at independence – the BDP have felt secure in their 
power and are therefore not threatened by the prospect of creative destruction which is why 
they have encouraged it. The following section will outline the significance of creative 
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destruction in terms of power and will investigate more closely the reasons behind the BDP 
being so encouraging of such creative destruction.  
 
6.4 Significance of Creative Destruction 
 
Creative destruction is a tricky concept and should not be taken lightly. By allowing for change 
and the potential disruption that it brings to society or the economy, leaders are effectively 
putting their position at risk due to the possible upset of the balance of power caused by such 
an upheaval. This is of course, only a risk if the enterprises entering into the country or the 
programmes set up to address technological or any other innovation are separate from the ruling 
party and therefore stand to counter their interests. This section will explore the implications 
of creative destruction, briefly touching on its significance for power dynamics before delving 
into the opposition faced by the BDP and what that means for its handling of creative 
destruction. Subsequently, the section will review the extent to which businesses in Botswana 
pose a threat to the BDP in terms of their power but will conclude that due to a largely weak 
opposition and business connections within the party, creative destruction has not posed as 
great a threat which is why innovation has been so encouraged and creative destruction handled 
so effectively. Finally, the section will muse over the ability of Botswana’s democracy to 
persist if businesses were to support BDP opposition parties.  
 
It is overwhelmingly evident that Botswana has not feared creative destruction nor the 
disruption and societal upheaval that innovation and technological advance can provoke, 
through the multitude of ways in which it has encouraged and, in some instances, aided such 
advances. While Botswana and its leaders have managed creative destruction extremely well, 
this thesis need not underestimate the power of creative destruction and the difficulty it has 
caused for many nations throughout the course of history. Acemoglu and Robinson make the 
power of creative destruction most apparent through the Industrial Revolution which serves as 
a prime example of the magnitude and force of change which innovation and technological 
advancement can induce. Just a few of these consequences being the redundancy of certain 
jobs, the creation of others and with that, increased power to the masses which began to infringe 
upon the power enjoyed by elites and even a limitation placed on monarchs. While it led to 
economic development and growth, it came at a price of a shifting power dynamic within 
society – one which is hard for certain societal and political groups to manage. These changes, 
while often beneficial for the country in the long run, cause great challenges for leaders and it 
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is therefore not difficult to understand why many countries, such as China and Russia, have 
resisted them.  
 
6.4.1 BDP and Opposition 
 
The BDP has been the majority party in Botswana since independence. Its closest rival has 
long been the BNF (Botswana National Front) and other more minor opponents such as the 
BCP (Botswana Congress Party) and the BMD (Botswana Movement for Democracy). The 
liberal democracy in Botswana has been found to place both “demands and constraints on both 
government and opposition parties” due to the vision it assigns to society (Molomo, 2000: 68). 
The first vision is that a level of openness must exist in the democracy in which all parties are 
given a platform to voice their opinions (Molomo, 2000: 68). These parties include the 
opposition as well as civil society, however due to Botswana’s relatively weak civil society, 
opposition parties are required to play an even greater role in addressing issues that would 
otherwise be undertaken by other state organs (Molomo, 2000: 68). However, the issue with 
Botswana’s opposition parties is that they are subject to many internal “expulsions, resignation 
and splits” and have thus had difficulty in forming a strong opposition unit with an alternate 
vision to the BDP (Molomo, 2000: 68). The second vision of liberal democracy is that it “places 
the provision of economic goods beyond the political realm and leaves it to market forces” 
(Molomo, 2000: 68). It is the market which regulates economic activity not the state which 
essentially takes the blame from the state in the event of less than favourable economic 
outcomes. Appreciating this as a factor of Botswana’s democracy, it is one of the many reasons 
the BDP has maintained power despite economic challenges such as poverty and income 
inequality.  
 
Having discussed some basic factors of Botswana’s democracy and opposition parties, it is 
important to understand how the BDP has maintained power in the face of opposition. One 
such tactic undertaken by the BDP was to vocalise the ‘dangers’ of opposition parties taking 
hold in the country. As far back as the mid-1970s, the BDP and the BNF in particular have 
spoken against one another with the BDP presenting a negative view of the BNF and going so 
far as to undermine the party’s legitimacy by insisting that the party was “an insidious threat 
to democracy” (Molomo, 2000: 69). Indeed, even Seretse Khama has been quoted as saying 
that the BNF are a “band of social malcontents” who “wanted political power at all costs” 
without anything to contribute to the country’s development and that any support for the party 
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is the same as “throwing the country to the wolves” (Molomo, 2000: 70). In response, the BNF 
leader accused the BDP of having him followed by the “special branch of police” because he 
“was perceived as an illegal thing” (Molomo, 2000: 70). While this may sound alarming, it is 
important to note that no evidence has been found for such a claim and that the BNF was a 
radical organisation and even made statements admitting that they would go so far as to take 
measures “other than the ballot box to attain state power” (Molomo, 2000: 70). It was believed 
due to the BNF’s radical nature, Botswana under their rule would be characterised by chaos 
and lawlessness with citizens living under constant intimidation (Molomo, 2000: 70). As the 
BNF are yet to take up power, such a statement cannot be substantiated, however, it is likely 
that much of this belief originated from BDP propaganda.  
 
In addition to warning the public about their biggest opposition - rightly or wrongly so - another 
way in which the BDP held onto their power was by banning civil servants from running for 
office. While Botswana allows for free political activity, it does however, place constraints on 
political participation. Civil servants include teachers, police and army personnel, Tswana 
chiefs and the bureaucracy (Molomo, 2000: 76). What such a ruling achieves is the exclusion 
of a large portion of the better educated and eloquent population (Molomo, 2000: 77). This is 
the group of people with the most potential to stand against the BDP or be recruited by 
opposition parties to oppose the BDP, so by excluding them, the BDP has furthered the divide 
between government and state which in turns strengthens the authority of the state.  
 
In spite of the BDP openly criticising their opposition and excluding civil servants from 
entering into politics, the BDP has always allowed opposition parties to hold events and rally 
support. In fact, Botswana’s opposition has been hailed as “old by African standards” given 
that unlike in many African post-colonial countries which banned any opposition outright, 
Botswana has instead allowed them to exist (Lotshwao, 2011: 103). Of course, merely allowing 
the existence of opposition does not make a ruling party democratic, but it must also be noted 
that the BDP have provided sufficient political space for opposition parties to function. The 
only rule laid down by the BDP in this regard, is that party proceedings and campaigns need to 
be carried out in accordance with the law – a fair condition which has only ever resulted in 
fines being imposed at most and no one being criminally charged or thrown into jail for their 




In addition, political events of opposition parties are also required to be monitored and 
recorded. While opposition resist this ruling as they feel it is a form of “undue regulation and 
intimidation”, the BDP feel that as the ruling government it is their responsibility to ensure that 
such events do not result in becoming “arenas for abuse, insults and lawlessness” and similarly, 
recording such events enables opposition to be held accountable for their actions and 
statements (Molomo, 2000: 77). Despite these measures, the BDP has always allowed for the 
existence of opposition groups as well as permitting them to rally and hold political events. 
However, despite being able to exist and rally for support, Botswana’s opposition has long 
been weak in comparison to the BDP. Indeed, one scholar claimed that the only reason why 
the BDP has tolerated its opposition is because the opposition has no chance of winning real 
power (Clapham, 1997: 544). Kenneth Koma, the leader of the BNF, himself has said that 
government only permits the opposition to prosper because it knows they (the opposition) are 
weak and government will crush them if they pose too great a threat to their rule (Molomo, 
2003: 297). Quite simply, it is not difficult to assume that Botswana’s opposition is weak due 
to their lack of impact against the BDP in the first nine consecutive elections after independence 
(Lotshwao, 2011: 103).  
 
There are a number of reasons which have held Botswana’s opposition parties back and serve 
to provide an explanation for their apparent weakness. The first is a lack of funding. Due to the 
country’s expansive and in some locations, challenging terrain, parties require substantial 
funding to reach certain, remote places in order to campaign (Molomo, 2000: 78). 
Alternatively, this is not a problem for the BDP as they have access to government funds in 
addition to receiving external funds, often from foreign entities (Molomo, 2000: 78). A further 
problem experienced by opposition parties is the factions within them and their inability to 
unify. These factions grew especially problematic in the BNF at the time of the 1998 election 
when Koma came under fire for being the “supreme ideologist of the party”, for failing to train 
party members sufficiently and for having “overwhelming authority” which resulted in two 
growing factions within the party, the socialists and the social democrats (Molomo, 2000: 80-
81). Growing factionalism in the party further weakened the BNF as it did in the BDP under 
Mogae and even more so under Khama. Another issue opposition parties have faced was their 
inability to unify. In 1999, Botswana’s opposition parties began to consider the possibility of 
joining forces to increase their power, subsequently forming the Botswana Alliance Movement 
(BAM) (Molomo, 2000: 83). BAM was formed on the premise of opposition parties coming 
together in order to take more political control and “transform our society for the better” due 
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to the BDPs “unwillingness” to address socio-economic issues such as unemployment and 
poverty (Molomo, 2000: 83). Part of BAM, was the BNF, BPP, Botswana Workers Front 
(BWF) and a host of Botswana’s smaller opposition parties which collectively decided that 
instead of a coalition, the parties would retain their individual identity and independence, but 
would combine their resources and “formulate joint strategies for the attainment of state 
power” (Molomo, 2000: 83-84). Given that the parties had similar ideologies and policies, it 
was assumed that the parties would merge to form one formidable force against the BDP, 
however this was not the case and BAM began to unravel fairly quickly.  
 
The first problem was that BAM was an alliance rather than a merger which meant that it had 
no real power against the strong-standing BDP and secondly, it was formed within the BNF 
which came at a great cost to smaller parties who were forced to submit to BNF interests at a 
cost to their own parties (Molomo, 2000: 84). Similarly, the BNF took a leadership position in 
BAM, insisting that members from other parties were only delegates whose input was to “be 
taken as proposals for further discussion” and the internal issues and subsequent splits in the 
BNF proved too much for BAM, as the party then withdrew from the alliance and BAM fell 
apart (Molomo, 2000: 84). Were it not for such an unequal balance of power, disrespect for 
smaller opposition parties and an inclination to form a merger rather than an alliance, it is likely 
that a formidable opposition may have been formed which would have rivalled the BDP. 
However, it is because of a weak opposition that the BDP’s power was not threatened and thus, 
creative destruction comes at little risk to the BDP which is why it has been supported and well 
managed. This can at least be said for the period prior to 2014 as the party comfortably received 
over a 50% majority in elections.  
 
6.4.2 BDP and Businesses 
 
The fact that the BDP has been so obliging and accepting of creative destruction in the country, 
begs the question of whether businesses in Botswana are so closely related to the BDP that 
they do not pose a threat? If businesses are largely controlled or at least, connected to the state, 
then they neither threaten the BDP nor jeopardise the power of the BDP through the innovation 
and creative destruction their practices inspire. This section will analyse the state’s 
involvement in business and conclude that the vast influence of the state in many areas of 
business has also aided in the BDP’s support for creative destruction as most of the innovation 
is at their behest. With regards to business in Botswana, the Botswana Development 
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Corporation (BDC) plays a significant role. The BDC is in control of industrial, commercial 
and state development and provides supervision over projects as well as financial provision 
(Xu, 2018: 44). Essentially, the BDC invests in various ventures by taking on the role as a 
“fund raising institution and a partner” and was created as a way of diversifying the economy 
and encouraging development (Xu, 2018: 44). While in theory the BDC is a positive addition 
to Botswana’s economy, there are a number of issues surrounding its existence and abilities.  
 
Firstly, the BDP is a state-owned corporation which was founded in 1970 and has since been 
led by a board of members, however, these members are appointed by the Minister of Finance 
and Development Planning (Xu, 2018: 44). This means that no matter which way one looks at 
the BDC, there is an unmistakable BDP influence given the close connection of the Minister 
of Finance and Development Planning. Secondly, the BDC is not particularly skilled or 
experienced in the manufacturing sector and does not have a “technology basis and 
management capacity in many mass projects at all” (Xu, 2018: 44). This is one of the reasons, 
quoted by Xu, which he blames for leading to the unsuccessful alliance between the BDC and 
the Shanghai Fengyue Glass Company Limited (FYG) which sought to set up a glass factory 
in Botswana in 2007 (Xu, 2018: 42).  
 
Unfortunately, it is all too often the case that state-owned businesses corporations go hand-in-
hand with corrupt practices. And while Botswana is one of the countries on the lowest side of 
the scale when it comes to corruption, there have been cases of corruption within the BDC. 
This glass factory case is a prime example as not only did the implementation of the project 
continue for three years until 2010 due to internal political struggles associated with the split 
in the BDP due to Ian Khama’s unpopularity (in which previous BDP members formed an 
opposition party, the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD)), but reports about the 
corruption in the BDC surrounding the glass factory project began to surface (Xu, 2018: 45). 
Subsequently, due to these negative reports of BDC corruption in the project, local suppliers 
and departments grew nervous about operating in the project, internal workers became 
increasingly concerned about the state of their employment and by 2011, the project was 
disbanded due to “funding shortages” (Xu, 2018: 45). In this example, it was arguably the 
influence of the state which complicated the establishment of the glass factory and resulted in 
its failure which perhaps would not have been the case were the FYG to have contracted with 




The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was created to prevent just the 
above-mentioned problem. The DCEC is an anti-corruption agency founded in 1994 which 
seeks to eradicate “thefts and frauds perpetuated on the public revenue” (Sebudubudu, 2003: 
125). It is important to note that Botswana “has maintained a relatively good record of 
governance” and has not experienced the kind of corruption that many African countries have 
experienced (Sebudubudu, 2003: 125). Nevertheless, there have been cases of corruption which 
have needed to be addressed – the construction of the glass factory being one of them. 
However, despite the presence of such an agency, the DCEC is government run and is also 
therefore influenced by internal politics as it is near impossible for any government-led agency 
not to be impacted by affairs of state (Sebudubudu, 2003: 134). The DCEC is just a further 
component of the economy in which the BDP is present.  
 
Additionally, the 1982 Presidential Commission on Economic Opportunities has also played a 
role in furthering the extent of BDP involvement in the economy. Prior to the commission, 
civil servants and government ministers were forbidden to take part or invest in business sectors 
except for traditional agriculture (Sebudubudu, 2003: 134). After the establishment of the 1982 
commission, civil servants and ministers were now allowed to participate and invest in 
businesses so long as their interests in such businesses were clearly stated, however, the stating 
of their interests never seemed to materialise (Sebudubudu, 2003: 134). This led to multiple 
cases of corruption as civil servants and ministers became shareholders in private companies 
and formed consortiums. As civil servants had access to confidential information on 
government policies and projects as well as access to ministers, more consortiums and 
syndicates began forming in the late 1980s which resulted in policies of bailing out and wiping 
away debts of the National Development Bank (Sebudubudu, 2003: 134). As has been seen 
time and time again, it is difficult for corruption not to take place when the state is so closely 
associated with business.  
 
It is evident that there is a particularly close relationship between the BDP and business 
enterprises in Botswana. The many commissions such as the Botswana Meat Commission, 
BDC, DCEC and even civil servants and government ministers have close political and 
business ties which in many cases has led to corruption. However, more than that, the 
government of Botswana’s connection to the business sector has enabled the government not 
to be threatened by potential business prospects as members of the state are usually involved 
in such practices and projects and are therefore able to ensure favourable outcomes for the 
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state. While there are private firms and enterprises within the country, the majority of major 
projects are overseen to an extent by the state which is why the BDP have no need to fear losing 
their power because they have a hand in such operations. It is far easier to manage and 
encourage creative destruction when there is no threat of losing power and so perhaps it is this 
combination of a central authority at independence, inclusive institutions and keeping a finger 
in various pies in business which has not only secured the BDP’s power, but also enabled it to 
accept creative destruction willingly.  
 
6.4.3 Would Botswana’s Democracy Cope if the BDP were to be Ousted from Power? 
 
What would become of the country’s democracy if business enterprises in Botswana were to 
withdraw their support for the BDP and place it in one of their opposition parties? An 
interesting question with no concrete answer as yet, however, due to Ian Khama’s authoritarian 
tendencies and subsequent split from the BDP, it is a question which might be answered sooner 
than expected. Indeed, if these authoritarian tendencies are set to continue under President 
Masisi and a crackdown on industry and personal freedoms persists, then it is a very real 
possibility that the country’s highly hailed democracy may be set to derail even under a BDP 
ruled Botswana. While this is a possibility, it does however, remain unlikely that the very 
structure of democracy will be undermined given how deeply entrenched Seretse Khama’s 
ideals of democracy are. In addition to these ideals, it is unlikely that a more authoritarian 
regime would be conducive to trade and may impact diamond revenue negatively – an impact 
likely to be avoided at all costs due to the country’s reliance on the revenue. Therefore, even if 
the tendencies of leaders became more authoritarian in nature while the BDP is still in power, 
it is unlikely that the very democratic structure of the country will be hindered, given the 
country’s dependence on trade and diamond revenue.  
 
Alternatively, if the BDP were not to be in power and an opposition party were to take over, 
the fate of Botswana’s democracy may be in a different position. Some of the BDP’s closest 
rivals, the BNF and the BCP identify with more socialist ideology which may not bode well 
for Botswana’s economic sector. During the years of the cold war, the BNF had an instilled 
socialist policy, however, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the party amended its policies and 
assumed a Socialist Democratic Programme (SDP) which accepted the “role of the private 
sector in economic development in contrast to its earlier position that was based on state 
centralism” (Molomo, 2000: 71). Prior to the end of the cold war, the BNF was an ardent 
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supporter of nationalising private property and sharing property and cattle – a thought which 
was most upsetting to the majority of citizens at the time (Molomo, 2000: 71). Although the 
BNF now advocate for a degree of free market capitalism, they also believe that the state should 
equally distribute financial resources (Molomo, 2000: 71). Similarly, the BCP believed in a 
“broad social democratic movement” insisting that a balance between a free market and state 
economic involvement should be achieved in order for the state to intervene in the economy 
and provide economic “redistributive justice and equalising opportunities” (Molomo, 2000: 
71).  
 
It would be interesting to see how Botswana’s democracy would stand if businesses were to 
revoke their support for the BDP and choose to support one of Botswana’s other, more 
socialist-inclined parties to take power. It also makes one curious as to whether these parties 
would have a great enough degree of centalised authority to rule as effectively and with the 
same degree of legitimacy and autonomy as the BDP does, given that they have not had the 
same foundations as the BDP. Ultimately, Botswana’s democracy is relatively strong and 
would in theory have sufficient strength to withstand a withdrawal of BDP support by 
businesses and change in political power. Creative destruction is significant because it can lead 
to an upset in the balance of power as well as social and economic upheaval which can have a 
substantial impact on the ruling party. From this section, it is evident that the BDP have been 
supportive and encouraging of all forms of creative destruction, however, this acceptance and 
effective management of creative destruction is due to a number of factors.  
 
Due to the majority of opposition parties being weak in nature and unable to unify, they do not 
pose as great a threat to the BDP’s power which gives them more security in accepting creative 
destruction as even if it upsets the power balance to a degree, it is unlikely to be significant 
enough for the BDP to be displaced from power. Secondly, the BDP’s close connection to 
several major business corporations and commissions, means that they have a degree of control 
over the innovation and creative destruction which is resulting from investment and new 
business ventures and thus are not afraid of the potential disruption that could bring seeing as 
they are involved. However, in the event that businesses were to switch their support from the 
BDP to an opposition party, it would likely cause upset to the current political atmosphere, but 
because of the strength of Botswana’s long-entrenched democracy, it is relatively safe to say 




6.5 Inclusive Institutions and Creative Destruction 
 
The impact of inclusive institutions on creative destruction is instrumental. Essentially, it is 
due to inclusive institutions that creative destruction has been managed well in Botswana. This 
is because the embeddedness of inclusive institutions at the time of Botswana’s independence 
resulted in the country becoming a coherent state with a cohesive central authority which was 
able to effectively handle the discovery of diamonds and the potential disruption with which 
such a discovery comes. It was this discovery which was not only potentially destructive in 
itself, but also had the potential to cause further creative destruction as revenue from diamonds 
has been used for investment in innovation and technological advancement. But due to 
inclusive institutions being entrenched in the country, both diamonds and the creative 
destruction from which diamonds derived, have been effectively managed.  
 
It is also due in part to the degree of centralised authority under which the BDP rose to power 
at independence. A strong majority that the BDP government has enjoyed since independence 
has enabled it to be less concerned over holding onto a tight grip of power and more open to 
empowering citizens with knowledge, skills and economic freedom, because the economic and 
societal prowess earned by others does not impact the overall power held by Botswana’s 
leaders. Such competent management of creative destruction derives from a history of inclusive 
political and economic institutions which have created an environment in which citizens are 
able to better their social and economic status through acquiring skills and hard work. Since 
inclusive institutions and therefore, this type of culture has always been in place in Botswana, 
it is possible that creative destruction and innovation does not afford citizens different 
opportunities to what they already had, which is why leaders are neither resistant nor fearful of 
the changes creative destruction can incite. Having a weak opposition as well as connections 
to the business sector also makes the BDP less fearful of the potential upheaval of creative 
destruction. Given that the country has a long history of supporting and encouraging creative 
destruction, it is likely that they will continue to accept and manage it effectively, however, 
this statement is most probably only true of a BDP-led government – there is no saying at this 
point in time how one of the BDP’s opposition parties may handle creative destruction if they 
were to take office. Thoughts of the future aside, it is vital to acknowledge that there is an 
undeniable link between inclusive institutions and the management of creative destruction and 
that due to their effective handling of diamonds and the creative destruction which that brought, 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
Botswana was able to successfully avoid any resource curse-like symptoms which may have 
arisen.  
 
6.6 Challenges in Botswana  
 
While creative destruction has been handled in a positive manner and has largely benefited 
Botswana by way of societal and economic innovation, modernisation and development, it 
would be erroneous not to provide a comprehensive overview of the country’s situation by 
ignoring that there are issues which the country should urgently be addressing. These are 
HIV/AIDS, income inequality and unemployment and will be discussed below.  
 
6.6.1 HIV/AIDS  
 
One current issue which has been a challenge for Botswana for a few decades is the prevalence 
of HIV/AIDS. It is the fourth country in the world most affected by HIV/AIDS, impacting over 
20% of the population and despite being the “first country in the region to provide universal 
free antiretroviral treatment to people living with HIV”, it is acknowledged that this approach 
is not as effective as it could be (Avert, 2020). Successful antiretroviral provision is 
overshadowed by a lack of testing and education about HIV as prevention programmes reach 
only half the number of people who are most at risk and a withdrawal of funding by 
international patrons jeopardises the programme (Avert, 2020).  
 
HIV/AIDS was a problematic issue for Masire too, as he is widely criticised for failing to 
adequately address it as well as his inability to implement policies or set measures in place 
(Green, 2017). While HIV/AIDS is an extremely difficult and sensitive issue to address, it is a 
known fact that labour and mining migration (which characterises much of Botswana’s 
workforce) are factors with a particularly strong likelihood of spreading ailments such as 
HIV/AIDS (Green, 2017). With this in mind, it was irresponsible of Masire to remain quiet on 
this issue. However, despite the difficulty of such an issue, Botswana has put in place two five-
year strategies to address the issue in the hopes of ending “the AIDS epidemic as a public health 






6.6.2 Income Inequality  
 
Another challenge which also concerns a lack of discussion is the level of income inequality 
which still plagues the country to this day (Green, 2017). Despite Botswana’s vast diamond 
wealth, it remains a largely unequal society in terms of income and due to a lack of address 
and discussion by past presidents, little has changed regarding such inequality up until recently. 
Despite boasting one of the highest GDP per capitas in Africa, Botswana stands as the third 
most unequal country in the world (The World Bank, 2015a). Botswana’s gini-coefficient sits 
at 60.5% and unfortunately, a great many citizens “live just marginally above the poverty line 
and are at risk of falling back into poverty” (The World Bank, 2015a).  
 
While these are less than encouraging statistics, the progress that Botswana has made regarding 
income inequality should not be overlooked. The National Development Plan and government 
subsidies have significantly tackled the country’s poverty, taking the gini-coefficient down 
from 64.7% and decreasing the poverty rate by 19.4% - 87% of this decrease coming from 
poverty reduction in rural Botswana (The World Bank, 2015b). Perhaps with discussion as far 
back as the 1980s, or measures put in place or attempts to diversify the economy and address 
the issue of inequality, such high levels of income inequality may not characterise the country 
to this day. However, despite the negative facts, Botswana is still making progress in their fight 
against inequality. 
 
6.6.3 Diamond Industry and Unemployment 
 
The diamond industry is the largest economic sector in Botswana, yet it contributes the least to 
employment. This is vastly problematic for Botswana as it has left the country with a significant 
unemployment rate which in turn has contributed to income inequality. The diamond industry 
contributes 20% of Botswana’s GDP, yet contributes only 5% of the country’s employment 
and alternatively, the agricultural sector contributes less than 5% of GDP, yet contributes to 
30% of the country’s employment (High Unemployment in Botswana, 2015).  
 
This is because diamond mining is capital-intensive and requires little labour, so no meaningful 
impact has been made on the employment rate and has therefore not seen substantial growth in 
employment within the formal economy (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263). This in turn, has 
had repercussions on the level of poverty and income inequality within the country as the 
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unemployment rate has remained high. Despite Botswana’s thriving diamond-based economy, 
the inequality is irrefutable as evidenced by the fact that below a quarter of Botswana’s 
workforce are employed formally, and by the turn of the century, 47% of their population 
earned below the poverty line (Taylor & Mokhawa, 2003: 263). 
 
There is a disconnect in Botswana between economic growth and employment. This needs to 
be rectified by focusing on the employment of youth as well as a shift in employment away 
from low income, low productivity subsistence sectors to high pay and high productivity 
sectors (High Unemployment in Botswana, 2015). In recent times, the government has sought 
to implement strategies outlined in the National Development Plan and “Vision 2016” which 
seek to further employment opportunities (Siphambe, 2007: 12). However, substantial 
evidence of unemployment reduction is yet to be seen.  
 
It is an incorrect assumption to say that Botswana is without problems, as evidenced by their 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, high levels of income inequality and unemployment levels. The 
presidents of the past too dealt with challenges such as droughts and poverty alleviation to 
name a few and perhaps the effective manner in which they were able to deal with those 
challenges was a result of sufficient centralised authority and inclusive institutions. But it must 
also be acknowledged that problems being faced in contemporary Botswana are not new 
phenomenons, but rather issues that post-colonial leaders too, struggled to contend with. It 
therefore would be incorrect to assume that inclusive institutions and centralised authority were 
the only factors necessary to manage conflicts and that contemporary leaders in Botswana, 
despite a lack of completely centralised authority and totally inclusive institutions are trying to 
tackle them as best they can as seen by the multiple policies and programmes which have been 
adopted to address such issues. This is not to say that a centralised authority and inclusive 
institutions are not vital aspects for the efficient and successful functioning of society, but only 
that they are less important when it comes to addressing conflicts.  
 
The above challenges which the country has faced for the last few decades are not unique to 
Botswana and by nature, are extremely difficult to resolve which could take years if not decades 
to completely eradicate. In spite of these issues, it is important to observe Botswana from a 
bigger picture and recognise that while it is not a perfect country, it has many exceptional 
qualities which have made it the stable, democratic, economically flourishing country that it is 
today. The discovery of diamonds has been handled remarkably well and has led to much 
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economic growth and development and despite these problems, Botswana has been largely 





Due to the significant degree of state centralisation and embedded inclusive institutions by way 
of rules and property rights, foundations were laid for the emergence of a strong, coherent 
authority in the form of the BDP. It is due to the BDP’s legitimacy, strength and central 
command that they were able to effectively handle the discovery of diamonds and the revenue 
which accrued from them. This revenue as well as the coherent nature of the state and historical 
inclination to encourage creative destruction resulted in Botswana’s investment of diamond 
revenue in ICT, knowledge innovation, SMEs, infrastructure and social development 
programmes – all of which could have had the potential to cause social and economic upheaval. 
However, the results of such innovation and investment in infrastructure and development has 
not been negative nor has it disrupted sectors within Botswana. This is due to the embedded 
inclusive institutions and effective management of such creative destruction by the BDP which 
was in a good position for such management largely due to their degree of centralised authority, 
enabling them to be secure in their power and therefore not threatened by creative destruction. 
In addition, it must be acknowledged that while their centralised autonomy plays a significant 
role, they too have ensured that BDP members are closely associated to businesses and 
economic commissions in the country which coupled with a weak opposition, has placed them 
in a favourable position, able to control the direction of creative destruction as well as not 
having their position of power threatened by it. This being said, the BDP have slowly begun to 
lose their outright majority in recent years, which means that this security in their power may 
not prevail for decades to come which may pose a threat to Botswana’s acceptance and 
handling of creative destruction in the future. Ultimately, the cohesion of the state coupled with 
inclusive institutions enabled diamonds to be managed successfully, avoiding a resource curse 
which has in turn led to diamond income being used effectively and to the benefit of Botswana 








7.1 Introduction  
 
Few would refute that Botswana is the “sparkling diamond” of Africa and that the country’s 
diamond resources have been a blessing rather than a curse. This thesis has sought to explore 
how Botswana was able to escape the clutches of the resource curse, highlighting a number of 
factors which existed at the time of independence which ultimately enabled for stable BDP rule 
and effective management of the discovery of diamonds. This chapter will outline the aim and 
objectives of this research, followed by the findings in relation to the resource curse literature, 
the reflections and importance of such a study and lastly, areas for future research on Botswana 
and the resource curse. 
 




The resource curse has dominated resource literature for the last four decades and has cast a 
negative shadow over the effect of resources on resource-abundant countries. This thesis 
therefore considered a case study which contrasts such a stance and sought to determine the 
reasons why Botswana escaped a potential resource curse. To achieve this, research has been 
conducted over three periods in Botswana – pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial – 
analysing how the pre-colonial institutions and ethnic Tswana structures survived due to 
limited colonial influence and consequently laid the foundations for a central authority to 





7.2.2.1 Objective 1: Determine if Botswana has Inclusive or Extractive Institutions 
 
The quality or nature of a country’s institutions is a good indicator of how a country will 
manage resources and their discovery. In order to determine this, the thesis examined two 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 142 
factors: Botswana’s degree of state centralisation and the enforcement of rules and property 
rights in Botswana. 
 
7.2.2.1.1 Is Botswana a Centralised State? 
 
State centralisation follows Acemoglu and Robinson’s definition, referring to the capacity of 
the state to effectively penetrate society and enforce rules and laws without having significant 
rivals to challenge their authority. As has been highlighted, according to Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s description of inclusive institutions, state centralisation is a vital aspect as 
institutions cannot be fully inclusive without this factor. It is therefore imperative that the 
degree of state centralisation was explored in Botswana.  
 
After examining the three periods of Botswana’s recent history, it was discovered that there 
was a significant degree of state centralisation in each. In the pre-colonial period, tribes were 
centred around a chief who had overarching authority, exerting control over rules and property 
rights, presided over the kgotla and managed tribal affairs. This sort of state centralisation was 
respected and entrenched in the culture of the Tswana which is why such a power dynamic was 
able to withstand colonial rule. Indeed, colonial rule saw the introduction of British authorities 
into the territory, yet the role of chiefs remained in place and altered only by way of chiefs now 
having to work under such authorities, implementing various policies such as hut and native 
taxes. Due to the persistence of the core structure of chiefs and villagers, in addition to the 
embeddedness of such a structure in Tswana culture, the BDP was able to emerge at 
independence under the leadership of Seretse Khama (who had a great sense of legitimacy due 
to his Bamangwato chiefdom lineage) as a centralised authority.  
 
Botswana’s position as a centralised state has been somewhat compromised in recent years by 
the BDP losing their outright majority, however, BDP opposition remains relatively weak in 
comparison and the BDP’s actions to separate government and state by way of inhibiting civil 
servants running for office has ensured that power is centralised in the BDP and that they 







7.2.2.1.2 Does Botswana Enforce the Rule of Law and Property Rights? 
 
Following Acemoglu and Robinson’s arguments, it is impossible for a country to have 
inclusive institutions without enforcing rule of law and property rights. After examining the 
three periods in Botswana’s history, it is evident that rules and property rights have not only 
been embedded in their history and culture but continue to be enforced today. In the pre-
colonial period the chief decided on justice and ruled over the kgotla, implementing judgement 
where necessary – his ruling having ultimate authority due to his legitimate centralised power. 
While land was communal, secure property rights extended so far as houses and cattle and later 
expanded to wells and boreholes. The enforcement of property rights encouraged inter-tribal 
and international trade leading to an advanced cash economy. While social and economic life 
changed dramatically in the colonial period due to migration, urbanisation and employment 
opportunities in neighbouring South Africa, the enforcement of rules and property rights 
remained untouched which is why Botswana emerged at independence with more inclusive 
institutions.  
 
Since independence, Botswana has had a strong constitution and legal system and has been 
able to enforce policies with more than enough authority. Likewise, property rights have 
continued to be enforced and economic participation and activities have been incentivised as 
evidenced by Botswana’s trade and industry 
 
7.2.2.2 Objective 2: How Has Botswana Dealt with the Discovery of Diamonds and the 
Creative Destruction Which it Brought? 
 
This thesis found that the significant degree of state centralisation with which the BDP was 
able to emerge at independence combined with the inclusive institutions that are entrenched in 
Tswana culture, survived the colonial period and emerged at independence to lay the 
foundations for the successful rise of the BDP, enabling the party to manage the discovery of 
diamonds which took place shortly after they came to power.   
 
A number of actions taken by the BDP in relation to diamonds indicate that diamonds were 
handled effectively. The first was the implementation of sub-soil mineral rights which altered 
the law stating that the tribal land within which resources were discovered entitled that tribe to 
ownership of those resources. This was changed and ensured that no one tribe had ownership 
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of resources, but rather that all resources in Botswana belonged to the state. Additionally, the 
BDP decided to partner with De Beers as they were more knowledgeable on diamond resources 
and aided substantially in the building up of the diamond sector. The BDP also decided that 
diamond revenue was to be used for further investment in and development of infrastructure in 
the country which has been of significant benefit for all citizens. 
 
However, with this investment and development comes the potential and risk for creative 
destruction. Creative destruction or a societal or economic upheaval could have taken place in 
response to this investment or the building up of SMEs, knowledge and innovation and 
technological advancement which has occurred in recent years but because the BDP has 
handled it effectively, little disruption has been experienced.  
 
Overall, diamonds have allowed Botswana to diversify their economy by way of creating 
demand for infrastructure development and improvement, manufacturing, knowledge 
production, broadening the technological sector and introduction into various business sectors 
through a multitude of SMEs. While these sectors have diversified Botswana’s economy to an 
extent, it can also be argued that they have not diversified it to a significant enough degree 
because diamonds have remained Botswana’s biggest economic sector and there is still a high 
level of unemployment. However, with a diamond sector as large as Botswana’s, it is difficult 
for any other sector to rival it.  
 
7.2.2.3 Objective 3: In What Way is it Evident that Botswana Escaped the Resource 
Curse? 
 
It is evident that Botswana has escaped the resource curse by way of several factors. Some such 
factors include the contribution of diamond revenue to vast increases in GDP, the infrastructure 
and development as mentioned above which has particularly improved public infrastructure, 
schools, access to healthcare and drinking water. Furthermore, Botswana has low levels of 
corruption and little elite involvement in the diamond sector as well as stability – for which it 
is well-known – and democracy. Lastly, the country is peaceful, without conflict and has 
inclusive political and economic institutions. All of these factors are not characteristic of 
countries who suffer from the resource curse and are frankly, quite the opposite which 




Undeniably, Botswana does face challenges such as widespread HIV/AIDS, income inequality 
and poverty. While some of these challenges are typically associated with the resource curse, 
these issues are not a direct result of having diamonds. It could be argued that an undiversified 
economy could be linked to the large scale of the diamond industry, however, much of 
Botswana is arid land and the country is nowhere near as rich in other minerals as it is in 
diamonds, so even if they did not have diamonds, it is unlikely that their economy would be 
diversified. Poverty, income inequality and the HIV/AIDS epidemic are not a result of 
diamonds and would potentially be even worse were it not for diamonds and the revenue which 
allows Botswana to attempt to solve such issues.  
 
7.3 Findings in Relation to the Literature 
 
7.3.1 How the Findings Relate to Pre-1980s Discourse 
 
These findings are more in line with pre-1980s resource discourse which views resources as 
being a blessing for the country. Using examples such as the US, UK or Australia, it is evident 
that resources have benefited those countries leading to growth, development and prosperity. 
Although using these country cases, which also have relatively strong institutions, confirms 
the institutional approach which came later in resource curse literature. This thesis has found 
diamonds to have the same, beneficial impact in Botswana as seen by GDP growth, 
infrastructural development, trade and investment and similarly to pre-1980s discourse, is a 
blessing. 
 
7.3.2 Botswana Defies Post-1980s Discourse  
 
In relation to the aforementioned point, by Botswana’s resources being a blessing, they contrast 
the now commonly held, post-1980s resource discourse which states that resources have 
negative impacts such as poverty, corruption, conflict, mismanagement of industry and the 
Dutch Disease. As this thesis has shown, Botswana stands in stark contrast to such a theory. 
However, this is not to dispute the resource curse as invalid, but rather to acknowledge that the 
resource curse is circumstantial and that due to a number of unique factors in Botswana, it has 
not experienced the resource curse. These factors include limited colonial rule which meant 
Botswana was able to avoid inheriting extractive institutions, the fact that diamonds were 
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discovered after independence, the Tswana are largely homogenous and the type of diamonds 
that Botswana has are fortunate as they do not lend themselves to looting.  
 
7.3.3 Resources Lead to Poor Economic Performance 
 
One of the main three reasons as to why resources are negative is because it is believed and 
has been observed to result in low economic performance. This is linked to looting, 
mismanagement and corruption which tends to come with countries abundant in resources. 
However, in Botswana this is not the case and diamonds have undeniably benefited their 
economy, as evidenced by exponential economic development, GDP growth, increased exports 
and investment which has been able to take place due to diamond revenue.  
 
7.3.4 Resources Lead to Conflict  
 
Resource curse literature agrees that in many case, resource-abundant countries are more likely 
to experience conflict and civil war as a result of their resources. Again, Botswana contradicts 
such literature, however, this is due to its unique factors such as the type of diamonds not 
lending themselves to looting and the largely ethnically homogenous tribes of Botswana which 
have many similarities such as language and religion and have not seen one another as a source 
for conflict.  
 
7.3.5 Resources Lead to Political Instability and a Tendency Toward Authoritarianism  
 
A substantial portion of resource curse literature considers the negative impact of resources on 
political stability and a tendency away from democracy. This is because resources raise the 
value of being in power which translates into leaders doing everything possible to hold onto 
their authority, leading to corruption, underhanded politics and illegal obliteration of 
opposition which are authoritarian practices which cause political instability. This has 
however, not been the case in Botswana, as leaders such as Seretse Khama and those who 
succeeded him have a deep-seated appreciation for democracy and have not used diamond 
revenue for their own personal gain, evidenced too by Botswana’s elite’s lack of involvement 
in the sector. This upholding of democratic values comes from the emergence of a central 
authority at independence and an embedded sense of enforcing such authority of the Tswana 




It must be acknowledged that democratic practices have waned slightly in the most recent 
period, however, this is not due to diamonds, as if it were because of diamonds, it would have 
taken place decades earlier.  
 
7.3.6 A Modern Notion of the Resource Curse 
 
The resource curse in modern literature has come to encompass any and all negative aspects 
that result from a country having resources. Although Botswana’s economy could be more 
diversified, and the diamond industry does not create much employment, diamonds have 
ultimately benefited the country as there is no other industry significant enough to take 
attention away from diamond mining in any case. Subsequently, Botswana’s other biggest issue 
– HIV/AIDS – is not a direct cause from diamonds and cannot be attributed as such. 
Effectively, Botswana’s benefit form diamonds has far outweighed the challenge of an 
undiversified economy, which in any case, cannot be credited to diamonds alone. Not only 
does Botswana dispute 1980s resource curse discourse, but also modern literature on resource 
curse theory. 
 
7.3.7 Resources and Institutions 
 
These findings on Botswana align far more closely with an alternate school of work on resource 
curse theory – the “institutions curse” as outlined by Menaldo. Scholars of institutions curse 
theory argue that it is the nature or quality of a country’s institutions which determine whether 
or not resources in that country will have a positive or negative effect and not purely the 
existence of the resources themselves (Menaldo, 2016). This thesis finds that Botswana 
complements this field of literature as it is due to good, inclusive institutions as evidenced by 
a centralised authority and the enforcement of rules and property rights which established a 
situation in which the BDP could manage diamonds well, thereby avoiding the resource curse. 
 
7.3.8 Final Remarks  
 
These findings on Botswana complement pre-1980s resource literature, while contrasting the 
commonly held view of resources post-1980. However, while these findings do not dispute 
such literature, they indicate that due to Botswana’s unique circumstances, it was in a very 
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different position to the majority of other resource-abundant countries which have fallen victim 
to the resource curse. Alternatively, these findings complement another field of resource curse 
literature, the institutions curse.  
 
7.4 Reflections and Importance of Study 
 
7.4.1 These Findings Dispel the Resource Curse as the “Common” Thought 
 
While these findings do not dispute that the resource curse exists and is a very real and 
damaging reality for a multitude of resource-abundant countries, it does dispel the notion that 
it is always a resource curse which is afflicting a resource-abundant country. Botswana 
therefore rivals the notion that any country with resources will fall victim to the resource curse 
as the fate of a resource-abundant country lies in its particular circumstances as these findings 
have indicated. Although these circumstances can be classified as unique, Botswana is not the 
only country to escape the resource curse, it is more simply that Botswana’s circumstances are 
unique in comparison to the majority of resource-abundant countries, especially in Africa. 
Another case with similarities to Botswana is Ghana, which is also hailed for its economic 
prosperity in West Africa and is similar by way of also being a former British territory and 
having resources of gold and diamonds. Where Ghana is different, is in the timing of their 
resource discovery, as it took place long before independence in the late nineteenth century. 
While, Ghana does not have the exact same circumstances as Botswana, it is testament to the 
fact that resources do not always result in a curse and even though a great many resource-
abundant countries, unfortunately do, the notion that resources are harmful should not always 
be the common notion when analysing a resource-rich country.  
 
7.4.2 These Findings Give Support to Institutional Theory 
 
These findings may force scholars to focus more on the possibility of the negative impacts of 
resources being an institutions curse rather than a resource curse and may prompt future 
scholars into exploring this possibility in far more depth which could have an important impact 
on the future of resource curse literature and study. This may also bring further focus on 
institutions in general as these findings have attempted to highlight the importance of inclusive 
institutions in all aspects of a country, not only in relation to resources. This may result in 
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scholars examining and emphasising the importance of institutions which may translate into 
countries giving them more attention than they do currently.  
 
7.4.3 These Finding are Important Because Botswana is at a Turning Point 
 
This thesis has indicated that Botswana began to change from the time that Ian Khama 
succeeded Mogae as president and not a change for the better as seen by increases in 
factionalism, a strengthened opposition and authoritarian tendencies. Botswana is currently a 
democracy, however there are authoritarian-like tendencies which have begun to creep in. 
Therefore, if the factors of Botswana’s success can be highlighted and if Botswana can 
recognise the importance of institutions and democracy in its success, then it still has time to 
prevent authoritarianism from taking hold any further, thereby preventing any potential 
resource curse symptoms in the future.  
 
7.5 Areas for Future Research 
 
7.5.1 Investigate Other Countries Which Escaped the Resource Curse 
 
Future research could analyse the institutions of other resource-abundant countries such as 
Ghana or Canada which have successfully avoided the resource curse in order to identify any 
different or further factors which have contributed to such an outcome. This could help scholars 
pinpoint an even more focused list of factors or circumstances which enable countries to escape 
the resource curse. 
 
7.5.2 Further Research Contemporary Botswana 
 
Future research could evaluate contemporary Botswana, examining the extent to which 
Masisi’s rule is democratic, analysing the impact of his rule on institutions and the effect he 
has on either further cementing democracy or authoritarian tendencies and ultimately 






7.5.3 Investigate Why Tswana Institutions Were So Inclusive 
 
Future research could also focus on why Tswana institutions were so much more inclusive 
than the political and economic institutions of other African tribes, such as the Zulu for 
example. A comparative analysis of tribal institutions and current institutions of African 
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